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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains three chapters that study contracting problems associated
with corporate financing. Below are the individual abstracts for each chapter.
Chapter 1: How Are Venture Capitalists Rewarded? The Economics of Venture Capital
Partnerships
We propose a simple model showing how investors, venture capitalists (VCs), and
entrepreneurs form venture capital funds (VCFs). Investors’ demand for VC services depends
on their beliefs about the accuracy of VC screening and their expected revenue without
the VC. The quality of screening depends on VCs’ information, incentives, and expected
profits. Our model characterizes equilibrium prices that VCs charge for their services and
the individual payoff schedules of VCs and investors as function of project cash flows. We
calibrate the model using data from existing empirical studies and find results that match the
management fees charged by real-world VCs and the returns observed in the industry. Our
analysis provides new insights into VC–investor partnerships and suggests that the services
provided by VCs improve financing efficiency and capital formation over the business cycle.
Chapter 2: Credit Default Swaps, Firm Financing and the Economy
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are thought to ease borrowing by protecting lenders
against default. These contracts, however, entail a potential drawback: the “empty credi-
tor” problem. This problem arises when creditors buy CDS insurance in excess of default
renegotiation proceeds. CDS-overinsured lenders may oppose out-of-court restructuring of
distressed firms, forcing them into bankruptcy even when continuation would be optimal.
This paper develops a model of the demand for CDS when investment is subject to moral haz-
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ard and verification is imperfect. We show that when the probability of investment success
is high, CDS overinsurance allows for greater financing of firms with positive NPV projects.
When investments are more likely to fail, CDS overinsurance triggers the early liquidation
of firms with low continuation values, but it does not have the same effect on firms with
high continuation values. The model reconciles empirical evidence showing that CDSs are
most beneficial for firms that are safer and have higher continuation values. Despite the role
played by CDSs in high profile bankruptcies during the financial crisis, we show that the
empty creditor problem is procyclical (less pronounced in bad times). Our paper provides
new insights on the growth of CDS markets in the early 2000s and on the optimal regulation
of CDSs following the 2008–9 crisis.
Chapter 3: Optimal Financing with CDS Markets
One could argue that CDSs improve risk sharing, hence credit supply and financing
terms for firms. Accordingly, one would expect risky borrowers to benefit the most from
CDS insurance. This is in contrast, however, with recent empirical evidence (Ashcraft and
Santos (2009) and Hirtle (2009)). This paper develops a model examining optimal financ-
ing policies in the presence of CDSs when competitive lenders have different exposures to
borrowers’ risk. The model shows that the existence of CDSs benefits safe borrowers and
harms risky ones. Following financing, the probability of a “credit event” (default following
borrowers’ failure to renegotiate out-of-court) is determined endogenously in a global-game
setup with heterogenous payoffs. Lenders with greater risk exposure contribute to a higher
probability of default and lenders that receive a higher weight in the financing process are
more influential in determining renegotiation outcomes. Prior to financing, lenders with
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higher risk exposure benefit the most from CDS insurance and allow for reduced repayments
— increasing borrowers’ surplus in the absence of distress. Riskier (safer) borrowers finance
more heavily with lenders that have lower (higher) exposure; lenders, in turn, insure less
(more) often and the probability of default given distress is lower (higher). The model sheds
light on the liquidity of CDSs across risk-differentiated borrowers and allows for proposals
that improve the welfare of market participants.
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Chapter 1
How Are Venture Capitalists
Rewarded? The Economics of
Venture Capital Partnerships
1.1 Introduction
Venture capital financing is a fast-growing segment of the capital markets landscape. In
2008 alone, venture-backed companies accounted for 12 million jobs in the U.S. (11% of
all private sector employment) and nearly $3 trillion in gross revenues (21% of the GDP).1
Despite their importance, relatively little is known about how venture capital funds emerge,
how they set their payoff structures, and whether they contribute to the overall efficiency of
capital allocation. Recent empirical studies provide key insights into the world of venture
capitalists (e.g., Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Puri and Zarutskie (2008), and Metrick and
Yasuda (2010)), but theoretical research lags in providing a framework that rationalizes and
integrates existing findings on venture capital activity.
VC-financing often brings together young entrepreneurial firms and investors with limited
1See Global Insight (2009) for additional statistics about the venture capital industry.
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project-specific expertise. Rather than investing directly in those firms, investors form part-
nerships with agents believed to have some expertise (venture capitalists) through venture
capital funds (Sahlman (1990)).2 VCs screen companies and report on the value potential
and progress of multiple ventures. A typical VCF makes investments in several stages, with
ventures often abandoned when initial returns are low (Barry (1994) and Puri and Zarutskie
(2008)). During the life of the VCF, the VC commonly contributes to a small fraction of the
fund (around 1%) and receives an annual management fee of 1.5% to 2.5% of the committed
capital (Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Metrick and Yasuda (2010)). In addition to the
fixed compensation, the VC receives a variable portion that depends on the realized profit of
the investment. It has become practice to reward VCs with 20% of the profits of successful
ventures (“carried interest”) through the IPO process (see Gompers and Lerner (1999)).
While relatively well documented, many questions arise about the set of economic rela-
tions and payoffs that characterize venture capital partnerships. For example, under what
conditions are investors willing to pay for the services VCs provide? How accurate is the
information contained in the reports VCs give to investors? What explains the observed
reward structures in the VC industry? Can VCF arrangements contribute to capital market
efficiency?
This paper tackles those questions by characterizing conditions under which VC–investor
partnerships emerge. VCs are special to the extent that they may be in a better position
to evaluate project quality and determine whether entrepreneurs are knowledgeable about
2According to the National Venture Capital Association, VCs tend to specialize in industries in which
they have years of prior experience (VCs are oftentimes former entrepreneurs in those industries). See also
Bottazzi et al. (2008).
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their projects. Because VCs’ information can increase expected gains from project funding,
investors are willing to pay for screening so long as VC reports are sufficiently accurate. In
exchange, VCs charge investors part of the economic surplus generated by screening. We for-
malize equilibrium conditions under which VCs increase the probability that good projects
are financed and reduce the probability that bad projects receive funding. We also describe
the payoff schedules of VCs and investors under the VCF partnership. To our knowledge,
this is the first study to model interactions between investors, VCs, and entrepreneurs in a
single framework. It is also the first study to jointly characterize the conditions for emergence
of VCFs, the payoffs of the various participants of VCFs, and the efficiency of VC financing.
Let us discuss the intuition underlying our model. We consider a setting in which in-
vestors are uninformed about the quality of any specific projects, while entrepreneurs may
be either informed or uninformed about project quality. Investors can either finance en-
trepreneurs directly (uninformed financing) or pay VCs for project screening. Under direct
financing, investors may charge a uniform price. If investors offer entrepreneurs contracts
requiring high returns, only informed entrepreneurs with good projects will accept the offer.
If investors require low returns, then entrepreneurs of all types will accept direct financing.
If it is optimal to demand high returns, uninformed entrepreneurs with good projects will
not be financed. If it is optimal to demand low returns, then bad projects will be financed
and investors lose rents from informed entrepreneurs with good projects.
Under indirect financing, VCs may increase investors’ expected payoffs by screening en-
trepreneurs and helping identify good projects. In particular, the reports provided by VCs
may help synchronize the beliefs of investors and entrepreneurs about project quality. This
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increases the willingness of entrepreneurs with good projects to accept contracts that de-
mand high returns, increasing investors’ expected payoffs. Investors pay for VC services to
the extent that reports reflect information gleaned through the screening process. Impor-
tantly, however, VC reports may be less than accurate, depending on VCs’ incentives and
knowledge about projects and entrepreneurs.
In solving this problem, we use the concept of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Under this
concept, sequential rationality implies that VC reports maximize the probability of higher
rounds of financing so as to generate higher levels of compensation through carried interest.
Accordingly, on the margin, VCs might want to produce optimistic reports on the projects
in their portfolios, even when those projects are relatively unattractive from investors’ per-
spective. Importantly, however, VCs only receive the carried interest after the initial rounds
of financing prove to be successful. As such, if VCs believe that the pool of projects under
consideration is of high quality, the gains associated with misreporting are small. On the
flip side, if VCs believe that projects are of intrinsically poor quality, they gain little by mis-
reporting, since in expectation their carried interest will be low (poor projects are unlikely
to survive much beyond the initial financing rounds).
If VCs are uncertain about project quality, however, they have incentives to produce
inaccurate reports; reports that might lead to overinvestment. Intuitively, this could un-
dermine the value of VCs as intermediaries, hence the emergence of VCFs. Nonetheless,
even though VCs may misreport in equilibrium, we show that distortions caused by inac-
curate reporting might still let investors and entrepreneurs synchronize their beliefs about
project quality. The key for this result is the degree of correlation between the information
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of VCs and entrepreneurs, which may allow for valuable data gathering even when reports
are imperfect. We show that this correlation allows for surplus extraction from uninformed
entrepreneurs with high-quality projects and increases investors’ expected profits under the
VC–investor partnership. VCFs emerge as optimal arrangements in this environment despite
imperfections in information and incentives.
Our VCF model provides interesting insights about the role VCs play in economic cycles.
When the fraction of good projects in the economy is small (“busts”), the proportion of un-
informed entrepreneurs with good projects is reduced. Accordingly, under direct financing,
investors are likely to demand high returns from entrepreneurs. This translates into financ-
ing inefficiencies, since some good projects do not receive funding. When the probability
of good projects is high (“booms”), investors may demand relatively lower returns. This
result is also inefficient since bad projects may receive funding. Under VCF financing, in
contrast, uninformed entrepreneurs with good projects as well as those with bad projects
adjust their beliefs about project quality. In booms, for example, the former accept contracts
with higher promised returns, while the latter reject most contracts. Notably, this outcome
does not require VCs to be fully-informed agents. Indeed, among other results, our model
shows that VCFs contribute to efficiency in capital formation in booms even in the absence
of strong assumptions about VC information.
The empirical counterpart for the price of screening in our model is the management fee
charged by VCs on the committed capital of the VCF. We use results from existing empirical
studies (e.g., Sahlman (1990), Phillips and Kirchoff (1989), and Puri and Zarutskie (2008))
and the restrictions of the model to calibrate relevant parameters. For example, we estimate
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management fees to be 16.4% of committed capital. This number is very similar to the fee of
16.1% reported by Metrick and Yasuda (2010). That estimate is also well within the 15–20%
range of Gompers and Lerner (1999). Following our model, we also calculate the VCFs’
annual rate of return. Our estimate of 22% per year virtually matches the figures reported
by Sahlman (1990) and Kaplan and Schoar (2005), which equal 21% and 20%, respectively.
We also characterize the VC compensation structure. In doing so, our model incorporates
features from the most common payment schedules of the industry, such as those described
in Metrick and Yasuda (2010). We show that investors receive the exit proceeds from the
VCF until they get repaid the full carry basis. After that, both investors and VCs share the
VCF’s cash flows. Our model also describes an interesting tension between management fees
and carried interest. These forms of compensation oppositely depend on the determinants
of VCs’ opportunity costs of investing. The relations described by the model are consistent
with Gompers and Lerner (1999), who show that management fees (carried interests) are
negatively (positively) related to proxies for the experience and skills of VCs. We estimate
the carried interest to be 4.4% of committed capital for a carry level of 20%, which is some-
what short of the 7.3% bound of Metrick and Yasuda. Given the dynamics described by our
model, however, a carried interest of 7.3% would be associated with a management fee of
12.9%. This number is consistent with the 12.1% figure estimated by Metrick and Yasuda
for a fee of 1.5% of committed capital.
Most theoretical papers in the literature focus on the interplay between the VC and the
entrepreneur. Some consider the VC to be an investor with skills to screen projects (Bern-
hardt and Krasa (2008)) or an insider that signals to outside investors whether the project
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is sound (Chan (1983) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1994)). Other studies view the VC as a
principal whose role is to ensure that entrepreneurs choose the optimal level of effort (Amist
et al. (1990)). In these papers, the notion of “investor” is reduced to an exogenous associ-
ation of VCs and financiers, which oversimplifies the characterization of the venture capital
industry. As a result of their setup, those models cannot explain the emergence of VCFs
and are unable to characterize the fees charged by VCs.
The paper that is perhaps closest to ours is Axelson et al. (2008). Those authors consider
a model with three agents: investors, venture capitalists, and fly-by-night operators. One of
their central results is that venture capital partnerships use a mix of ex-post and ex-ante fi-
nancing. The compensation scheme the authors derive resembles that of a debt-like contract:
for outcomes lower than the amount invested, investors seize everything; while for outcomes
above that threshold, investors and VCs receive a fraction of the project’s profits. In the
Axelson et al. model, VCs are assumed to be fully informed about the quality of projects,
while investors and fly-by-night operators are uninformed. Notably, their analysis does not
explain what determines the management fee charged by VCs. Our framework, in contrast,
allows for a more general information structure; for example, we do not impose that either
entrepreneurs or VCs are fully informed. In addition, we focus on the payoffs that VCs and
investors derive from the VCF. By explicitly modeling entrepreneurs, the payoff structures
of VCs and investors, and the correlation of information between VCs and entrepreneurs,
our analysis extends the existing theoretical literature into new directions.
The debate on the appropriate level of management fees charged by VCs has intensified
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since the financial crisis.3 Because these fees are a significant portion of VCs’ compensation
and are invariant to the performance of the VCFs, the fixed compensation structure has
come under scrutiny after the drop in industry returns in late 2007. Investors are calling
for a “realignment of interests,” increased transparency in reporting, and demanding man-
agement fees to reflect the quality of the portfolios VCs oversee. While those demands for
reform may be warranted, it is difficult to evaluate their merit in the absence of a model
that rationalizes the payoff structures of the VC industry. Our analysis helps understand the
implications of these kinds of debates by formalizing the economics of the rewards currently
observed in the industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup.
In Section 3, we solve the model and examine its main results. Section 4 performs calibra-
tions examining the main results of our model. Section 5 presents a list of testable empirical
implications. Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are in Appendix A.
1.2 The Model
We set out to frame our model according to stylized facts of the industry. Entrepreneurs
are endowed with projects and entrepreneurial capital, which can be thought as human
capital, talent, ideas, and inventions. VCs are special in that they may have relevant in-
formation about entrepreneurs’ projects. This is in accordance with the Venture Census
2008 (National Venture Capital Association (2008)), which reports that VCs are generally
former entrepreneurs with industry-specific expertise. Entrepreneurs’ projects require en-
3See Preqin (2007, 2009) and Wyatt (2009) for industry reports on the intensity of this debate.
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trepreneurial capital and outside finance, which is provided by investors. Ample evidence
suggests that a VCF invests in several rounds and that subsequent financing happens only if
the previous round of investment is considered successful (see Sahlman (1990), Barry (1994),
and Puri and Zarutskie (2008)). To capture these features, we assume that financing takes
place in multiple periods.
1.2.1 Players and Environment
There are three periods {0, 1, 2}, financing takes place in periods 0 and 1, and there is no
discounting. The economy has an investor K, an entrepreneur E, and a venture capitalist
V . The investor has an amount d that he can lend to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is
penniless, but is endowed with entrepreneurial capital and a project. Both the entrepreneur
and the VC hold private information about the quality of the entrepreneur’s project. The
information of the entrepreneur and the VC can be correlated. All agents are risk-neutral.
The entrepreneur is endowed with entrepreneurial capital mH , which is assumed to be
common knowledge. Projects can be either good (G) or bad (B). A project is denoted by
s ∈ {G,B}, and its outcome by pi (s) ∈ {piL, piH}. We assume piH > 1 and piL = 0. Bad
projects always have an outcome of pi (B) = piL.
Projects generate outcomes after being implemented. The investment technology in
period 0 dictates that projects require mH units of entrepreneurial capital and 1−mH units of
external funding, where 0 ≤ 1−d ≤ mH < 1. In period 1, the investment technology requires
projects to have one unit of outside finance. The entrepreneur and the VC face opportunity
costs ofmH+u and u, respectively, for implementing a project. The parameter u > 0 captures
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general characteristics of the industry in which the entrepreneur and the VC operate.4
The entrepreneur and the VC can be informed or uninformed. If informed, they know the
project’s quality, otherwise they do not know if the project is good or bad. The types of the
entrepreneur and the VC belong to the set T = {{G} , {B} , {U}}, with {U} = {G,B}; they
are denoted by ιE and ιV , respectively. These types are private information. We denote the
probability of a good project by λ ∈ (0, 1), the probability of a good outcome by p ∈ (0, 1),
and the probability of being informed about the project’s quality by q ∈ (0, 1). To make the
model interesting, we assume it is always profitable to finance a project that is known to be
good, that is, ppiH − 1 − u > 0. To simplify the exposition, we assume piH − mH+uλp > 1. As
will become clear in the equilibrium analysis, this assumption implies that a project will be
financed in the second period if it succeeds in the first period.
Given that the VC is informed, the probability that the entrepreneur is informed is θ.
Conversely, given that the VC is uninformed, the probability that the entrepreneur is un-
informed is γ. Consistency of probabilities require that q (1− θ) = (1− q) (1− γ). For
i, j ∈ {E, V } we define µ (ιi, ιj) as the prior distribution of types, µ (ιi) as the marginal
distribution, and µ (ιi|ιj) as the conditional distribution.
It is important to frame the information (or “expertise”) that VCs have about the projects
they screen and about the entrepreneurs behind those projects. The role of VC expertise
and experience has been studied by recent literature looking at VC characteristics and the
4In a more general setting, the opportunity costs of the entrepreneur and the VC could be given by
oE (·) and oV (·), respectively. Both the entrepreneur’s and the VC’s opportunity costs would be a function
of u. In addition, the entrepreneur’s opportunity cost oE would depend on his entrepreneurial capital. In
order to keep the model parsimonious, we set oE = mH + u and oV = u. In this way, we reduce the number
of free parameters in our calibration exercise and are able to assess the power of the model in replicating
observed VC compensation structures.
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performance of the projects in their portfolios (e.g., Gompers et al. (2005) and Bottazzi et
al. (2008)). We consider the following possibilities for VC expertise:5
(1) The VC has industry expertise and knowledge about entrepreneur’s type; or (θ, γ) =
(1, 1). This is to say that the VC gauges the type of the entrepreneur based on his own
experience with the sort of project his is screening. For example, when considering a stan-
dard, simple (new, complex) project, the VC anticipates the entrepreneur may know as
much (as little) as he does about the project’s likely outcome. Simply put, the VC and the
entrepreneur have highly correlated information about the project; and
(2) The VCs has only industry expertise; or (θ, γ) = (q, 1− q). This is to say that the VC
might know the project’s type, but the VC does not know about the entrepreneur’s specific
knowledge about the project. For example, when he knows the project’s type, the VC can
only assign a general probability q that the entrepreneur also knows the project’s type.
1.2.2 Timing, Strategies, and Payoffs
The timing of the model is described in Figure 1.1. In period 0, Nature chooses the types
of the entrepreneur and the VC. The uninformed investor decides if he wants to finance the
entrepreneur directly or to use the VC as an intermediary. If he chooses the direct route,
the investor sends a contract to the entrepreneur. If the investor chooses the intermediated
route, he sends the VC a contract featuring a fixed price for a report containing informa-
tion about the project. Upon receiving the report, the investor decides whether to fund the
5Essentially, the state space is {G,B} and the types of the entrepreneur and the VC represent their
information regarding the realized state. We restrict our attention to polar cases for two reasons: (i) a more
general correlation structure would make the number of parameters to be pinned down by any calibration
exercise greater than the number of constraints generated by the model, and (ii) the results provided by a
more general information structure are qualitatively similar.
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project. Let us detail the events that take place in each period of the model.
[Figure 1.1 about here]
• Period 0
Nature chooses the type of the project and the knowledge of both the entrepreneur and
the VC. A financing contract specifies a nonnegative price R that needs to be paid to the
investor and the ownership over the project in period 1. We assume limited liability such
that R (pis) ≤ pis. Therefore, R (piL) = 0 and the relevant choice is about the price in the
event the project succeeds R ≡ R (piH). Since projects do not require entrepreneurial capital
in period 1 and the VC has a lower opportunity cost for implementing a project in that
period, the investor will propose a contract in which he has ownership of the project.
The investor decides either to finance the entrepreneur directly or to hire a VC to learn
about the venture. The VC has belief µ (ιE|ιV ) that the entrepreneur is of type ιE, and
chooses a nonnegative price zιV for his information. After observing z and forming belief
µK (ιV |z) ∈ [0, 1] that the VC is of type ιV , the investor takes action k (z) ∈ {0, 1}, where
k = 0 if the investor rejects the price, and k = 1 if the investor accepts the price. If the in-
vestor chooses uninformed financing, he sends the entrepreneur a contract with nonnegative
price RU0 (z). The entrepreneur of type ιE holds a belief µE (ιV |ιE, z) that the VC is of type
ιV , and takes action e
U
ιE
(
RU0
) ∈ {0, 1}, where eUιE = 0 if he rejects the contract, and eUιE = 1
if he accepts.
If the investor chooses informed financing, he signs a contract with the VC. The VC of
type ιV selects information τιV ∈ T to reveal. The information {G} implies that the VC
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is informed that the entrepreneur has a good project, {B} implies the VC is informed that
the entrepreneur has a bad project, and {U} implies that the VC is uninformed about the
quality of the project. Upon receiving a report, the investor has belief µK (ιV |z, τ) ∈ [0, 1]
that the VC is of type ιV , and chooses a contract with a nonnegative price R
I
0 (τ). The
entrepreneur of type ιE forms belief µE (ιV |ιE, z, τ) that the VC is of type ιV and takes
action eIιE
(
RI0
) ∈ {0, 1}, where eIιE = 0 if he refuses to sign the contract, and eIιE = 1 if he
decides to sign it. If he chooses the former, the game ends. For convenience, we assume that
the investor, the entrepreneur, and the VC accept proposals whenever they are indifferent.
Two technical aspects of our modeling choices are worth discussing. First, we assume
that the investor cannot commit to a rule following a report. In this way, our analysis does
not reduce to a mechanism design problem and it cannot be used to find optimal contracts.
This assumption is consistent with investors’ right not to invest beyond the initial committed
capital. It implies the following ratchet effects : (1) the investor cannot commit to invest if
he is told that the investment under consideration has negative NPV, and (2) the investor
cannot refrain from demanding high returns if he is told that the project is good.
Second, under informed financing, it is the investor that offers the entrepreneur a con-
tract. While this simplifies the model set up and analysis, it will be clear from the equilibrium
solution that our assumption is made without loss of generality. Indeed, we can show that
the outcome that obtains when the design of contracts is delegated to the VC is also an
equilibrium outcome of our model. Our simpler set up, however, is useful in helping one to
gauge the role of VC reports in coordinating the expectations of investors and entrepreneurs
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in a way that benefits not only the private interests of VCs, but also the VCF.6
• Period 1
Payments are made according to project outcomes and contracts in place. The payoff of
the entrepreneur of type ιE is:
u0ιE ≡ (1− k)
[
eUιE1{s=G}p
(
piH −RU0
)
+
(
1− eUιE
)
(mH + u)
]
+
k
[
eIιE1{s=G}p
(
piH −RI0
)
+
(
1− eIιE
)
(mH + u)
]
. (1.1)
The payoff of the investor is:
u0K ≡ (1− k)
[
eUιE
(
1{s=G}pRU0 − (1−mH)
)]
+
k
[
eIιE
(
1{s=G}pRI0 − (1−mH)− zιV
)− (1− eIιE) zιV ] . (1.2)
The payoff of the VC of type ιV is:
u0ιV ≡ kzιV . (1.3)
If piL = 0, there are insufficient funds for a new financing round and the game ends.
If the outcome is piH , all players believe that the project is good. If the investor chose
uninformed financing in period 0, he offers a contract with a nonnegative price RU1 to the
VC. The VC chooses vUιV
(
RU1
) ∈ {0, 1}, where vUιV = 0 if he rejects the contract; otherwise,
vUιV = 1. If the investor chose informed financing, he offers the VC a contract to implement
the entrepreneur’s project in period 1 with a nonnegative price RI1. The VC of type ιV takes
6If the VC offered the contract, we would have a delegation game. The outcome of the selected equilibria in
our model maximizes the carried interest paid to the VC, and this is the same outcome that would be observed
in a delegation game. This assumption is made without loss of generality, but greatly simplifies the analysis.
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action vIιV
(
RI1
) ∈ {0, 1}, where vIιV = 0 if he rejects the contract, and vIιV = 1 if he accepts
it. If the contract is accepted, investment is made.
• Period 2
The payoffs of the second period are realized and the game ends. The payoff of the
investor is:
u1K = (1− k) eUιE1{pis=piH}vUιV
(
pRU1 − 1
)
+ keIιE1{pis=piH}v
I
ιV
(
pRI1 − 1
)
. (1.4)
Finally, the payoff of the VC of type ιV is:
u1ιV = (1− k) eUιE1{pis=piH}
[
vUιV p
(
piH −RU1
)
+
(
1− vUιV
)
u
]
+ (1.5)
keIιE1{pis=piH}
[
vIιV p
(
piH −RI1
)
+
(
1− vIιV
)
u
]
.
Figure 1.2 describes the investor’s and VC’s proceeds as a function of the VCF’s cash flow.
When the investor chooses to offer a contract to the VC, a VCF emerges. The entrepreneur
is financed and the investor receives RI0 if the project succeeds. This is the first cash flow of
the VCF. In the second round of financing, the VC implements the entrepreneur’s project
and the outcome in the event of success is given by piH . This is the VCF’s second cash flow
and is shared between the VC and the investor, who receive
piH−RI1
piH
and
RI1
piH
, respectively.
[Figure 1.2 about here]
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1.3 Equilibrium
1.3.1 Preliminaries
The equilibrium concept we use is that of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). We restrict
ourselves to pure strategies. Let S (z) ⊂ T be the set of types of VC that charge z. The
beliefs of the investor and the entrepreneur after observing z are consistent according to
Bayes’s rule if µK (ιV |z) = µ(ιV )∑
ι′
V
∈S(z)
µ(ι′V )
and µE (ιV |ιE, z) = µ(ιV |ιE)∑
ι′
V
∈S(z)
µ(ι′V |ιE)
for ιV ∈ S (z), and
µK (ιV |z) = µE (ιV |z) = 0 for ιE2 /∈ S (z).
Analogously, if S (τ) ⊂ T is the set of types of VC that report τ , the beliefs of the investor
and the entrepreneur after observing τ are Bayes-consistent if µK (ιV |z, τ) = µK(ιV |z)∑
ι′
V
∈S(τ)
µ(ι′V |z)
and µE (ιV |ιE, z, τ) = µE(ιV |ιE ,z)∑
ι′
V
∈S(τ)
µE(ι′V |ιE ,z)
for ιV ∈ S (τ), and µK (ιV |z, τ) = µE (ιV |ιE, z, τ) = 0
for ιV /∈ S (τ). Given our assumptions about the correlation of types, the investor’s beliefs
about the type of the entrepreneur are directly obtained from his beliefs regarding the type of
the VC µK (ιE|z) =
∑
ι′V ∈S(z)
µK (ι
′
V |z)µ (ιE|ι′V ) and µK (ιE|z, τ) =
∑
ι′V ∈S(τ)
µK (ι
′
V |z, τ)µ (ιE|ι′V ).
Definition 1 A collection of strategies((
k,RU0 , R
I
0, R
U
1 , R
I
1
)
,
(
eUιE , e
I
ιE
)
,
(
zιV , τιV , v
U
ιV
, vIιV
))
and beliefs(
(µK (ιi|z) , µK (ιi|z, τ))i∈{E,V } , (µE (ιV |ιE, z) , µE (ιV |ιE, z, τ)) , µ (ιE|ιV )
)
constitute a (pure strategy) PBE if:
(i) For every history of actions, strategies maximize expected payoffs given beliefs; and
(ii) Beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Our first lemma will be useful in order to establish later results. It states that the optimal
strategies of the investor and the VC regarding refinancing are the same under uninformed
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and informed financing.
Lemma 1 In any PBE RU1 = R
I
1 = R1 = piH − up ,
vUιV (R) = v
I
ιV
(R) =
{
1, if 0 ≤ R ≤ piH − up
0, if R > piH − up
∀ιV ∈ T\ {B}.
To characterize the outcome of markets under uninformed financing and under VC fi-
nancing, we first need to define equilibria in which VCFs emerge.
Definition 2 A PBE is a VC-equilibrium if k = 1 and zιV > 0 ∀ιV ∈ T ; i.e., if the investor
chooses informed financing and pays a positive fee to the VC.
We now proceed to show that there is no separating equilibria with respect to prices; i.e.,
equilibria where different types of VCs charge different prices for their information. We then
show that the investor can restrict attention to charging either a high price or a low price
under uninformed financing. The former will be accepted only by informed entrepreneurs
with good projects, whereas the latter will be accepted by all entrepreneurs except those
informed with bad projects. This will allow the derivation of the expected payoff of the
investor given his strategy so that it can be later compared with the expected payoff under
informed financing.
Lemma 2 There is no VC-equilibrium where VCs charge different prices.
Although this result is consistent with empirical evidence (e.g., Sahlman (1990) and
Gompers and Lerner (1999)), it is still viewed in the literature as a puzzle (as discussed
by Kaplan and Schoar (2005)). If VCs charged prices contingent on their information, that
would identify their types and allow the investor to get the information he wanted at no
cost. This implies a flat price and the possibility that VCs receive compensation even when
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they are uninformed about the quality of projects. As a consequence of this lemma, we will
focus our attention to the cases in which S (z) = T .
The next lemma derives the optimal choices of the entrepreneur under informed and
uninformed financing. In essence, it states that the entrepreneur’s decision regarding the
contract is dictated by a set of cutoff rules.
Lemma 3 Let RU0 = piH − mH+uλp , RU0 = piH − mH+up , RI0 = piH − mH+up , and RI0 (τ) =
piH − mH+uµE(G|{U},z,τ)p for µE (G| {U} , z, τ) > 0. In any PBE equilibrium with S (z) = T :
(i) ek{B} (R
i
0) = 0 ∀Ri0 ∈ R+,
(ii) ei{U} (R
i
0) =

0, if µE (G| {U} , z, τ) = 0
1, if 0 ≤ Ri0 ≤ Ri0 and µE (G| {U} , z, τ) > 0
0, if Ri0 > R
i
0 and µE1 (G| {U} , z, τ) > 0
, and
(iii) ei{G} (R
i
0) =
{
1, if 0 ≤ Ri0 ≤ Ri0
0, if Ri0 > R
i
0
for i = U, I.
According to the last lemma, if the entrepreneur is informed that he holds a bad project,
then he rejects any contract. The price Ri0, which only informed entrepreneurs with good
projects accept, is the highest price an entrepreneur will ever accept. The price Ri0, which is
accepted by all entrepreneurs (except the informed entrepreneur with a bad project), is the
highest price an uninformed entrepreneur will accept.
Our next result further simplifies our analysis as it shows that the investor’s decision
under uninformed financing is to choose among two possible contracts.
Lemma 4 In any PBE, the investor chooses RU0 ∈
{
RU0 , R
U
0
}
.
Our setup makes it easy to constrain the investor’s pricing strategy to a space in which
only two numbers have positive probability mass, making the problem more tractable. The
investor does not need to worry about financing an informed entrepreneur with a bad project.
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However, if the investor requires a low share of the cash flow as payment, he cannot avoid
financing uninformed entrepreneurs with bad projects. On the other hand, if he charges a
high price, he will lose good deals from entrepreneurs that are unaware of the quality of their
projects, those of type {U}.
Lemma 5 There is no VC-equilibrium in which all VCs report the same information.
This result is also fairly intuitive. If all VCs reported the same information, by consis-
tency of beliefs, the investor would consider the true probability distribution. In this case,
the investor would be better off not spending any positive amount on screening services.
The next lemma will be important in deriving the incentives for the VC to report his
information accurately. It implies that the investor has enough money to finance the en-
trepreneur’s project in the second period if and only if the investment in period 0 succeeds.
Lemma 6 Suppose piH − mH+uλp > 1. Then in any PBE the condition
1 ≤ (d− (1−mH) +Ri0) for i = U, I is satisfied.
We can now investigate the investor’s problem under uninformed financing. Consider P
(
RU0
)
the investor’s expected repayment given that he chooses a contract with price RU0 . Let
Q
(
RU0
)
be the probability that an entrepreneur with a good project accepts a contract with
price RU0 . We can think of P as the “price” and Q as the “quantity” in a standard demand
framework. Figure 1.3 shows that the investor in our model faces a standard monopoly
dilemma. The bold vertical lines represent the entrepreneur’s demand. The investor would
like to discriminate and charge a high price from an entrepreneur of type {G} and a low price
from an entrepreneur of type {U}. However, since types are unobservable, the investor needs
to set a flat price. If the price chosen is RU0 , then the investor’s expected revenue is given by
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the area A+B+C, while his expected cost is given by C. If the price is RU0 , then the investor’s
expected revenue and cost are given by the areas B+C+D+E and C+E+F , respectively.
[Figure 1.3 about here]
Under uninformed financing, the investor’s expected payoff when he chooses RU0 = R
U
0 is
given by (A+B + C)− C:
Π = λq
[
p
(
piH − mH + u
p
)
+ p (ppiH − u− 1)
]
− λq (1−mH) . (1.6)
On the other hand, if he chooses RU0 , the ex ante expected payoff is (B + C +D + E) −
(C + E + F ):
Π = λ
[
p
(
piH − mH + u
λp
)
+ p (ppiH − u− 1)
]
− (λq + (1− q)) (1−mH) . (1.7)
Note that the investor would always choose RU0 if q → 1 or λ→ 0. If the entrepreneur is
informed, he will accept a contract if and only if he has a good project. Hence, it is a weakly
dominant strategy to charge RU0 . When the entrepreneur has a bad project, the investor can
guarantee himself a revenue of zero by choosing RU0 . If he chooses R
U
0 , his expected revenue
will be negative. On the other hand, the investor would always choose RU0 if λ→ 1. In this
case, we would have 0 < Π = qΠ < Π. Also notice that the higher the values of p, λ, and
piH , the more likely it is for the investor to choose R
U
0 . Intuitively, the investor’s choice of
whether to send a contract to the VC is determined by a trade-off between the price that he
has to pay and his belief about the accuracy of the VC’s information.
Once the outcome under uninformed financing (the investor’s outside option) is deter-
mined, we need to compare it with the outcome he would get under informed financing.
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Under informed financing, the investor’s expected payoff gross of z is:
Π = θλq
[
pRI0
(
τ{G}
)
+ p (ppiH − u− 1)
]
+ (1.8)
(1− γ) (1− q)λ [pRI0 (τ{U})+ p (ppiH − u− 1)]+
(1− θ)λqeI{U}
(
RI0
(
τ{G}
)) [
pRI0
(
τ{G}
)− (1−mH) + p (ppiH − u− 1)]+
γ (1− q) eI{U}
(
RI0
(
τ{U}
)) [
λpRI0
(
τ{U}
)− (1−mH) + λp (ppiH − u− 1)]−
(1− θ) (1− λ) qeI{U}
(
RI0
(
τ{B}
))
(1−mH)− λq (1−mH) .
The intuition for our results is captured by Figure 1.3. First, suppose the types of
the entrepreneur and the VC are perfectly correlated; i.e., (θ, γ) = (1, 1). Second, assume
A−(D − F ) > 0; i.e., Π > Π. Third, consider a separating equilibrium τ{B} 6= τ{U} 6= τ{G}. In
this economy, the investor will choose RU0 if he finances the entrepreneur directly, receiving an
expected payoff of Π. However, if he uses VCs as intermediaries and chooses RI0
(
τ{G}
)
= RU0
and RI0
(
τ{U}
)
= RU0 , his expected payoff (gross of z) will be A+B +D − F :
Π = Π + (1− q) Π (q = 0) = Π + q (1− λ) (mH + u) . (1.9)
The investor will find it attractive to hire the VC whenever D − F greater than zero.
The difference is the surplus generated by screening. When the surplus is smaller than the
amount of resources left to the investor after financing, the VC will charge the investor the
entire surplus, which is denoted by z in the figure. Otherwise he will charge d− (1−mH).
We can think of two concepts when analyzing the efficiency of an outcome. The first con-
cept is that of ex post efficiency, in which case we check for efficiency given that the quality
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of the entrepreneur’s project is known. Here, ex post efficiency requires good projects being
financed with probability one and bad projects with probability zero. The second concept is
that of ex ante efficiency; i.e., efficiency is checked before the quality of the entrepreneur’s
project is known. Ex ante efficiency requires uninformed entrepreneurs to be financed if
D − F > 0.
In bad times (low λ), we are more likely to observe Π > Π. It follows that unin-
formed financing is ex post inefficient as good projects will be financed with probability q. If
D−F > 0, then uninformed financing is also ex ante inefficient as uninformed entrepreneurs
are not financed. In good times (high λ), we are more likely to observe Π < Π. Bad projects
will be financed with probability 1 − q, which implies that uninformed financing is ex post
inefficient. However, in this case uninformed financing is ex ante efficient if D − F > 0.
Another interesting implication of our results is that when the market conditions are
favorable — large fraction of good projects, high chance of success, and large payoffs — the
investor will demand a lower share of the gains from entrepreneurs. The reason is simple:
when market conditions are attractive and the investor charges a high price, he is heav-
ily penalized by not financing uninformed entrepreneurs with good ventures. This cost is
reduced when market conditions deteriorate and the probability of financing a uninformed
entrepreneur with bad project increases.
Our objective now is to determine when there is a surplus from screening. This depends
on the accuracy of the report produced by the VC. The incentive of the VC to report ac-
curately depends on his information and on the future gains from the partnership. We first
examine the case in which the VC has “industry and entrepreneur-type expertise.” In this
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case, the types of the entrepreneur and the VC are perfectly correlated. This simpler setup
serves as the baseline model since the VC has incentive to report truthfully and the outcome
will be that of standard price discrimination. We then study the case in which VCs have only
“industry expertise.” In this more realistic setting, the VC might misreport in equilibrium in
order to maximize his carry. Interestingly, the information might be accurate enough so as
to adjust the beliefs of the investor and the entrepreneur, in which case informed financing
generates a surplus to the investor.
1.3.2 Industry Expertise and Entrepreneur-Type Expertise
This represents the case where the VC can be informed about the project’s quality and about
the entrepreneur’s knowledge about the project’s quality. In this subsection, we characterize
the VC-equilibria. The expected surplus from screening will be calculated and the existence
of a VC-equilibria will be established. A necessary and sufficient condition for emergence of
VCFs is that the expected surplus from financing an uninformed entrepreneur is positive.
This condition is readily available from Figure 1.3 and is equivalent to D − F > 0.
We characterize VC-equilibria by their types and outcomes. The types of VC-equilibria
are: separating equilibria, where |S (τ)| = 1∀τ ∈ T ; and semi-pooling equilibria, where
|S (τ)| = 2 for some τ ∈ T . With slight abuse of notation, we denote τ as the report given
by the two types of VC that pool in a semi-pooling equilibrium, and τιV as the report of the
separating type ιV . Without loss of generality, we will consider the cases Π > Π , with the
set of VC-equilibria denoted by A
(
Π
)
, and Π > Π, with the set of VC-equilibria denoted
by A (Π). The outcome of a VC-equilibrium is determined by the investor’s action played in
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equilibrium as a function of VC types RI0 (τιV ) and by the price z charged by VCs.
We now establish the first major result of our paper, which is the characterization of
VC-equilibria when VCs have both industry and entrepreneur-type expertise.
Proposition 1 A VC-equilibrium exists if and only if Π (q = 0) > 0. If a VC-equilibrium
exists, then each of the sets A
(
Π
)
and A (Π) contains three types of equilibria with a unique
outcome: separating equilibria; semi-pooling equilibria with S (τ) = {{U} , {B}}; and semi-
pooling equilibria with S (τ) = {{G} , {B}}. The unique outcome is given by:
z =
{
min {d− (1−mH) , (1− q) Π (q = 0)} if Π > Π
min {d− (1−mH) , q (1− λ) (mH + u)} if Π > Π
,
RI0
(
τ{G}
)
= RI0,
RI0
(
τ{U}
)
= RI0
(
τ{U}
)
= piH − mH + u
λp
.
The assumption Π (q = 0) > 0 means that the expected surplus upon financing an en-
trepreneur who is known to be uninformed about his project is positive. An interesting
insight from this proposition is that a truth-telling equilibrium is possible where the investor
associates with a VC to form a VCF and VC reports accurately reflect the quality of the
projects being financed.
Corollary 1 If Π > Π, then z is non-decreasing in p, λ, piH , mH , d, and it is non-increasing
in q and u.
Intuitively, if the investor is charging RU0 , then the information becomes more valuable as
the probability of good projects increases. This happens because it becomes more likely that
uninformed types with good projects will reject a price RU0 . Thus, knowing the true state
makes it possible to increase profits. In addition, as the probability of success increases, the
loss from not financing an uninformed entrepreneur with a good project also increases, mak-
ing the information more valuable. The same effect explains the relationship between z and
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the outcome of good projects. On the flip side, when q increases, the possibility of mistakes —
i.e., not financing a good project — becomes smaller, making the information less valuable.
Corollary 2 If Π < Π, then z is increasing in mH , non-decreasing in q, u, d, and non-
increasing in λ.
If the investor charges RU0 , the information becomes more valuable as the probability of
being informed increases. This happens because it becomes less likely that an uninformed
entrepreneur with a good project will not be financed. At the same time, the potential gains
associated with rents extracted from informed entrepreneurs with good projects increase.
Therefore, charging R0 increases profits. On the other hand, when λ increases, charging R
U
0
reduces the possibility of mistakes (not financing a good project), making the information
less valuable.
It is worth noting that these results have interesting welfare implications. Recall that if
Π > Π, then (1) uninformed financing is ex post inefficient since good projects are financed
with probability q, and (2) uninformed financing is ex ante inefficient if D − F > 0 as
uninformed entrepreneurs are not financed. Although informed financing is still ex post inef-
ficient (bad projects are financed with probability 1− q), ex ante efficiency is increased since
uninformed entrepreneurs are now financed in equilibrium. Therefore, although the VC may
not necessarily have a better understanding of the venture (relative to the entrepreneur),
they help reduce financing inefficiencies.
If Π < Π, then (1) uninformed financing is ex post inefficient since bad projects are
financed with probability 1− q, and (2) uninformed financed is ex ante efficient if D−F > 0
as uninformed entrepreneurs are financed. Therefore, there is no efficiency gain under in-
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formed financing. However, there are important redistributive effects as the surplus from
the entrepreneur of type {G} is transferred to the VC.
1.3.3 Industry Expertise
We now demonstrate that a VC-equilibrium may emerge even when the VC has more limited
information about how knowledgeable the entrepreneur is about the quality of the project.
The difference between this more realistic setting and that of the last subsection is that the
VC is no longer fully informed. To be precise, the VC might know about the business of the
entrepreneur, but he does not know whether the entrepreneur is aware of the quality of his
project. This setting captures the situation where the VC is himself a former entrepreneur
(“knows the business”), but he has no special expertise in assessing the knowledge of en-
trepreneurs currently seeking finance. A direct consequence of this information structure is
that a truth-telling VC-equilibrium along with a price discrimination outcome will no longer
obtain. However, an interesting mechanism comes into play. The idea is illustrated in Figure
1.4.
[Figure 1.4 about here]
Figure 1.4 contains the same investor’s dilemma under uninformed financing that is featured
in Figure 1.3. Because a truth-telling VC-equilibrium is unlikely, the investor can no longer
rely on the reports of the VC to identify the entrepreneurs of type {G} and {U}. However,
the reports from the VC might be accurate enough so as to adjust the expectations of the
entrepreneur and the investor. For instance, suppose the VC reports {G} whenever his type
is either {G} or {U}, and reports {B} whenever his type is {B}. First, consider the case in
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which the entrepreneur holds a good project but is unaware of that; i.e., he is of type {U}.
In this case, upon receiving a report from the VC saying that the entrepreneur’s project is
good, the uninformed entrepreneur believes with higher probability that he holds a good
project. As a consequence, the uninformed entrepreneur would be willing to accept a con-
tract with repayment RI0, which is higher than the possible repayment R
U
0 under uninformed
financing. The investor also updates his beliefs and will charge RI0 under informed financing.
Therefore, the investor’s revenue would be G+H higher compared to that under uninformed
financing with repayment RU0 . Second, consider the case in which the entrepreneur holds
a bad project but is of type {U}. Upon receiving a report from the VC saying that the
entrepreneur’s project is bad, both the uninformed entrepreneur and the investor know the
project is bad. As a result, the project will not be financed and the expected financing cost I
is subtracted from the total expected cost under uninformed financing with repayment RU0 .
Under the scenario described above, it is straightforward to conclude that, if Π < Π,
then a VC-equilibrium exists. In addition, if Π > Π instead, then a VC-equilibrium exists if
and only if G+H +D − (F − I)− A > 0. We now establish the second main result of our
model, which is the characterization of equilibria when VCs have only industry expertise.
Proposition 2 (i) If Π > Π, then a VC-equilibrium exists. The set A
(
Π
)
contains two
types of equilibria with a unique outcome: separating equilibria; and semi-pooling equilibria
with S (τ) = {{U} , {B}}. The unique outcome is given by:
z = min
{
d− (1−mH) , (1− q) Π
}
,
RI0
(
τ{G}
)
= RI0
(
τ{G}
)
= RI0,
R1
(
τ{U}
)
= RI0.
(ii) The set A
(
Π
)
contains semi-pooling equilibria in which S (τ) = {{G} , {U}} if and
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only if
Π (q = 0)− [q (1− λ)]
2
1− q (1− λ) (mH + u) ≥ 0.
The resulting outcome is given by:
z = min {d− (1−mH) , (1− q) Π} ,
RI0 (τ) = R
I
0 (τ) = piH − [1− q (1− λ)]
mH + u
λp
.
(iii) Semi-pooling equilibria in which S (τ) = {{G} , {B}} do not exist.
As the proposition states, we have the possibility of two equilibria with different out-
comes. We use the refinement proposed by Matthews et al. (1991) for cheap-talk games
to show that the outcome described in (ii) of Proposition 2 is the most sensible one. We
formally discuss and define the refinement criterion in Appendix B.
The basic equilibrium argument is as follows. Suppose Π > Π such that the investor
would charge RU0 under uninformed financing. In this case, uninformed entrepreneurs with
good projects would reject contracts. Consider a truth-telling VC-equilibrium. In this sepa-
rating equilibrium, uninformed entrepreneurs with good projects learn about the quality of
their projects. This allows investors to demand RI0 from these entrepreneurs and increase
their expected payoffs. Since the signal of the VC of type {U} is uninformative, the investor
also charges RI0 upon receiving a report from a VC of type {U} (since this was optimal under
uninformed financing).
Now consider a VC-equilibrium in which the VC of type {U} pools with the VC of type
{G}. Under this equilibrium, it must be the case that the investor charges RI0 (τ) upon
receiving report τ from either the VC of type {G} or the VC of type {U}. This follows
from the observation that, if the investor charged RI0, only entrepreneurs of type {G} would
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accept the contract, giving the investor the same expected payoff as under uninformed fi-
nancing. The difference from the separating equilibrium is that, while the VC of type {G}
has the same expected payoff, the VC of type {U} receives a higher expected carried interest.
Therefore, one should expect the VC of type {U} to try to convince the investor that his
type is in {{G} , {U}}. If he announces that his type is in {{G} , {U}}, the investor has no
reason not to believe it since the equilibrium strategy of the VC of type {B} gives him a
payoff that is at least as good as the best payoff he receives if the announcement is believed
(he receives 0 in both cases). At the same time, the VC of type {G} is indifferent and
could well be the author of the announcement. Therefore, the announcement {{G} , {U}}
is credible. An equilibrium for which there is no credible announcement is called strongly
announcement-proof (Matthews et al. (1991)).
Proposition 3 The equilibria in (i) of Proposition 2 are not strongly announcement-proof.
The equilibria in (ii) of Proposition 2 are strongly announcement-proof.
From a practical perspective, this is perhaps the main result of our model. It allows us
to derive a number of comparative statics regarding the management fee charged by VCs.
The model has very clear predictions about the relation between management fees and pri-
vate equity activity. Investments in the VC industry are positively correlated with the fixed
compensation received by VCs, which makes management fees pro-cyclical.
Corollary 3 For equilibria in (ii) of Proposition 2, z is increasing in mH , non-decreasing
in p, λ, piH , d, and non-increasing in u. Moreover, there exists a λ
∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that z
non-increasing in q for λ > λ∗ and non-decreasing in q for λ < λ∗.
The main difference between this result and the one obtained in the previous subsection
relates to q. When q increases, report τ is more informative since it is more likely to come
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from the VC of type {G} than from the VC of type {U}. Uninformed entrepreneurs would
believe with higher probability that they hold a good project, which would allow the investor
to charge a higher price. However, when λ is reasonably high, increases in q greatly reduce
the potential loss from not financing an uninformed entrepreneur with a good project. At
the same time, for low levels of λ, increases in q not only make report τ more informative,
but also increase the potential loss from not financing uninformed entrepreneurs with good
projects. Therefore, the information becomes more valuable.
We now establish the last key result of the model, characterizing equilibria when VCs
have only industry expertise and Π > Π.
Proposition 4 (i) If Π > Π, then a VC-equilibrium exists. The set A (Π) contains two
types of equilibria with a unique outcome: separating equilibria; and semi-pooling equilibria
with S (τ) = {{G} , {U}} if and only if
Π (q = 0)− [q (1− λ)]
2
1− q (1− λ) (mH + u) ≥ 0.
The unique outcome is given by:
z = min {d− (1−mH) , q (1− λ) [(1− q) (1−mH) +mH + u]} ,
RI0
(
τ{G}
)
= RI0
(
τ{G}
)
= RI0,
RI0
(
τ{U}
)
= RI0
(
τ{U}
)
= piH − mH + u
λp
.
(ii) Semi-pooling equilibria in which S (τ) = {{G} , {B}} and S (τ) = {{U} , {B}} do
not exist.
Corollary 4 z increasing in mH , non-decreasing in u, and non-increasing in λ.
In this more realistic setup, informed financing increases both ex ante and ex post effi-
ciency. If Π > Π, then uninformed financing is ex ante inefficient if D−F > 0 as uninformed
entrepreneurs are not financed. Under a VC-equilibrium, all uninformed entrepreneurs with
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good projects are financed, and the probability that an uninformed entrepreneur with a bad
project is financed is (1− q)2. Therefore, informed financing increases ex ante efficiency.
If Π < Π, then uninformed financing, although ex ante efficient (if D−F > 0), is ex post
inefficient as a bad project is financed with probability 1− q. However, the probability that
a bad project is financed under a VC-equilibrium is only (1− q)2. As a result, VCs increase
both ex ante and ex post efficiency in the financial markets.
Notably, although VCs do not report truthfully when they are uninformed about the
project, they reduce inefficiencies. What drives this result is the fact that the VC may know
about the quality of the project even if the entrepreneur is uninformed. This result is in-
teresting in highlighting how financing efficiency can be improved in equilibrium even when
agents produce less than perfect reports.
1.4 Model Calibration
We calibrate our model for the case in which VCs have industry expertise. We focus on
this case because it requires the least amount of knowledge by the VCs and yet it offers
enough conditions to identify the model parameters. The industry only expertise scenario
also strikes us as the more interesting one. Our numbers come largely from the study of
Sahlman (1990) on the venture capital industry. An individual investment is characterized
by the funding given to a single project throughout the financing cycle and by the length of
the financing cycle. We take that the representative real-world counterpart of that project is
the average start-up company financed by VCs. The average life of an investment in Sahlman
is 5 years and the results derived here should be interpreted with that time horizon in mind.
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In the model, the price charged by the VC is independent of the success of the venture
that is financed. The same is true regarding the management fees that VCs charge in the real
world. In addition, VCs usually get 20% of the profits in case of success. The counterpart
in the model is the VC’s reservation utility for carrying out the project. The VC receives
that amount only if the investment does not fail in period 0.
Our first step is to calibrate piH . Sahlman reports that around 16% of the investments
made are responsible for 75% of the ending value of the portfolio. Moreover, about 34% of
the ventures sponsored by the VCs fail. The remaining 50% of the investments account for
25% of the total ending value. He also finds that the ending value of investments is 4.3 times
the original cost.
One can represent the numbers in Sahlman assuming that the ending value of the
portfolio is as a random variable that takes values 0, 2.15, and 20.156 with probabilities
0.34, 0.50, and 0.16 respectively. We can represent this by points (x, y) in R2 such that
(x, y) ∈ Σ = {(0.16, 20.156) , (0.34, 0) , (0.50, 2.15)} . Let us define Γ = ∑
{x:(x,y)∈Σ}
|f (x)− y|.
In our model, an investment takes the values piH and piL. Accordingly, we want to calibrate
piH and piL in order to concisely approximate the set Σ. One way to do this is by using a
step function with two steps. We define an optimal step function as one that minimizes Γ.7
An optimal two-step function approximation f : [0, 1]→ R that minimizes Γ is given by:
f (x) =

20.156, for x ∈ [0, 0.34)
0, for x ∈ [0.34, 1]
. (1.10)
7Another way of fitting a step function to a point set is by minimizing the maximum vertical difference
(see Fournier and Vigneron (2008)). Our conclusions are similar if we use this alternative approach.
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We want an approximation such that the average ending value of investments is equal to
4.3. Accordingly, we need a two-step function f ′ that minimizes Γ subject to the constraint∑
{x:(x,y)∈Σ}
xf ′ (x) = 4.3. It is straightforward to see that the following function satisfies that
requirement:
f ′ (x) =

26.875, for x ∈ [0, 0.34)
0, for x ∈ [0.34, 1]
. (1.11)
We can model the ending value of a portfolio of projects as a Bernoulli process that
takes values piH = 27 in case of success, and piL = 0 in case of failure. This gives us the
best two-step function approximation to the actual ending value distribution, subject to the
constraint that the average implied by the model matches the data.
We use additional information from the VC industry. In particular, note that in 88% of
the funds surveyed by Sahlman, VCs are entitled to 20% of the realized gains. Since the
average expected net gain from an investment is 3.3 (= 4.3 − 1), we set u = 0.66. The
average share of the ending portfolio held by the founders of the venture (entrepreneurs) is
roughly 30% (see Sahlman (1990) and Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003)). Therefore, mH solves
mH + 0.66 = 0.3× 3.3, which implies mH = 0.33.
Since 34% of the ventures sponsored by VCs are expected to fail, we have an estimate of
the probability that an investment fails given that it is financed by VCs. The equilibrium of
our model implies that a bad project will be financed with probability (1− λ) (1− q)2 and
a good project will be financed with probability λ. Hence, the following condition must be
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satisfied:
0.34 = Pr (failure | financed by VCFs) = (1− λ) (1− q)
2 + λ (1− p)
(1− λ) (1− q)2 + λ . (1.12)
From Berlin (1998), we take that the probability that a VC funds a received project
is 10%. In our model, the probability that a project will be financed by the VCF is
(1− λ) (1− q)2 + λ. As a result, we have the following condition:
0.10 = Pr (funding) = (1− λ) (1− q)2 + λ. (1.13)
Our next condition comes from the probability of failure given that projects are financed.
One of the main distinctions between VC-financed and non-VC-financed firms is that the
former typically have low cash flows and do not have tangible assets to offer as collateral.
Puri and Zarutskie (2008) show that 47% of firms financed by VCs have zero cash revenue
in their first year, compared to only 6% of firms with other sources of financing. They also
report evidence that most of the difference between failure rates of VC-financed and non-
VC-financed firms is due to successful selection of good projects by VCs. In other words,
firms that seek VC financing are drawn from the general distribution of start-up firms in
the economy, but VCs seem to add value by way of their selection process. Phillips and
Kirchoff (1989), Puri and Zarutskie (2008), and Bernhardt and Krasa (2008) estimate that
the failure rate of all start-up firms, firms financed outside the VC industry, and all firms that
seek finance from VCs are, respectively, 60% , 62%, and 57%. Since firms that seek financing
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from VCs are thought to be riskier than the average firm, we use the following condition:
0.62 = Pr (failure | all financed) = (1− λ) (1− q) + λ (1− q) (1− p) + λq (1− p)
(1− λ) (1− q) + λ (1− q) + λq . (1.14)
Using conditions (7), (8), and (9) we can solve for q, λ, and p:
λ = 0.093, p = 0.711, q = 0.911. (1.15)
These conditions imply an environment in which the probability of good projects is low.
However, given that the project is of good quality, its probability of success is high. This
result highlights the consistency of our model with the VC industry and provides insights
into the economic role of VCs. In essence, VCs are agents that can screen out bad projects in
an environment where good projects are scarce. They add value to investors and contribute
to the capital allocation process.
Lastly, we normalize the investor’s money endowment to one; i.e., d = 1. We summarize
the calibration of the parameters in Table 1.1.
[Table 1.1 about here]
We can now compute the endogenous variables of the model:
Π = 2.537, (1.16)
Π = 1.834, (1.17)
RI0 =
(
piH − mH + u
p
)
= 25.608, (1.18)
RI0 = piH − [1− q (1− λ)]
mH + u
λp
= 24.395. (1.19)
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These estimates suggest that the investor would have charged 25.61 if he did not have the
option to buy information from the VC. In other words, if the project succeeded, the en-
trepreneur would have to give the investor 25.61 from the realized gain of 27. However,
Propositions 2 and 3 say that the investor will buy the services from the VC at a price
determined by:
Π = Π + (1− q) Π = 2.701, (1.20)
z∗ = min
{
1− (1−mH) ,Π− Π
}
= min {0.33, 0.164} = 0.164. (1.21)
We note that these estimates match the real-world data quite well. The committed cap-
ital in our model is given by d = 1, which is the amount of resources the investor is willing
to commit to the VCF at time 0. Accordingly, the estimations imply that the management
fee charged by VCs is equal to 16.4% of committed capital. This is consistent with the
numbers estimated by Metrick and Yasuda (2010) for VCFs with annual management fees
of 2% and 2.5%, which are respectively 16.1% and 20.2%. This estimate also falls well within
the management fee range of 15–20% that is reported by Gompers and Lerner (1999). Our
estimated return of a VCF (net of fees) over its life is 2.70. The implied effective annual rate
of return, in a five-year horizon, is 22%.8 As it turns out, this number is virtually the same
as those reported by Sahlman (1990) and Kaplan and Schoar (2005).
Finally, the expected carried interest received by the VC is given by
λpu = 0.044, (1.22)
8The effective rate of return r is given by 2.7 = (1 + r)5.
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which falls short of the 0.073–0.083 range estimated by Metrick and Yasuda (2010) for VCFs
with carry level of 20%. This underestimation is related to the interesting tension that exists
in our model between management fees and carried interest. From Corollary 3, we know
that the management fee is non-increasing in u. However, the expected carried interest is
increasing in u. Therefore, an expected carried interest of 7% is associated with an estimated
present value of management fees of 12.9%. This number is consistent with that estimated
by Metrick and Yasuda for a management fee of 1.5%, which is 12.1%.
In summary, our model calibration matches key elements of the VC industry, such as
expected returns and management fees. We estimate management fees to be 16.4% of com-
mitted capital and an annual rate of return of 22% for the industry. Notably, our model is
consistent with the fact that the industry deals with risky projects. Only few projects have
positive net present value, which makes the information and experience of VCs all the more
valuable to investors. We believe the ability to represent these well-known stylized facts
makes the model proposed particularly interesting.
1.5 Empirical Implications
Our calibration exercise allows us to sharpen the predictions of the model. In particular, it
suggests that we may use Corollary 3 to derive implications regarding VC compensation. A
non-exhaustive list of testable empirical implications derived from our model is as follows:
Implication #1: Management fees should be higher for VCs that focus on early-stage and
high technology ventures ( z is increasing in mH). The implication agrees with the notion
that early-stage and high-technology ventures require higher entrepreneurial capital.
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Implication #2: Management fees should be higher for VCs specialized in industries in
which good projects are more likely to succeed ( z is non-decreasing in p). To the extent that
VCs screen out bad projects from a pool of projects, these projects that are VC-financed are
more likely to be good. Accordingly, if two identical VCs differ with respect to the indus-
try in which they specialize, the one focused on the industry in which the return of VCFs
first-order stochastically dominates that of the other should receive higher management fees.
Implication #3: Management fees should be higher for VCs specialized in industries with
higher incidence of good projects ( z is non-decreasing in λ). VCs specialized in industries
with smaller failure rates and higher returns should receive higher management fees.
Implication #4: Management fees should be higher in booms and lower in busts ( z is
non-decreasing in λ). This result follows from the notion that booms (busts) are associ-
ated with higher (lower) incidence of good projects, which implies that management fees are
procyclical.
Implication #5: Management fees should be higher for VCs that manage funds in which
successful investments generate higher payoffs ( z is non-decreasing in piH). If VCFs managed
by two VCs share similar failure rates and differ from each other only regarding returns, then
the VC associated with the funds with higher returns should receive higher management fees.
Implication #6: Management fees should be higher for VCs that manage large funds ( z
is non-decreasing in d). VCs that manage VCFs with larger amounts of committed capital
should receive higher management fees.
Implication #7: The more experienced and skilled the VC, the lower the management fee
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and the higher the carried interest. This result exposes the tension that exists between the
carry and the management fee. The tension arises because the opportunity costs of both the
entrepreneur and the VC are linked through u, which captures the characteristics of the in-
vestment and the industry where the investment takes place. The higher the u, the higher the
carried interest received by VCs. However, Corollary 3 shows that a higher u also decreases
the surplus brought about by VCs’ screening, which in turn reduces the base compensation z.
Our predictions are consistent with a number of regularities reported in the empirical
literature. The results in Gompers and Lerner (1999), for example, support Implications
1 and 7. VC organizations that focus on early-stage and high-technology investments tend
to charge higher management fees. In addition, the management fee (carried interest) is
negatively (positively) associated with size and age of VC organizations. Kaplan and Schoar
(2005) find that industry returns (net of fees) are procyclical. This in accordance with
Implication 4 since management fees are given by the surplus brought about by VCs.
To our knowledge, many of the predictions listed above have not been empirically tested.
This is somewhat surprising since they agree with heuristic arguments found elsewhere in
the academic and practitioner literatures. Directly testing these model implications would
deepen our understanding of the venture capital industry.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
Our paper analyzes the emergence and efficiency of venture capital partnerships. We develop
a model in which a uniformed investor offers project funding and decides whether to screen
an entrepreneur before financing. Financing takes place in two periods. Investment in the
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first period requires resources from both the investor and the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs
are heterogeneous with respect to wealth, information, and project quality. Venture capital-
ists provide information for screening activity at a price. The relation that is created when
the investor uses the services (i.e., buys information) from the VC gives rise to the venture
capital fund (VCF).
We formally derive equilibrium conditions in which the investor pays VCs in order to
carry out screening (VC-equilibrium). The willingness of the investor to buy information
from VCs will depend on his expected return when he does not buy information and on his
beliefs about the accuracy of the screening. The precision of screening will depend on the
information of VCs and on the expected gains upon forming a VCF.
The analysis shows that uninformed financing allows for inefficient outcomes as good
projects are not financed in bad times and bad projects are financed in good times. Although
VCs might provide inaccurate reports to investors about investments opportunities, reports
are precise enough so as to adjust beliefs of investors and entrepreneurs about projects. The
correlation between the information of entrepreneurs and VCs is key to this adjustment. A
lower proportion of bad projects is financed in good times and a higher proportion of good
projects are financed in bad times — inefficiency is reduced.
In the final part of our analysis, we build on findings from previous studies to calibrate our
model. We find estimates for the management fees charged by VCs and industry returns that
are quite consistent with empirical evidence. We also provide a long list of testable model im-
plications. To the best of our knowledge, most of those predictions remain untested. This is
surprising since they agree with arguments found in the academic and practitioner literatures.
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While there is much work to do on the economics of venture capital financing, the analysis
of this paper reconcile a number of features of the VC industry within a standard contract
theory framework. It also helps pushing theoretical and empirical research in the field in
new directions. We believe analyses such as ours can be helpful in guiding regulatory and
popular debates on the role of venture capital financing in the economy.
41
1.7 Figures and Tables
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Figure 1.1: Timing of the Game
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Figure 1.2: Investor’s and VC’s Proceeds. The first cash flow of the VCF is the investor’s
revenue from the investment in period 0, which is given by RI0 and is appropriated by the
investor. The second cash flow comes from the outcome of the second round of financing,
which is given by piH and is shared between the VC and the investor.
43
QP
0
A
B
C
D
E F
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Figure 1.3: Outcomes under Uninformed Financing. The vertical axis represents the “price,”
i.e., the investor’s expected repayment P
(
RU0
)
given his price strategy RU0 . The horizontal
axis represents the “quantity,” i.e., the probability that an entrepreneur with a good project
accepts the contract Q
(
RU0
)
. The bold vertical lines represent the quantity demanded. R1
is the price of funding in the follow up stage of financing, p is the probability that a good
project succeeds, q is the probability of being informed about the entrepreneur’s project, λ is
the probability that the entrepreneur’s project has positive NPV, and mH is the entrepreneur’s
entrepreneurial capital.
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Figure 1.4: Outcomes under Informed Financing. The vertical axis represents the “price,”
i.e., the investor’s expected repayment P
(
Ri0
)
given his price strategy Ri0 for i = U, I. The
horizontal axis represents the “quantity,” i.e., the probability that an entrepreneur with a good
project accepts the contract Q
(
Ri0
)
. The bold vertical lines represent the quantity demanded
at a given price. R1 is the price of funding in the follow up stage of financing, p is the probability
that a good project succeeds, q is the probability of being informed about the entrepreneur’s
project, λ is the probability that the entrepreneur’s project has positive NPV, and mH is the
entrepreneur’s entrepreneurial capital.
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Table 1.1: Calibrated Parameters of the Model
piH is the return of a good project in the good state, q is the probability that the entrepreneur is
informed, p is the probability that a good project succeeds, λ is the probability that the entrepreneur
has a good project, u is the entrepreneur’s reservation utility, mH is the high-type entrepreneurial
capital, and d is the investor’s amount of resources. See text for details of the parameter setting
process.
piH q p λ u mH d
27 0.911 0.711 0.093 0.66 0.33 1
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Chapter 2
Credit Default Swaps, Firm Financing
and the Economy
2.1 Introduction
The 2000s witnessed a formidable growth in the market for credit default swaps. According
to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the outstanding amount of
CDS contracts grew from $3 trillion in 2003 to a peak of $62 trillion in 2007. The 2008–9
crisis brought attention to these contracts. There is an ongoing debate about whether CDSs
contributed to the crisis and how one might regulate CDS markets.1 Surprisingly, however,
little is known about why CDSs exist in the first place. We know little about the role of CDSs
in financial markets, what contracting inefficiencies they address, or whether they affect the
availability of credit in the economy. Understanding these issues should strike anyone as an
important step for improving financial architecture and regulation over the next decade.
A CDS is a bilateral agreement between a debt protection seller and a debt protection
buyer. The buyer makes periodic payments to the seller in exchange for compensation in
1Title VII of Dodd-Frank Act (HR #4173) gives the SEC regulatory authority over swaps, including
CDSs. The Act requires the reporting of trades, sets position limits, imposes margin requirements, and
moves swaps away from over-the-counter markets into organized exchanges.
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the event a borrower defaults on its debt. Hu and Black (2008a,b) argue that CDSs can
give rise to the empty creditor problem. Simply put, lenders protected by CDS might have
low incentives to participate in out-of-court restructurings of distressed firms since formal
default triggers immediate compensation for their exposure. The incentives to engage in
restructuring could be even lower if lenders “overinsure;” that is, their protection payoff
surpasses the amount of debt that can be recovered in default. In these cases, lenders might
collect large profits from bankruptcy. CDS-insured lenders might thus force distressed firms
into bankruptcy even when continuation would be optimal.2
The introduction of CDS contracts may alter the dynamics of corporate financing since
optimal lending decisions are influenced by expected distress outcomes. While there is grow-
ing interest in the impact of CDSs on creditor–borrower relations, the literature lacks a model
that examines important questions about these contracts. How do CDSs affect lenders’ pref-
erences between out-of-court restructuring and bankruptcy? Do CDSs affect borrowers’
incentives to make their projects profitable and avoid bankruptcy? How do firm character-
istics such as risk and size influence CDS contracting? How do economic conditions affect
the demand for CDSs? Do CDS markets affect the availability of credit in the economy?
This paper develops a model of CDS contracting when investment is subject to moral
hazard and verification is imperfect. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine
the optimal demand for CDS in a setting that incorporates these real-world complexities (we
discuss the existing literature shortly). Creditors choose the amount of CDS protection to
2Numerous accounts blame overinsured CDS lenders for blocking out-of-court restructurings of high
profile firms during the financial crisis. In 2009 alone, companies in that category included Six Flags,
Harrah’s, GM, Chrysler, Unisys, R. H. Donnelley, Abitibi Bowater, Marconi, and Lyondell Basell.
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modulate their economic exposure to borrowers and our analysis shows how this choice is
made, describing its economic consequences.
In a nutshell, our model shows that CDS overinsurance is associated with the implemen-
tation of efficient effort by borrowers, which maximizes the likelihood that projects succeed
and alleviates the empty creditor problem. The model also shows that CDS overinsurance is
more likely to be associated with safer firms. Along with evidence that CDSs are mainly writ-
ten on these types of firms, our analysis suggests that CDS contracts may have emerged and
become popular in the early 2000s precisely by virtue of its overinsurance capabilities. The
analysis additionally implies that CDS contracts can boost the availability of credit in the
economy and that CDS overinsurance is less common at times when projects are more likely
to fail. Our paper shows that while CDSs facilitate borrowing by credit-constrained firms,
CDSs will also be associated with their demise in bad times, leading to the “appearance” that
CDSs aggravate the impact of economic downturns.3 As we discuss below, proposed regula-
tory changes that prohibit lenders to overinsure via CDS may have the adverse consequence
of reducing the availability of credit when firms most need it.
Let us provide context to our framework and discuss the implications of our analysis in
some detail. In credit markets lenders have to design contracts that account for commitment
issues, moral hazard problems, and inefficient restructuring protocols. Our analysis of CDS
contracting incorporates these features. In the model, borrowers face a limited commitment
problem in that they cannot commit to pay out cash flows from their projects. In effect, bor-
rowers can divert cash flows and strategically trigger debt renegotiation even when projects
3Relatedly, Stulz (2010) argues that it is unlikely that CDSs have caused the worst problems of the
financial crisis.
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succeed. Moreover, the amount of effort that borrowers dedicate to their projects is unob-
servable, even though that effort affects cash flows. Finally, we consider that restructuring
is a costly process and can dissipate enterprise value.
As is standard, lenders can refuse to renegotiate contracts in default and force firms into
liquidation; else they can engage in out-of-court restructurings and bargain over the portion
of firm continuation values that can be verified. In the presence of CDS contracts, however,
they have an alternative course of action. Lenders can insure against strategic renegotiation:
CDS contracts trigger a payment by a third party if a “credit event” occurs.4 As we demon-
strate, the innovation brought about by CDSs is that they can be used to strengthen lenders’
position by: (1) increasing debt repayments when investments succeed and (2) increasing
lenders’ share of proceeds in default states. Differently put, CDS insurance can be used to
modulate whether lenders will have a stronger bargaining position when projects succeed or
when they fail. Let’s discuss how this works under different degrees of CDS insurance.
If lenders buy CDS protection beyond the maximum amount they can receive in restruc-
turings (i.e., lenders “overinsure” or have so-called “negative net economic ownership”), they
pre-commit to forcing defaulting borrowers into bankruptcy. Intuitively, the mechanism
works somewhat similarly to standard insurance. CDSs resemble actuarially fairly-priced
policies and overinsurance increases both the likelihood that the insured party will require
payoffs (immediate compensation for credit events) and the associated insurance premia
(CDS fees).5 To wit, once a credit event happens, the one-time payoff from seeking im-
4As desfined by the ISDA, credit events include default, debt acceleration, failure to pay, repudia-
tion/moratorium, and bankruptcy. The standard CDS contract does not recognize out-of-court restructuring
as a credit event.
5As in any competitive market, the insurance premium schedule is such that, in expectation, the insured
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mediate borrower liquidation is large enough to commit CDS-protected lenders with that
course of action. As a result, borrowers are prevented from capturing rents from default–
continuation strategies. This not only discourages borrowers from defaulting strategically,
but also incentivizes them to exert high effort, increasing the likelihood that investments
are successful. By altering the dynamics of renegotiations and heightening borrowers’ incen-
tives, overinsured lenders maximize regular debt repayments in good investment states (e.g.,
extraction of higher “debt coupons”).
If lenders buy an amount of CDS protection that equals the maximum payoff under
restructuring (“zero net economic ownership”), they do not commit to unconditional liqui-
dation in default states.6 Instead, they position themselves so as to bargain over surpluses
stemming from out-of-court renegotiations. Although zero net economic ownership maxi-
mizes the amount of debt repayment consistent with no liquidation, it leaves some surplus
for borrowers when the verification of funds in default states is imperfect. Because “just-
insured” lenders are relatively less inclined to call for bankruptcy if borrowers default, they
pay lower fees for their CDS insurance. At the same time, because borrowers retain a fraction
of restructuring values and know forced liquidation is less likely to happen, they are more
prone to strategically default. This dynamic determines the tradeoffs faced by just-insured
lenders. These lenders forego debt repayment surpluses that are extracted when investments
succeed in exchange for higher renegotiation proceeds when investments fail.
The optimal degree of CDS insurance will be a function of tradeoffs between continua-
party does not make an economic profit (e.g., higher insurance payoffs are associated with higher premia).
6For completeness, in the law and economics literature “positive net economic ownership” refers to the case
in which lenders do not completely hedge their economic exposure to borrowers (see Hu and Black (2007)).
We will later discuss current proposals mandating that lenders maintain such positions in CDS markets.
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tion and liquidation values, as well as the probability of investment success. When values
under out-of-court restructuring and liquidation are similar, lenders expect to get the same
payoff should firms become distressed. Given a similar bad state payoff, it is not worth it
for lenders to position themselves so as to bargain over firm continuation. Instead, lenders
will be inclined to overinsure so as to maximize gains from good investment states. When
continuation values are higher than liquidation values, on the other hand, lenders face a
more difficult problem. In this case, as we discuss next, they need to weigh in the likelihood
that projects succeed.
When investments are likely to succeed (call it “booms”), the probability that borrowers
are in distress is small. Lenders’ payoffs will come mostly from regular debt repayments.
To maximize those payoffs, lenders will prefer to take negative net economic ownerships
(overinsure with CDS). CDS overinsurance will then maximize debt repayments consistent
with borrowers exerting high effort to make their firms profitable. Conditional on distress,
however, firms with CDS-overinsured lenders will be promptly liquidated — the empty cred-
itor problem is pronounced in booms.
In “busts,” the probability of investment failure is higher and lenders’ expected payoffs
lean more towards outcomes associated with default (out-of-court restructuring and liqui-
dation values). If continuation values are higher than liquidation values, lenders will be
inclined to have zero net economic ownership — the empty creditor problem is reduced. In
this scenario, zero net economic ownership reduces borrowers’ payoffs when their firms are in
distress (as lenders stand to capture restructuring surpluses). This, in turn, prompts borrow-
ers to exert high effort to make their investments more likely to succeed. On the flip side, if
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continuation values are low and approximate liquidation values, the gains from renegotiation
decline. Lenders will then be more inclined to overinsure. Notably, Because investments are
more likely to fail in bad states, this dynamic might lead one to “too often” observe CDS-
insured lenders forcing firms with low continuation values into bankruptcy during busts.
The endogenous link between the demand for CDS and the state of the economy described
by our model is new to the literature.7 The implications of a contracting framework that
allows for complexities such as commitment and moral hazard problems stand in contrast
to the extant notion that CDSs are harmful for allowing lenders to have negative economic
ownership in the firms they finance. Additional model analysis shows that, in booms, CDS
overinsurance increases financing to levels that exceed financing in economies where lender
ownership is constrained to be non-negative. In busts, CDSs increase funding to levels that,
at a minimum, equal those in economies where lender ownership is constrained to be non-
negative. Naturally, there are more investment failures in downturns and, observationally,
there are more bankruptcies being pushed forward by lenders that are CDS insured during
those times. In the absence of a benchmark, however, that casual observation is uninforma-
tive about the role played by CDSs in busts.
The theory we propose has several empirical implications and sheds light on recent at-
tempts to find evidence on the empty creditor hypothesis. We show, for example, that CDSs
are more beneficial for firms that are safer and have higher continuation values. This result
is surprising as one might expect riskier firms to benefit the most from the existence of CDS
7In the existent literature, Bolton and Oehmke (2011) do not consider the impact of investment success
on the demand for CDS (CDS contracting in their paper ignores the state of the economy and managerial
effort), while Arping (2004) does not consider the incentives of lenders to overinsure with CDS.
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insurance. Consistent with our model, recent studies by Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and
Hirtle (2009) find that safer, larger firms have benefited the most from CDS contracts (for
example, by paying lower interest on their bank loans once CDSs are written on their bonds).
Our theory predicts that the beneficial effects of CDSs on firm financing are present even
when aggregate credit is tight. Consistent with this prediction, Saretto and Tookes (2011)
find that CDSs increased corporate leverage and debt maturity even during the 2008–9 crisis.
Our model also implies that the empty credit problem is procyclical; that is, the conditional
probability of CDS-led liquidation given that a firm is in distress is higher (lower) in booms
(busts). As such, the model reconciles results from empirical studies looking at the role of
CDSs in influencing the choice between restructuring and bankruptcy during recent con-
tractions, including the financial crisis (e.g., Mengle (2009), Aspeli and Iden (2010), and
Bedendo et al. (2010)).
Our analysis has direct implications for the debate about the optimal regulation of CDS
markets. Hu and Black (2008a,b) argue that voting in restructuring decisions should be
limited to lenders with positive net economic ownerships. We argue, in turn, that this con-
straint would destroy the ex ante benefits of CDSs. Bolton and Oehmke (2011) suggest that
eliminating negative net economic ownerships (CDS overinsurance) would increase efficiency
since this would reduce the risk of breakdowns in restructurings. In contrast to their recom-
mendation, we show that banning overinsurance is undesirable in a world where economic
fluctuations affect investment prospects. Indeed, we show that imposing strict limits on CDS
positions may end up reducing firms’ credit capacity when they most need it.
Our paper is related to an infant literature on links between CDSs and creditor–borrower
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relations. Most papers in this literature focus on the effect of CDSs on adverse selection
and moral hazard problems. Duffee and Zhou (2001) show that CDSs can alleviate “lemons
problems” in credit risk-transfer markets. Parlour and Winton (2008) show how loan sales
and CDSs might jointly emerge in equilibrium, characterizing risk-transfer efficiency. Par-
lour and Plantin (2008) further investigate the effect of CDS markets on banks’ incentive to
monitor (see also Morrison (2005)). Arping (2004) shows that CDSs increase the commit-
ment of lenders to terminate projects in the presence of moral hazard. Bolton and Oehmke
(2011) show that CDSs help reduce strategic renegotiations. Creditors in their model disre-
gard payoffs associated with non-default states and optimal CDS insurance is independent
of investment prospects. The aforementioned papers are silent on the interplay between the
empty creditor problem, the probability of investment success (state of the economy and
effort), and the demand for CDS.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup.
In Section 3, we analyze the consequences of CDS contracting on renegotiation and liq-
uidation outcomes. Section 4 characterizes the interplay between debt repayment, CDS
contracts, and borrowers’ effort choices. Section 5 derives the demand for CDS. In Section
6, we characterize the efficiency of CDS markets and study welfare implications of imposing
constraints on those markets. We present a set of empirical implications in Section 7. Section
8 concludes the paper. All proofs are in Appendix C.
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2.2 Model Setup
There are three risk neutral players: a borrower, a lender, and a competitive CDS provider.
The game is played in three periods t = 0, 1, 2. The borrower is penniless, but endowed with
a project. He turns to a lender to fund the project.
The time line and structure of the game is depicted in Figure 2.1. The project needs
I > 0 units of investment in t = 0. If a project receives investment in t = 0, it generates
outcome o1 ∈ {0, y1} in t = 1. Following Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) and Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990, 1996), we assume that o1 is non-verifiable. If the lender decides to fi-
nance the project, she makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the borrower. A contract specifies
a repayment R˜1 (o˜1) to be made to the lender in t = 1, where o˜1 ∈ {0, y1} is the outcome
reported by the borrower. We assume limited liability such that R˜1 (o˜1) ≤ o˜1. Accordingly,
we have R˜1 (0) = 0, and a contract is characterized by R1 ≡ R˜1 (y1).
[Figure 2.1 about here]
If the borrower accepts the offer, he chooses his effort level. The borrower chooses either
to exert high effort, eH , or low effort, eL. The distribution of the short-term outcome o1
depends on the effort level. The probability that o1 = y1 is pH if the borrower chooses
e = eH , and pL if the borrower chooses e = eL, where pH > pL. If the borrower chooses
eL, he derives a private benefit B > 0. Effort choices are not observed by the lender, who
has belief µ that the borrower chooses e = eH . After the borrower decides on his effort, the
lender decides whether to buy a CDS. If the lender buys a CDS, she chooses the repayment
that accrues if a “credit event” occurs in t = 1, and pays the correspondent fee f to the CDS
56
provider. We model the payment received by the lender in the event of liquidation according
to practice in the CDS market. The lender retains the liquidation value of the investment
(interpreted as proceeds from Chapter 11) βI, where 0 < β < 1. In addition, she also
receives the compensation amount pi. Since the CDS market is competitive, the premium f
is fairly priced. A credit event is said to occur if the borrower is formally in default; i.e., if the
borrower reports o˜1 = 0 and the lender refuses to engage in a voluntary debt renegotiation.
At the beginning of t = 1, outcome o1 is realized. If the borrower reports o˜1 = y1, then
no default occurs. In this case, the project continues and generates outcome o2 = y2 in
t = 2.8 The borrower’s payoff is y1−R1 + y2 and the lender receives R1. We assume that y2
cannot be contracted upon ex ante, but it can be verified by the lender in t = 2. Following
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Krasa and Villamil (2000), we assume that the verification
technology is imperfect, that is, an amount (1− δ) y2 of the continuation outcome cannot
be verified by an outside court and remains with the borrower. In this case, the lender can
verify δy2 at a cost (1− λ) δy2.
If the borrower reports o˜1 = 0, the lender can either engage in renegotiation or force liq-
uidation. If the lender refuses to renegotiate, the borrower defaults on his debt. The project
is liquidated and the lender receives L (pi) ≡ βI + pi, while the borrower receives o1. If the
lender adheres to a renegotiation schedule, both the lender and the borrower bargain over
the value y˜2 ≡ λδy2 in t = 2. In this case, the lender receives x and the borrower receives
o1 + (1− δ) y2 + y˜2 − x, where x is the outcome of the renegotiation game.
The borrower may choose to strategically renegotiate (i.e., to trigger renegotiation even
8In principle, there could be uncertainty regarding the continuation outcome o2 (as in Bolton and
Oehmke (2011)). Our results, however, are qualitatively similar in the presence of uncertainty.
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when o1 = y1) if the lender cannot credibly commit to liquidate and the borrower’s payoff
under renegotiation is sufficiently high. However, CDSs increase the lender’s payoff under
liquidation, which makes the lender’s threat to liquidate more credible. As we show below,
CDSs also increase the lender’s bargaining position under renegotiation, hence her share of
the project’s continuation value y2. The amount of CDS insurance bought by the lender can
be used as a way of strengthening her bargaining power when the project is not liquidated,
or as a liquidation commitment device.
2.3 CDS, Renegotiation, and Default
We start our equilibrium analysis by investigating the outcome that would prevail when the
borrower triggers renegotiation (o˜1 = 0) and the lender accepts to renegotiate. We use a
standard Nash-bargaining solution concept where the borrower and the lender disagreement
payoffs are 0 and L (pi), respectively. According to this concept, the bargaining outcome will
be given by
x (L (pi)) =
1
2
y˜2 +
1
2
L (pi) . (2.1)
From equation (3.1) one can see that the lender’s (gross) economic ownership — her
share of the continuation value — is increasing in both the amount of CDS protection pi and
the liquidation value βI.9
For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that x (L (0)) > L (0). This implies that
the lender prefers renegotiation to liquidation and that liquidation is ex post inefficient.
Given the outcome of renegotiation, the lender refuses to renegotiate if L (pi) > x (L (pi))
9Hu and Black (2007) define economic ownership as “...the economic return on shares, which can be
achieved directly by holding shares or indirectly by holding a coupled asset.”
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and engages in renegotiation if L (pi) ≤ x (L (pi)). We note that an increase in L (pi) not
only directly affects the threat point of liquidation (one-to-one), but also the renegotiation
outcome (also in a linear fashion, but with slope smaller than one). Therefore, there exists
a unique threshold of L (pi∗) such that the lender is indifferent between liquidation and rene-
gotiation. We assume that the lender renegotiates if she is indifferent between the payoff of
renegotiation and that of bankruptcy. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose the borrower triggers renegotiation. The lender refuses to renego-
tiate if L (pi) > L (pi∗) and engages in renegotiation if L (pi) ≤ L (pi∗) , where L (pi∗) = y˜2.
Proposition 1 says that the lender’s maximum payoff consistent with renegotiation is at-
tained when she buys credit protection in the amount of pi = pi∗. Although CDS protection
above pi∗ increases the lender’s economic ownership, it reduces her interest to renegotiate
and results in default. The reason is that the lender’s incentive to renegotiate is dictated by
her net economic ownership. The lender’s net economic ownership is a combination of her
share of the continuation value and her payoff under bankruptcy.10 Accordingly, credit pro-
tection above pi∗ builds up negative net economic ownership, while credit protection below
that amount results in positive net economic ownership. If the lender’s CDS protection is
equal to pi∗, she has zero net economic ownership.
For credit protection values at most as high as pi∗, the lender builds up non-negative net
economic ownership and engages in renegotiation. In this case, the maximum renegotiation
payoff is given by y˜2. Credit protection in excess of pi
∗ results in negative net economic owner-
ship, in which case the lender refuses to renegotiate and forces the borrower into bankruptcy.
10Hu and Black (2007) define net economic ownership as “...a person’s combined economic ownership of
host company shares and coupled assets, and can be positive, zero, or negative.”
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We now derive the borrower’s decision to call for strategic renegotiation given that the
project succeeds (o1 = y1). If the borrower reports the truth (i.e., o˜1 = y1), his payoff is
y1 − R1 + y2. This payoff needs to be compared to that when he lies (o˜1 = 0). In this case,
if the lender renegotiates, the borrower’s payoff is y1 + (1− δ) y2 + y˜2 − x (L (pi)). If the
lender does not renegotiate, the borrower’s payoff is y1. We assume that the borrower does
not call for renegotiation when he is indifferent between diverting the realized cash flow and
reporting the true outcome.
Intuitively, the borrower triggers strategic renegotiation if the face value of debt R1 ex-
ceeds a threshold. The game is solved backwards and if the lender is expected to renegotiate,
the borrower triggers renegotiation if R1 > δy2 − y˜2 + x (L (pi)). If the lender is expected to
liquidate, the borrower triggers renegotiation if R1 > y2. We summarize this result in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose the project succeeds. Then:
(1) If the lender has non-negative net economic ownership, the borrower triggers renegoti-
ation if and only if R1 > δ (1− λ) y2 + x (L (pi)).
(2) If the lender has negative net economic ownership, the borrower triggers renegotiation
if and only if R1 > y2.
Proposition 2 states that, as long as the lender has positive net economic ownership, i.e.,
pi < pi∗, an increase in pi (and hence L (pi)) reduces the borrower’s incentive to strategically
trigger renegotiation. In other words, an increase in the amount of CDS protection con-
tinuously increases the threshold value for repayment R1. At pi = pi
∗ (zero net economic
ownership), the threshold value for R1 hits a discontinuity as the lender’s economic owner-
ship becomes negative. The proposition implies that one needs to consider only the following
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two cases in the analysis of optimal CDS demand: (1) the lender has zero net economic own-
ership, i.e., pi = pi∗; or (2) the lender has negative net economic ownership, i.e., pi > pi∗. By
choosing the amount of CDS protection, pi, the lender modulates her net economic ownership
in the firm. Our paper is the first to demonstrate how this choice is optimally made.
2.4 Debt Repayments, CDS, and Effort
In the last section we identified the key tradeoff faced by the lender in our CDS model. Al-
though overinsurance allows the lender to receive higher debt repayments when investment is
successful, it comes at the cost of triggering bankruptcy when investment fails. Bankruptcy
gives the lender the liquidation value βI, which is smaller than her share of the continuation
value under renegotiation, δλy2. An important factor influencing this tradeoff is the bor-
rower’s effort choice. In this section we study how the lender chooses an optimal level of credit
protection given that she does not observe the borrower’s effort choice. We then analyze how
the lender’s choice of debt repayment affects the equilibrium of this CDS–Effort subgame.
2.4.1 The CDS–Effort Subgame
In this subsection we characterize the equilibria of the CDS-Effort subgame. First, we de-
rive the lender’s optimal CDS demand given her expectation regarding the borrower’s effort
choice. Next, we determine the borrower’s best effort choice given the lender’s choice of CDS
protection. Finally, we combine both the lender’s and the borrower’s best responses in order
to find the equilibria.
If the borrower chooses high effort, he increases the probability that the project suc-
61
ceeds. This weights the lender’s expected payoff more towards the repayment R1, making
CDS-overinsurance more attractive given the greater bargaining power this position entails.
The problem is that the lender does not observe the borrower’s effort level and must make her
decision on the amount of CDS under uncertainty. Proposition 3 characterizes the lender’s
optimal decision regarding the level of CDS protection.
Proposition 3 The lender’s net economic ownership is determined as follows:
(1) For R1 > y2, the lender chooses to have zero net economic ownership.
(2) For R1 ∈ (δy2, y2],
(i) the lender chooses to have negative net economic ownership if
R1 > R (µ) ≡ δλy2 − βI [µ (1− pH) + (1− µ) (1− pL)]
µpH + (1− µ) pL ,
(ii) the lender chooses to have zero net economic ownership if R1 ≤ R (µ).
(3) For R1 ≤ δy2, the lender chooses to have zero net economic ownership.
According to Proposition 3, the lender does not overinsure if she chooses R1 > y2. The
reason is that a repayment R1 > y2 causes the borrower to trigger strategic renegotiation,
implying that renegotiation takes place independent of the outcome o1. If the lender overin-
sures, she refuses to renegotiate and the borrower defaults. The payoff of the lender is βI. If
the lender does not build up negative economic ownership, her payoff is y˜2 > βI. Therefore,
the lender is better off without overinsurance.
If the lender chooses R1 ∈ (δy2, y2], then Proposition 3 shows that overinsurance is attrac-
tive for the lender provided that she is able to receive a high debt repayment. In this case, if
the lender chooses pi = pi∗, renegotiation is always triggered and the lender’s payoff is given
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by δλy2. If the lender overinsures, she receives R1 when the project succeeds and receives βI
when the project fails. Given the lender’s expected probability of success µpH + (1− µ) pL,
the repayment R1 must be high enough so as to compensate for foregone renegotiation pro-
ceeds. This translates into the requirement that R1 > R (µ). Since R (µ) is decreasing in µ,
the more the lender believes the borrower is exerting low effort, the higher the repayment
must be in other to compensate her for the loan. Another important observation is that the
higher the recovery value βI, the smaller the repayment necessary to induce overinsurance.
A repayment R1 ≤ δy2 is insufficient to induce overinsurance. In this situation, zero
net economic ownership is enough to avoid strategic renegotiation. Accordingly, overinsur-
ance only decreases the lender’s payoff since foregone renegotiation proceeds are higher than
bankruptcy proceeds.
Proposition 3 described the lender’s best choices of CDS insurance given her beliefs about
the borrower’s effort choice. To find the equilibria of this subgame, we need to derive the
borrower’s effort choices given the lender’s amount of insurance. This is given by Proposition
4. We assume that whenever the borrower is indifferent between exerting high effort and
low effort, he chooses the former.
Proposition 4 Let ∆ ≡ y1 − B(pH−pL) . The borrower’s choice of effort is determined as
follows:
(1) For R1 > y2, the borrower chooses high effort if and only if y1 (pH − pL) ≥ B.
(2) For R1 ∈ (δy, y2],
(i) if the lender has negative net economic ownership, the borrower chooses high effort
if and only if R1 ≡ y2 + ∆ ≥ R1,
(ii) if the lender has non-negative net economic ownership, the borrower chooses high
effort if and only if y1 (pH − pL) ≥ B.
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(3) For R1 ≤ δy2, the borrower chooses high effort if and only if
R1 ≡ δy2 + ∆ ≥ R1.
We assume that it is optimal to implement high effort in the absence of strategic default
and liquidation given default. In this efficient world, investment I should be made if and
only if
Π ≡ max {pH (y1 + y2) + (1− pH) [(1− λ) y2 + y˜2]
, pL (y1 + y2) + (1− pL) [(1− λ) y2 + y˜2] +B} ≥ I. (2.2)
Conditional on the project having positive NPV, i.e., Π > 0, high effort should be induced
if and only if y1 (pH − pL) + δ (1− λ) y2 ≥ B. Along with this assumption, we also assume
that y1 (pH − pL) < B.11 These two assumptions imply that verification costs are sufficiently
high such that it is optimal do induce high effort in order to avoid those costs.
It follows from Proposition 4 that, if the lender has zero net economic ownership, the
borrower’s compensation in the event the project succeeds must be sufficiently high to in-
duce him to exert high effort. Alternatively, if the lender chooses a debt repayment that is
sufficiently high, then she must build up negative net economic ownership to induce high
effort. If the lender overinsures, she can credibly threat to reject renegotiation and force
the borrower into bankruptcy. This reduces the borrower’s payoff when investment fails and
creates a compensation scheme that induces high effort.
Proposition 5 characterizes the equilibria of the CDS–Effort subgame. While the proposi-
11If we assume otherwise, then according to Proposition 4 it would follow that high effort is always
implemented.
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tion seems fairly involved, it reveals a number of economically interesting results. We discuss
them in turn.
Proposition 5 Let R (0) ∈ (δy2, y2). The equilibria of the CDS–Effort subgame are deter-
mined as follows:
(1) For R1 > y2, the lender chooses zero net economic ownership and the borrower chooses
low effort.
(2) Let R1 ∈ (δy2, y2].
(i) For R1 ∈ (R (0) , y2]: (a) if R1 > R1, the lender chooses negative net economic
ownership and the borrower chooses low effort; (b) if R1 ≤ R1, the lender chooses
negative net economic ownership and the borrower chooses high effort.
(ii) For R1 ∈ (δy2, R (0)]: (a) if R1 > R1, the lender chooses zero net economic owner-
ship and the borrower chooses low effort; (b) if R1 ≤ R1, there is one equilibrium
in which the lender chooses negative net economic ownership and the borrower
chooses high effort, and another in which the lender chooses zero net economic
ownership and the borrower chooses low effort.
(3) For R1 ≤ δy2:
(i) if R1 > R1, the lender chooses zero net economic ownership and the borrower
chooses low effort;
(ii) if R1 ≤ R1, the lender chooses zero net economic ownership and the borrower
chooses high effort.
If the lender charges a repayment that is too high (i.e., R1 > y2), then she chooses to have
zero net economic ownership. According to Proposition 5, this debt repayment is insufficient
to induce the borrower to exert high effort. If the lender chooses a debt repayment below
R1 ≤ δy2, then she also prefers a zero net economic ownership position. The reason is that
the lender receives δR1 when the project succeeds under both negative and zero net economic
ownerships. On the other hand, if the lender overinsures and the project fails, she receives
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the liquidation value βI, as opposed to the renegotiation surplus y˜2 > βI. The borrower’s
effort choice depends on his payoff when the project succeeds. If the repayment chosen by
the lender is above R1, then the borrower exerts low effort and derives benefit B. If the
lender’s repayment is sufficiently low (R1 ≤ R1), then the borrower has enough incentives
to choose high effort in order to increase the project’s probability of success.
The analysis is slightly more involved when the lender’s choice of debt repayment lies
in the interval (δy2, y2]. If the debt repayment is sufficiently high (R1 > R (0)), the lender
prefers to overinsure. This result follows from the fact that the debt repayment received
when the project succeeds is large enough so as to compensate for the foregone renegotiation
proceeds when the project fails. If the debt repayment is such that R1 < R1 ≤ R (0), the
lender chooses zero net economic ownership. The intuition for nonexistence of an equilib-
rium with overinsurance is as follows. Proposition 4 says the lender overinsures if and only
if her belief that the borrower chooses high effort is sufficiently high, such that R1 > R (µ).
Proposition 5 says that for R1 > R1, the borrower’s optimal choice of effort is eL, which
implies that the lender’s updated belief is µ = 0. However, because R1 ≤ R (0) the lender is
better off without overinsurance.
If R1 ≤ R1 ≤ R (0), then there are two equilibria. On the one hand, if the lender an-
ticipates that the borrower will choose high effort (i.e., R1 > R (µ)), then according the
Proposition 4 she overinsures. From Proposition 5 we know that overinsurance induces the
borrower to exert high effort, which results in µ = 1. This reinforces the lender’s willingness
to assume a negative net economic ownership as R1 > R (µ) ≥ R (1). On the other hand,
if the lender anticipates the borrower will choose low effort, then R1 ≤ R (µ). Proposition 4
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says that the lender chooses to have zero net economic ownership and Proposition 5 implies
that he borrower chooses low effort. Accordingly, the lender’s updated belief is µ = 0, which
confirms her decision to not overinsure since R1 ≤ R (µ) ≤ R (0).
Proposition 5 shows, in essence, that the lender can choose a debt repayment schedule
from two different sets. If she chooses a repayment from the set of low values, then just-
insurance is enough to avoid strategic default. On the other hand, to achieve the same
outcome when choosing from the set with high values, she must overinsure. Regardless of
the set from which the lender chooses the repayment, she needs to select a value that is
sufficiently small (within the relevant range) in order to induce high effort.
2.4.2 Debt Repayment and Effort
The analysis in the preceding subsection shows the possibility for equilibria with both zero
and negative net economic ownership in the CDS–Effort subgame for R1 ∈ (δy2, y2]. In par-
ticular, equilibria with zero net economic ownership occur when R1 ∈ (δy2, R (0)]. However,
the lender chooses a repayment in this range only if R1 ≤ R1 and the equilibrium played is
one that results in overinsurance. This result follows from the fact that if the equilibrium for
R1 ∈ (δy2, R (0)] involves zero net economic ownership and low effort, then a repayment in
this range is strictly dominated by a repayment of R1 = δy2. To see this point, note that if
the lender chooses R1 ∈ (δy2, R (0)], then renegotiation is always triggered and her payoff is
y˜2. If the lender chooses R1 = δy2, then the borrower does not call for strategic renegotiation
and the lender’s payoff is
Π (δy2) ≡ [pLδ + (1− pL) δλ] y2, (2.3)
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which is strictly greater than y˜2.
As a consequence of the preceding analysis, the lender chooses R1 ∈ (δy2, y2] only if she
overinsures. The lender’s dilemma within this range is whether to choose a low repayment
R1 ≤ R1 consistent with high effort, or require a high repayment R1 > R1 at the expense of
inducing low effort. To streamline our subsequent analysis, we assume that the equilibrium
played in (ii)(b) of Proposition 5 is the one that results in negative net economic ownership.12
We are then able to characterize the lender’s debt repayment choice.
If the lender chooses R1 ≤ δy2, then she faces a tradeoff between (1) requiring a repay-
ment that is consistent with the borrower exerting high effort, and (2) demanding a higher
repayment that induces the borrower to choose low effort and increases the probability of
failure and renegotiation. If the lender chooses the former, her payoff is given by:
Π
(
R1
) ≡ pH∆ + [pHδ + (1− pH) δλ] y2. (2.4)
If the lender chooses R1 ∈ (δy2, y2], she faces a similar tradeoff. In particular, when the
lender chooses R1 = y2, her payoff is
Π (y2) ≡ (1− pL) βI + pLy2, (2.5)
while if she chooses R1 = R1, her payoff is
Π
(
R1
) ≡ pH∆ + (1− pH) βI + pHy2. (2.6)
Proposition 6 derives the conditions under which the lender chooses to induce high effort.
12If the equilibrium played is the one that results in zero net economic ownership, then if R1 ≤ R (0), the
lender chooses R1 ∈ (δy2, y2] only if R1 > R1 (i.e., only if she induces low effort).
68
Proposition 6 The level of effort induced by the lender is determined as follows:
(1) For R1 ∈ (δy2, y2], the lender chooses R1 = R1 over R1 = y2 if and only if
y2 ≥ y2 ≡ − pH
pH − pL∆ + βI.
(2) For R1 ≤ δy2, the lender chooses R1 = R1 over R1 = δy2 if and only if
y2 ≥ y2 ≡ − pH
δ (pH − pL) (1− λ)∆.
Proposition 6 shows that, within a given range, it is optimal for the lender to induce
high effort if and only if the project’s continuation value is sufficiently large. Since there is
no strategic renegotiation in equilibrium, the lender’s payoff is partially dependent upon the
debt repayment received when the project succeeds. Recall, Proposition 2 showed that the
higher the project’s continuation value, the higher the debt repayment consistent with no
strategic renegotiation. The probability that the project succeeds is thus partially dependent
upon the effort that the borrower chooses. In order for the lender to increase the probability
of success, she must give up some debt repayment to induce the borrower to exert high effort.
At the same time, increases in the project’s continuation value improve the tradeoff terms
in favor of inducing high effort. A higher probability of success makes the lender’s payoff
more sensitive to the continuation value. As Proposition 4 showed, higher continuation values
increase the debt repayment consistent with the borrower exerting high effort. Proposition
6 shows that for large enough continuation values, the lender prefers to induce the borrower
to exert high effort.
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2.5 CDS Contracts and the Economy
Although Proposition 6 describes the lender’s tradeoff between payoffs associated with debt
repayment and investment failure, it does not shed light on the lender’s choice to have zero
or negative net economic ownership — the demand for CDS. We describe this choice in turn.
The lender overinsures if she chooses a debt repayment in the range (δy2, y2], and as-
sumes a zero net economic ownership if she chooses a debt repayment such that R1 ≤ δy2.
Proposition 7 introduces one of the central results of our paper. It characterizes the lender’s
optimal repayment choice when the liquidation value is sufficiently small. A more complete
characterization is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 Let c (p) = δλ+δ (1− λ) p. If βI is sufficiently small, the lender’s repayment
choice is characterized by cutoffs y∗2 < y2 < y
∗∗
2 < y2 ≤ y∗∗∗2 such that:
(1) If pH > pL ≥ c (pH) > c (pL), the lender chooses
R1 =
{
y2, for y2 < y2
R1, for y2 ≥ y2
.
(2) If pH ≥ c (pH) > c (pL) > pL, the lender chooses
R1 =

y2, for y2 < y
∗
2
δy2, for y2 ∈ [y∗2, y∗∗2 )
R1, for y2 ≥ y∗∗2
.
(3) If c (pH) > pH > c (pL) > pL, the lender chooses
R1 =

y2, for y2 < y
∗
2
δy2, for y2 ∈ [y∗2, y∗∗2 )
R1, for y2 ∈ [y∗∗2 , y∗∗∗2 )
R1, for y2 ≥ y∗∗∗2
.
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(4) If c (pH) > c (pL) ≥ pH > pL, the lender chooses
R1 =

y2, for y2 < y
∗
2
δy2, for y2 ∈ [y∗2, y2)
R1, for y2 ≥ y2
.
Proposition 7 describes an important tradeoff faced by the lender in our model. If the
lender chooses to have negative net economic ownership, she refuses to renegotiate in default
and forces the borrower into bankruptcy. This maximizes debt repayments when investment
is successful, but reduces the payoff to the liquidation value of the project when the bor-
rower enters distress. If the lender chooses to have zero net economic ownership, she gives
up some debt repayment in the event investment succeeds in exchange for maximum rene-
gotiation proceeds in the event it fails. These dynamics are determined by the probability
of investment success pH and pL and project’s continuation value.
The first result from Proposition 7 is illustrated in Figure 2.2. If pH > pL ≥ c (pH) >
c (pL), then the lender’s payoff is weighted more towards outcomes associated with invest-
ment success (a portion of the project’s cash flows). As a result, the extra debt repayment
extracted when the project succeeds compensates for the forgone renegotiation proceeds
when the project fails.
[Figure 2.2 about here]
The second result from Proposition 7 is described in Figure 2.3. When economic conditions
are such that pH ≥ c (pH) > c (pL) > pL, there is a range of continuation values for which
the lender prefers not to overinsure. If the continuation value is low, the tradeoff faced
by the lender disappears. The lender’s payoffs when the project fails are approximately
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the same regardless of her net economic ownership. Therefore, the lender overinsures to
maximize her payoff (debt repayment) in the event the project succeeds. In addition, the
continuation value is insufficient for high effort to be optimal and the resulting probability of
success is pL. As the continuation value increases, the opportunity cost of overinsurance also
increases. Since the probability of success is still relatively low, expected forgone proceeds
from renegotiation are sizeable. Accordingly, it becomes optimal for the lender to have
zero net economic ownership. On the other hand, if the continuation value is sufficiently
high, then inducing the borrower to exert high effort is attractive for the lender. In this case,
overinsurance becomes optimal as it increases the debt repayment consistent with high effort.
[Figure 2.3 about here]
Another implication of Proposition 7 is that overinsurance is more likely to be associated
with firms that are safer (higher probability of investment success) and larger (higher con-
tinuation values). Along with the fact that the main difference between CDS and standard
insurance is that CDS allows for protection beyond economic interest, Proposition 7 helps
characterize the types of CDS positions we often observe: CDS are written on safer, larger
firms and many times leave lenders “overinsured” in their exposures to firms they lend to.
The results described above suggest that CDS-overinsurance is a likely phenomenon dur-
ing booms. To wit, higher probabilities of successful investments strengthen the beneficial
effects of CDSs on limited commitment and agency problems. This boosts the income that
can be pledged to lenders, increasing firm debt capacity. As a result, a larger number of
projects with positive NPV receive financing. Because the probabilities of investment failure
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are smaller in booms, the appearance of the empty creditor problem is reduced during those
times.Proposition 7 also shows that the lender prefers to overinsure when continuation values
are low. On the other hand, if c (pH) > c (pL) ≥ pH > pL, the lender chooses to have zero
net economic ownership for continuation values that are large. The reason is that, in this
case, the lender’s payoff is weighted more towards outcomes associated with project failure.
This increases the expected forgone renegotiation proceeds and the opportunity cost under
negative net economic ownership.
The fourth result of Proposition 7 is depicted in Figure 2.4. When the continuation value
is sufficiently low, the lender’s payoff when the project fails is the same regardless of her net
economic ownership. Thus, the lender prefers overinsurance in order to maximize her payoff
in the event the project succeeds. Since the continuation value is low, inducing high effort
is not optimal for the lender. Increasing the continuation value raises the attractiveness of
inducing the borrower to exert high effort. As a result, the lender chooses to overinsure and
to induce high effort. At high continuation values, in contrast, the tradeoff between debt re-
payment and renegotiation proceeds faced by the lender is sizeable. Because the probability
of success is low, the opportunity cost of overinsurance is large and it becomes optimal for
the lender to have zero net economic ownership.
[Figure 2.4 about here]
These results suggest that, during busts, CDS overinsurance emerges where credit constraints
are most likely to bind. Indeed, CDS overinsurance eases the financing of profitable projects
with relatively low continuation values, projects that would likely be underfunded (“finan-
cially constrained”) in tight credit markets without CDS contracts. On the flip side, the
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lender does not overinsure in busts when project continuation values are high. This optimal
CDS policy reduces the empty creditor problem exactly when its drawback is potentially
sizeable; that is, when the probability of distress is high. Importantly, zero net economic
ownership does not come at the cost of leaving profitable firms underfunded since, in expec-
tation, firms with high continuation values would likely receive funding even in the absence
CDS overinsurance.
Putting these results together, our analysis reveals the striking result that the empty
creditor problem is procyclical. Although CDS overinsurance leads to bankruptcy when the
borrower is distressed, the incidence of overinsurance is higher in booms, when the probabil-
ity of distress is small. Notably, the dynamics of the demand for CDS over the business cycle
works so as to minimize the empty creditor problem. As we discuss below, this result makes
the task of finding empirical evidence of the empty creditor problem particularly challenging.
2.6 Efficiency and Regulatory Constraints on CDS
Markets
From a welfare standpoint, it is important to characterize the efficiency gains associated with
the existence of CDS contracts. It is also important to understand how constraints on CDSs
— in especial, constraints on CDS overinsurance — may affect credit markets and firms.
The analysis of this section considers these issues and sheds light on the economic effects
of proposed regulatory changes in CDS markets. The comparison benchmark we use is the
equilibrium that obtains in the absence of CDSs.
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2.6.1 Equilibrium without CDS Markets
Proposition 2 shows that in the absence of CDSs the maximum repayment consistent with
no strategic default is given by R1 = δ (1− λ) y2 + x (L (0)). In order to implement high
effort, the repayment chosen by the lender must be such that
pH (y1 −R1 + y2) + (1− pH) [(1− δ) y2 + y˜2 − x (L (0))] ≥
pL (y1 −R1 + y2) + (1− pL) [(1− δ) y2 + y˜2 − x (L (0))] +B.
At the same time, the lender chooses to induce high effort if and only if
pH [δ (1− λ) y2 + x (L (0)) + ∆] + (1− pH) [x (L (0))] ≥
pL [δ (1− λ) y2 + x (L (0))] + (1− pL) [x (L (0))] ,
which holds if and only if y2 ≥ y2.
It follows that the borrower’s effort in the absence of CDSs is similar to the effort level
that obtains when CDS overinsurance is not allowed. This result is important in order to
examine the efficiency properties of CDSs as well as proposals to cap CDS insurance.
2.6.2 Efficiency
In our model, efficiency requires: (1) no strategic renegotiation, (2) no liquidation given
default, and (3) implementation of high effort. To see this, suppose the realized outcome
is o1 = y1. If the borrower does not call for renegotiation (i.e., o˜1 = y1), then total welfare
is y1 + y2. If a strategic renegotiation process takes place (o˜1 = 0), then total welfare is
y1 + (1− δ) y2 + y˜2 < y1 + y2. Accordingly, strategic renegotiation is inefficient. Failure to
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renegotiate when o1 = 0 is also inefficient. Total welfare under renegotiation is (1− δ) y2+y˜2.
However, if the lender refuses to engage in renegotiation, the lender defaults and total wel-
fare is βI < (1− δ) y2 + y˜2. Finally, implementation of high effort is efficient under the
assumption that y1 (pH − pL) + δ (1− λ) y2 ≥ B.
In order to assess the efficiency properties of CDS contracts, we need to examine the
equilibrium levels of effort and insurance as functions of the project’s continuation value and
probability of success. We can use Proposition 7 to compile a table that helps illustrate the
problem.
[Table 2.1 about here]
Table 2.1 shows the equilibrium levels of CDS insurance (overinsurance vs. no-overinsurance)
and effort (low vs. high) for various combinations of investment success probability and con-
tinuation values. Each entry has the CDS–Effort equilibrium outcome that obtains for a
continuation value that is lower than the level specified in the column heading. One can
readily see from the table that overinsurance is increasing in the probability of investment
success. The table also suggests that effort is increasing in the project’s continuation value,
probability of success, and the level of CDS insurance.
To give context to the results in Table 2.1, recall that in the absence of CDSs, pi = 0. In
this case, the lender’s share of the continuation value resulting from renegotiation is x (L(0)).
This value is smaller than y˜2, which is her share when she just-insures, i.e., pi = pi
∗. The
borrower receives a greater share of the continuation value when he calls for renegotiation,
which increases his incentive to strategically default. The maximum debt repayment con-
sistent with no strategic renegotiation is therefore smaller in the absence of CDSs. Because
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the effort levels implemented without CDSs and with just-insurance are the same, it fol-
lows that it is always efficient for the lender to have zero net economic ownership. CDS
(just-)insurance improves debt capacity and does not cause the empty creditor problem.
If the level of effort implemented is the same with and without CDSs, then overinsurance
is inefficient if the project can be financed in the absence of CDS contracts. The cause of
this inefficiency is the empty creditor problem. Although CDSs increase lenders’ payoffs and
debt capacity, they also bring the threat of inefficient liquidation. If a project cannot be
financed with an amount of pi∗ of CDS protection, then overinsurance is efficient if it allows
the project to be financed.
Within this context, Table 2.1 depicts the efficiency role of CDS insurance; in particular,
CDS overinsurance. Despite the fact that overinsurance may lead to the empty creditor prob-
lem, in equilibrium, overinsurance is more likely to emerge when the probability of investment
success is high (see upper part of Table 2.1). In addition, CDS overinsurance helps implement
the efficient level of effort (more often than not, overinsurance is associated with high effort in
Table 2.1). Indeed, without CDSs (or when only just-insurance is allowed), high effort is only
implemented for continuation values above y2. Recall, a concern with CDS overinsurance
is that losses brought about by the empty creditor problem are increasing in continuation
values. However, Table 2.1 shows that this effect is partially offset by the fact that effort is
also increasing in continuation values, which reduce the probability of inefficient liquidation.
Finally, note that the inefficiency of empty creditors is higher when the verification cost
is lower (λ is higher), which results in higher forgone renegotiation proceeds. However, from
Proposition 7 one can see that the cutoffs c (p∗), c (pH), and c (pL) are increasing in λ. This
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makes the equilibria depicted in the lower part Table 2.1 more likely to obtain, implying less
overinsurance.13
2.6.3 Constraints on CDS
According to the analysis of the last subsection, it is efficient for the lender to have zero
net economic ownership. This result questions the reform proposals made by Hu and Black
(2008a,b), who argue that lenders’ CDS positions should be limited to positive net economic
ownerships. Under that proposed reform, our model says that restructuring proceeds would
be inefficiently reduced when zero net economic ownership is optimal.
If the level of effort implemented under both zero and negative net economic owner-
ships are the same, then overinsurance is inefficient if the project can be financed with
just-insurance. If this is the case, proposals to restrict net economic ownership to be non-
negative, such as Bolton and Oehmke (2011), could increase welfare. However, as pointed
by our model, overinsurance minimizes agency problems by allowing the implementation
of high effort. When this happens, the gains brought about by overinsurance in terms of
higher probability of success can offset the losses caused by the empty creditor problem. Our
analysis suggests that banning CDS overinsurance may thus be unwarranted.
To characterize this latter point, we need to start by considering equilibria that result
in overinsurance and high effort in the absence of constraints on CDSs. These equilibria
must then lead to low effort if we ban CDS overinsurance. These scenarios are described in
13Although not depicted in Table 2.1, note that the expected inefficiency of CDS overinsurance is reduced
by a better verification technology (higher δ) and a higher recovery rate (β). The former implies higher
verification costs and reduces the proceeds from renegotiation, while the latter increases the proceeds from
liquidation.
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Table 2.1 by the outcomes with overinsurance and continuation values above y2 and below
y2. Total welfare with negative net economic ownership is given by
W− ≡ pH (y1 + y2) + (1− pH) βI, (2.7)
while welfare with zero net economic ownership is equal to
W0 ≡ pL (y1 + y2) + (1− pL) [1− δ (1− λ)] y2. (2.8)
Since W− > W0 for pH sufficiently high, and W− < W0 for pH close to pL, there exists a
cutoff p∗H > pL such that for pH > p
∗
H it holds that W− > W0, and for pH < p
∗
H we have W− <
W0. This result says that a policy to cap net economic ownership to be nonnegative can re-
duce welfare. This and other results derived in this section are summarized in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 The following results hold regarding intervention and efficiency in CDS mar-
kets:
(1) For continuation values below y2 and above y2, overinsurance (restricting net economic
ownership to be nonnegative) is inefficient (efficient) if and only if the project can
be financed without overinsurance. The inefficiency (efficiency) of overinsurance is in-
creasing (decreasing) in the projects’ continuation value and decreasing in its probability
of success.
(2) For continuation values between y2 and y2, there exists a cutoff p
∗
H > pL such that
overinsurance (restricting net economic ownership to be nonnegative) is inefficient (ef-
ficient) if and only if pH < p
∗
H .
(3) Just-insurance (restricting net economic ownership to be positive) is efficient (ineffi-
cient).
Proposition 8 shows that for continuation values that are either sufficiently high or small
enough, CDS markets can be inefficient if they lead to overinsurance and if projects can be
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financed without CDSs. However, the inefficiency caused by the empty creditor problem is
likely to be small in these cases. High continuation values are associated with high effort
and high probability of success, which reduces the probability of default and liquidation.
For low continuation values, the inefficiency of empty creditors is reduced since forgone
renegotiation proceeds under liquidation are small. Our results suggest that constraining
the lender’s net economic ownership to be nonnegative is unlikely to reduce the inefficien-
cies caused by the empty creditor problem. If along with these results one also considers
that CDSs increase lenders’ payoffs and debt capacity, then one might conclude that not
allowing for negative net economic ownership can be harmful. In fact, when the probability
of success is low (“busts”), overinsurance only occurs for borrowers with low continuation
values (inefficiency due to empty creditors is small). Accordingly, policies constraining CDSs
are not only unlikely to reduce the empty creditor problem, but also likely to reduce credit
availability when firms need it the most.
For continuation values in the intermediary range, not allowing for CDS overinsurance
can be inefficient whether or not projects can be financed by overinsured creditors. Since
overinsurance minimizes the moral hazard problem and helps the implementation of high
effort, it increases projects’ payoffs. This is particularly true when agency problems are
severe and the state of the economy is such that projects are likely to succeed (“booms”).
Our model thus casts doubt on the benefits of capping CDS insurance.
The results of this section characterize the role CDSs play in borrower–creditor relations
and their impact on the availability of credit. The analysis also discusses implications for
optimal regulation. To sum up, although CDS overinsurance may cause the empty creditor
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problem, our model shows that overinsurance is more likely to be observed when expected in-
efficiencies associated with empty creditors are lowest. In addition, we show that the efficient
effort levels are generally induced along with overinsurance, further reducing the probability
of default and inefficient liquidation. Our model implies that these effects have an impact
on credit availability, suggesting that they need to be more fully appreciated by researchers
in the field and policymakers.
2.7 Empirical Implications
We dedicate this section to the discussion of our model’s implications. We do so presenting a
non-exhaustive list of testable empirical predictions, some of which are summarized in Table
2.1. We believe that examining these predictions would deepen our understanding of the
CDS markets and their impact on corporate financing and economic efficiency.
Implication #1: Lenders of firms that have higher probability of success and larger continu-
ation values benefit the most from the existence of CDSs.
This implication follows from lenders deriving greater benefits from CDS overinsurance
when borrowers have higher probability of success (“safer firms”) and higher continuation
values (“larger firms”). This implies that CDS are more likely to be written on firms that are
safer and larger, and that these firms are likely to experience more favorable credit terms.
Implication #2: The incidence of negative net economic ownership is increasing in firms’
probability of success.
This implication follows from the fact that a higher probability of success implies that
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lenders’ payoff are weighted more towards outcomes associated with investment success. As
a result, the extra debt repayment extracted when the project succeeds compensates for the
forgone renegotiation proceeds when the project fails.
Implication #3: The incidence of negative economic ownership is higher in booms and lower
in busts; i.e., net economic ownership is countercyclical.
This result is a corollary of Implication #2. During booms, the economy’s overall proba-
bility of success is higher, reducing the opportunity cost of overinsurance. The opposite hold
in periods of downturns.
Implication #4: Among firms with CDSs written on their debt, the probability of bankruptcy
given default is increasing in firms’ probability of success.
This implication follows from Implication #2 along with the following results: (1) neg-
ative net economic ownership leads to bankruptcy given default; and (2) zero negative net
economic ownership leads to successful out-of-court renegotiation.
Implication #5: After the emergence of CDS markets, firms’ probability of bankruptcy given
default should be higher in booms and lower in busts; i.e., the probability of bankruptcy given
default is procyclical.
This implication is a corollary of Implication #4 and suggests that CDS-led bankruptcy
(out-of-court restructuring) probabilities given distress are higher (lower) in booms. The
opposite holds for busts. Simply put, the empty creditor problem is procyclical.
Implication #6: Among firms with CDSs written on their debt, the incidence of agency costs
is smaller for firms with higher probability of success.
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This implication follows from Implication #2 along with the fact that negative net eco-
nomic ownership minimizes managers’ payoffs under default. The latter implies that man-
agers have higher incentives to avoid default by implementing high effort, hence increasing
the probability of success.
While our model’s predictions are new and have not been directly taken to the data,
some reported empirical regularities are consistent with our theory. We argue, for example,
that CDSs are more beneficial for firms that are safer and have higher continuation values.
This result is interesting and stands in contrast to common intuition that riskier firms would
benefit the most from the existence of CDS markets. Consistent with our theory, however,
recent studies by Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Hirtle (2009) find that safer and larger
firms have benefited the most from CDS contracts (for example, by paying lower spreads on
their bank loans). Song and Uzmanoglu (2010) explore the financial crisis and find evidence
that firms associated with safer banks (typically safer firms) observed smaller CDS spreads
in the 2008–9 period.
Another unintuitive prediction of our model is the procyclicality of the empty creditor
problem. This implies that the conditional probability of CDS-led bankruptcy given that
a firm is in distress is higher in booms. Interestingly, starting with the prior that CDSs
aggravate the empty credit problems in busts — the opposite of our model’s prediction —
Bedendo et al. (2010) fail to find evidence that the CDS contracting leads to a higher inci-
dence of bankruptcies (relative to out-of-court restructurings) during the financial crisis (see
also Mengle (2009) and Aspeli and Iden (2010)).
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A number of other predictions listed above can be directly taken to the data. Empirical
research on CDS is still in its infancy and this strikes us as setting in which models describing
rich sets of creditor–borrower relations are particularly useful in guiding empirical work.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
Financial innovation is the hallmark of capital markets in developed economies. At the same
time, financial innovations have also preceded virtually all major economic crises in history
(see Kindleberger (2000)). The 2008–9 crisis has brought renewed interest in innovation and
regulation of financial markets. A great deal of attention, in particular, has been given to
CDS contracts as these derivatives seemed to play a role in the demise of numerous banks
and industrial firms during the crisis. Examples range from Lehman Brothers to GM and
Six Flags. We argue that while we might have observed a high degree of association be-
tween bankruptcies and CDS contracts during the crisis, it is hard to conclude that CDSs
led to excessive, inefficient liquidation in that period. To draw that inference, one needs a
benchmark model describing the connections between CDS contracting and the economy.
We develop a model of optimal CDS contracting when investment is subject to moral
hazard and wealth verification is imperfect. To our knowledge, this model is the first to show
how lenders choose between debt payments and restructuring proceeds — accounting for the
state of the economy — when selecting the optimal amount of CDS protection. Counter
to previous arguments in the literature, we show that CDS overinsurance is more likely to
occur in booms, when it boosts firm debt capacity and increases the number of projects with
positive NPV that receive funding. CDS contracts alleviate credit rationing during reces-
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sions, but in those times CDS overinsurance may prompt the liquidation of firms with less
promising prospects (firms that would likely be rationed in the absence of CDS). Our model
demonstrates that the empty creditor problem is procyclical. Moreover, it implies that the
casual observation that CDS contracts are associated with bankruptcies in the crisis does
not imply that those contracts harm financial efficiency.
A number of recent proposals aim at constraining the amount and ownership of CDS
contracts on a firm’s debt. Most notably, they suggest that the degree CDS-based insurance
should be lower than — or, at a maximum, equal to — the amount of economic exposure of
lenders. Our paper cautions about the potential effects of these proposals on the availability
of credit and on financing efficiency. Complex contracts such as CDSs are inexorably linked
to the forms of financing arrangements we will be seeing in future years, as financial markets
become more sophisticated and integrated. One has to be careful about imposing constraints
on the markets for these contracts at an early stage of their development. At the same time,
one needs to better understand how these contracts work and the types of inefficiencies they
address. In this way, one might be able to more fully benefit from what these contracts have
to offer.
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2.9 Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.2: Lender Overinsures. The horizontal axis represents the project’s continuation
value, y2. The vertical axis represents the lender’s payoff, Π. The two dotted lines represent
the lender’s payoffs if she chooses to have zero net economic ownership. The two dashed-dotted
lines denote the lender’s payoffs if he overinsures. The solid (overimposed) lines describe the
lender’s optimal payoff schedule. The lender’s choice of debt repayment induces low effort for
continuation values below y2 and induces high effort for values above that cutoff.
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Figure 2.3: Lender Not Always Overinsure for High Continuation Values. The horizontal
axis represents the project’s continuation value, y2. The vertical axis represents the lender’s
payoff, Π. The two dotted lines represent the lender’s payoffs if she chooses to have zero net
economic ownership. The two dashed-dotted lines denote the lender’s payoffs if he overinsures.
The solid (overimposed) lines describe the lender’s optimal payoff schedule. The lender’s choice
of debt repayment induces low effort for continuation values below y∗∗2 and induces high effort
for values above that cutoff.
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Figure 2.4: Lender Does Not Overinsure for High Continuation Values. The horizontal axis
represents the project’s continuation value, y2. The vertical axis represents the lender’s payoff,
Π. The two dotted lines represent the lender’s payoffs if she chooses to have zero net economic
ownership. The two dashed-dotted lines denote the lender’s payoffs if he overinsures. The solid
(overimposed) lines describe the lender’s optimal payoff schedule. The lender’s choice of debt
repayment induces low effort for continuation values below y2 and induces high effort for values
above that cutoff.
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Table 2.1: CDS–Effort Equilibrium Outcomes
The table entries represent the equilibrium levels of CDS insurance (overinsurance vs. no-
overinsurance) and effort level (low vs. high) for different combinations of investment success
probability (across rows) and continuation values (across columns). O, NO, LE, and HE denote,
respectively, overinsurance, no-overinsurance, low effort, and high effort.
Probability of Investment Success Continuation Value
< y∗2 < y2 < y
∗∗
2 < y2 < y
∗∗∗
2 > y
∗∗∗
2
pH > pL ≥ c (pH) > c (pL) O–LE O–LE O–HE O–HE O–HE O–HE
pH ≥ c (pH) > c (pL) > pL O–LE NO–LE NO–LE O–HE O–HE O–HE
c (pH) > pH > c (pL) > pL O–LE NO–LE NO–LE O–HE O–HE NO–HE
c (pH) > c (pL) ≥ pH > pL O–LE NO–LE NO–LE NO–LE NO–HE NO–HE
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Chapter 3
Optimal Financing with CDS Markets
3.1 Introduction
The credit default swap (CDS) market has experienced explosive growth since 2003. Accord-
ing to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the outstanding amount
of CDS contracts was under $4 trillion in 2003 and reached a peak of $62 trillion in 2007.
The 2008–9 crisis brought scrutiny to CDSs. Many have identified CDSs as a main cul-
prit for the crisis and new regulatory legislations have been enacted to curb CDS markets.1
Surprisingly, however, little is known about CDSs. We know little about the role of CDSs
in financial markets, what contracting inefficiencies they address, whether they affect the
supply of credit, and how economic conditions impact the demand for CDS.
One can argue that CDSs alleviate the frictions of capital markets by improving hedging
opportunities and allowing for greater credit supply and better terms for firms. Accordingly,
1In his testimony before congress on September 23, 2008, the SEC chairman Christopher Cox has called
for regulatory scrutiny of the CDS market. George Soros said “Some derivatives ought not to be allowed to
be traded at all. I have in mind credit default swaps. The more I’ve heard about them, the more I’ve realised
they’re truly toxic” (see “UPDATE 1-Ban CDS as “instruments of destruction” - Soros”, Reuters, June 12,
2009). Signed by President Barack Obama in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act (HR #4173) gives the SEC regulatory
authority over swaps, including CDSs. The new law requires the reporting of trades, sets position limits, im-
poses margin requirements, and moves swaps away from over-the-counter markets into organized exchanges.
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one would expect riskier firms to benefit the most from the existence of CDS insurance. In
contrast, recent evidence by Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Hirtle (2009) find that CDSs
are more liquid for safer, larger firms and that these firms have benefited the most from CDS
markets (for example, by paying lower interest on their bank loans once CDSs are written on
their bonds). This puzzling result suggests that CDSs can be beneficial to some firms and
less so to others. Understanding how this arises in equilibrium should be seen as fundamental
for a better understanding of CDS markets and for the design of welfare improving policies
following the financial crisis.
A CDS is a bilateral agreement between a debt protection seller and a debt protection
buyer. The buyer makes periodic payments to the seller in exchange for compensation when
there is a credit event — a borrower defaults on the debt it issued. In the real world, lenders
have differentiated exposures to borrowers’ risk of distress (Minton, Stulz and Williamson
(2009) and Knaup and Wagner (2009)) and hence heterogenous incentives to buy CDS pro-
tection. One would think that borrowers would get better financing terms with those lenders
who benefit the most from improved hedging mechanisms. However, as pointed out by Hu
and Black (2008a,b), lenders protected by CDS might have low incentives to participate in
out-of-court restructurings of distressed firms since formal default triggers immediate com-
pensation for their exposure.
While there is a growing literature examining the impact of CDS on lender-borrower
relationships, the literature lacks a theoretical framework to answer some of the most funda-
mental questions about CDSs. How the existence of lenders that have differentiated benefits
from CDSs affects firms’ policies? Which firms benefit the most from the existence of CDS?
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Answering these questions allows for the characterization of welfare and financing policies as
functions of lenders and borrowers’ attributes. These, in turn, can be used to enhance the
regulatory architecture.
This paper addresses these questions by developing a model of optimal financing policies
in the presence of CDSs when competitive lenders have different exposures to borrowers’
distress risk. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to consider how heterogenous lenders
affect firms’ probability of default given distress and financing policy. This study also shows
why safer firms — those with lower probability of being in distress — have a higher prob-
ability of having CDSs written on their debt and experience better financing terms. The
model I introduce is useful in allowing us to understand important facets of the CDS mar-
kets, which until now were not fully understood. I show that a simple tax scheme based on
fixed fees that are proportional to lenders’ exposure and increasing in the borrower’s risk of
distress can make CDSs beneficial to those firms that would be harmed otherwise. I also
demonstrate that if lenders’ exposures to the borrower’s risk of distress are unknown to the
borrower, then the beneficial properties of CDSs are reduced.
The model I develop also sheds light on recent empirical studies on CDSs. Ashcraft and
Santos (2009) do not find evidence that the average firm experiences improved lending terms.
They argue that one possible explanation is lack of liquidity in the CDS market. The authors
in turn find evidence that firms for which CDSs are more liquid benefit more from CDSs. My
model is consistent with this result, but suggests the link is non-causal as liquidity is an en-
dogenous variable: safer firms benefit more from CDS and lean more heavily on lenders that
profit the most from CDS insurance, which are exactly those that demand CDSs more often.
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Let me provide some details of the model. A borrower must get funds from heterogenous
and competitive lenders to finance a project. These lenders have different exposures to the
borrower’s risk of distress, which take the form of additional losses triggered in the event the
borrower is in distress. This captures the idea that defaulting loans can cause lenders to be
in distress. These losses depend negatively on the amount of resources available to lenders
and the dependence is more sensitive for lenders with higher risk exposure. Risk exposures
could result from the concentration of lenders’ portfolio on loans with similar risk as that of
the borrower, or from lenders’ absolute sensitivity to credit risk — which depends on factors
such as size of portfolio and leverage. As a consequence, CDS protection might be more
useful to some lenders than to others.
If the borrower is in distress, insured lenders have stronger preferences for default as this
triggers CDS payment and reduces their losses. The risk faced by these lenders is that the
fraction of lenders that buy CDS may be insufficiently large to cause the borrower to default.
In this case, the borrower can renegotiate the debt in the hands of uninsured lenders and
fully repay protected lenders. As a result, the borrower successfully renegotiate his debt
out-of-court, avoiding a credit event. This outcome can be especially harmful to overinsured
lenders — lenders that buy an amount of protection beyond the face value of debt. The risk
of successful private workouts is justified since standard CDS contracts, as defined by the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, do not recognize out-of-court restructuring
as a credit event. Although it is possible to include restructuring as a credit event in a CDS
contract, CDS payments are triggered only if the restructuring binds all debt holders.2
2Notably, a corporate private workout has never triggered a credit event in the U.S. (Bedendo et al
(2010)).
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I model this coordination game among lenders as a global game and establish unique
conditions for liquidation.3 Lenders coordinate in buying CDS protection whenever the
fundamental regarding the borrower’s cash flow in distress exceeds a cutoff. The global
game structure permits the direct computation of the liquidation threshold. This threshold
depends on the cost-benefit ratios of insuring for lenders of different types and on the pro-
portion of each type in the total amount of debt outstanding. The higher the fraction of
debt in the hands of a group of lenders, the more influential this group is in determining the
liquidation threshold. Lenders with higher exposure (low cost-benefit ratios) contribute to
a lower cutoff, while lenders with lower exposure (higher cost-benefit ratios) contribute to a
higher cutoff.4 The reason is that, the higher the exposure, the less is the optimism about
the occurrence of a credit event necessary to make a lender indifferent between insuring and
not insuring. Finally, the lower is the debt repayment of a particular group, the higher is
the cost of coordination failure and the higher is this group’s cost benefit ratio.
When choosing its financing policy, a borrower faces the following tradeoff. Lenders that
are highly exposed to borrowers’ risk benefit the most from CDS insurance, allowing the bor-
rower to finance his debt with lower repayments. Increasing the proportion of these lenders
reduces the overall face value of debt but decreases the liquidation cutoff. Therefore, safer
borrowers finance more heavily with more exposed lenders and enjoy lower debt repayments
even though this results in a lower liquidation cutoff and in a higher probability of liquida-
tion given distress. Riskier borrowers are relatively more penalized by a lower liquidation
3For a summary of global game results and the most commonly used setups see Morris and Shin (2003).
4This is consistent with recent evidence provided by Song and Uzmanoglo (2010). Their paper explores
the financial crisis and finds evidence that firms associated with safer banks observed smaller CDS spreads
in the 2008–9 period.
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threshold and therefore optimally choose to lean more heavily on less exposed lenders. Since
lenders’ payoffs increase in the probability of a credit event, a borrower can reduce the re-
payment to a particular group of lenders by increasing that of others. Hence, the safer the
borrower, the higher the proportion of more exposed lenders and the higher the spread —
repayment of riskier lenders minus that of safer lenders. Overall, firms that are sufficiently
safe benefit from CDSs, as the surplus brought about in terms of reduced repayments in
good times surpasses the extra distress costs. At the other end of the spectrum, firms with
sufficiently high distress probabilities have inefficiently low liquidation cutoffs. These firms
are frequently liquidated once in distress, so that CDSs are harmful to them.
After identifying the sources of inefficiency in CDS markets, I look for policies that might
improve welfare. In that vein, I first examine policies that would make risky borrowers ben-
efit from CDS markets. I show that a simple scheme in which lenders pay a fixed fee in order
to buy CDS protection can reduce inefficient liquidation. The fee is higher for CDSs written
on the debt of riskier borrowers and for lenders that are more exposed to borrowers’ risk of
distress. As a result, it becomes harder for lenders to coordinate, which raises the liquidation
cutoff. This fee system does not require information regarding lenders’ private information
and their distributions or the proportion of each type of lender holding the borrower’s debt.
It only requires a measure of the exposure of each group of lenders to borrower’s distress
and the probability of distress, where the former can be obtained from balance sheet data
and the latter from CDS spreads.
I compare this fee scheme with commonly proposed interventions, namely, limiting voting
in restructuring decisions to lenders with positive net economic ownerships — CDS protec-
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tion below the amount of debt owed by the firm (Hu and Black (2008a,b)), making voluntary
renegotiations trigger a credit event, and capping the amount of protection to the amount
of debt owed by the borrower (Spamann (2010) and Bolton and Oehmke (2011)).5 I show
that the fee system of this paper is superior to those proposals if the borrower’s probability
of distress is sufficiently high — exactly the range for which CDSs can be harmful otherwise.
The reason is that these proposals work as a coordination tool to lenders, resulting in an
excessively low liquidation cutoff and a high distress cost.
Things get more complicated if lenders’ exposures are unknown to the borrower at the
time of financing. This happens when lenders’ distress risk is hard to measure objectively.
In this case, lenders that are more exposed want to look like they have lower exposure in
order to enjoy higher repayments.6 This would harm specially safer borrowers that lean
more heavily on these types of lenders. Therefore, borrowers need to inefficiently increase
the proportion of safer lenders, reducing the surplus brought about by CDSs. This result
provides some support for proposals that aim at making information regarding lenders’ risk
exposure more transparent and accessible. It also suggests that finding better measures and
indicators of lenders’ risk exposure can greatly improve market efficiency.
My model is related to an emerging literature on “empty voting.” This literature empha-
sizes the ability of informed agents to make gains by inefficiently influencing voting outcomes.
Brav and Matthews (2011) develop a model in which a proposal needs shareholder approval.
5See “Restructuring credit event may be reviewed - ISDA,” Reuters, August 3, 2011 for considerations
on extending restructuring credit event definitions.
6There is large evidence in the banking literature that banks manipulate reports on their loan loss data
(see Wall and Koch (2000) and Hasan and Wall (2004)). There is also evidence of delaying loan provisioning
(Laeven and Majnoni (2003)) and overstating the value of distressed assets (Huizinga and Laeven (2009)).
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Traders with superior information know the true value of the proposal and combine negative
net economic ownership and high voting power by buying and selling shares. Traders may
then approve (and profit from) proposals that are detrimental to firm welfare. Spamann
(2010) focuses on how traders build up empty voting positions via derivatives instruments.
In his model, hedge funds derive gains from their positions because they are better informed
than other agents about derivatives and securities markets. These models have two impor-
tant features. First, they assume that one agent is systematically better informed than the
others. Second, while informed agents vote strategically, the votes of other market partic-
ipants are assumed to be given by a random variable that is exogenous to the model. The
present paper focus on implications of strategic uncertainty — players’ uncertainty about
the actions of other players — rather then heterogenous uncertainty regarding a fundamen-
tal (e.g., the value of a proposal). Importantly, the liquidation outcome in my model is
endogenously determined by all participants acting strategically.
There is also a growing literature on the link between CDSs and creditor–borrower re-
lations. Most studies in this literature focus on the impact of CDSs on adverse selection
and moral hazard problems. Duffee and Zhou (2001) show that CDSs can alleviate “lemons
problems” in credit risk-transfer markets. Thompson (2007) extends Duffee and Zhou by al-
lowing asymmetric information in the credit insurance market. He derives welfare properties
when loan sales and CDSs emerge as banks’ optimal risk-transfer instruments. In a similar
vein, Parlour and Winton (2008) analyze when loan sales and CDSs emerge in equilibrium
and characterize efficiency in terms of risk transferring and bank monitoring. Parlour and
Plantin (2008) further investigate the effect of CDS markets on banks’ incentive to monitor
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(see also Morrison (2005)). Arping (2004) studies CDS contracting in the presence of moral
hazard. He shows that CDSs increase the commitment of lenders to terminate projects if bor-
rowers misbehave. Bolton and Oehmke (2011) study CDSs in a model where borrowers have
no commitment to repay their debt (cash flows are non-verifiable). CDSs increase lenders’
bargaining power, working as a commitment device that increases borrowers’ debt capacity.
The authors show that the drawback of CDSs is that lenders often overinsure, causing the
empty creditor problem. Campello and Matta (2011) show that the empty creditor problem
might not be so severe as it depends on the probability of investment success. Overinsurance
is higher when the probability of investment success is higher or the probability of distress is
lower. None of these papers consider the impact of heterogenous lenders on the probability
of liquidation and its implications for how borrowers choose which lenders to borrow from.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup.
Section 3 examines the equilibrium of the CDS coordination game and its implications for
the probability of default given distress. Section 4 derives the borrower’s optimal financing
policy with and without CDSs and derive comparative statics. Section 5 extends the model
to allow for uncertainty regarding lenders’ risk exposure and the investigation of public poli-
cies. Section 6 presents a set of empirical implications. Section 7 concludes the paper. All
proofs are in Appendix D.
3.2 The Model
The economy lasts for three periods t = 0, 1, 2 and is populated by a borrower, a continuum
of lenders indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and a continuum of atomistic CDS providers. All agents are
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risk neutral and there is no discounting. The borrower is penniless and needs an amount
α ∈ (0, 1) of funds to finance his project in t = 0. The borrower can obtain finance from
lenders, each of whom is endowed with one unit of funds in t = 0 and one unit of an illiquid
and indivisible asset that generates a value of a in t = 1. Lenders can be from two different
groups indexed by g ∈ {R, S}. The proportion of lenders from group R is β ∈ (0, 1) (and
that from group S is 1− β). It is possible for the borrower to finance his project only with
lenders of a particular group, i.e., α ≤ min {β, 1− β}.7
If the project is financed it generates cash flow c ∈ {y (θ) , y} in t = 2. With probability
1− λ the project succeeds and c = y — assumed to be large — and with probability λ the
project fails and c = y (θ). When the project’s cash flow is y, the borrower is “sound”, while
when the cash flow is y (θ), the borrower is “in distress”. I assume that c is observable, but
non-verifiable. Cash flow y (θ), which depends on the fundamental θ, is given by y (θ) =
max {0, θ}, where θ is distributed according to a continuously differentiable and strictly
positive density h (·) with support on R. The true value of θ is unknown to all participants
until t = 2.
Each lender i receives a private noisy signal in t = 1 given by
xi = θ + σηi, (3.1)
where the noise terms are i.i.d. with continuous density fgi (·) with support on R.8
7Initially, lenders’ groups are assumed to be common knowledge. Later, the model is extended to accom-
modate the possibility that lenders’ groups are unknown to the borrower.
8One could argue it would be more realistic to assume that the borrower is better informed than lenders
about the probability of distress. Adding this assumption would add more complexity without causing any
qualitative change to my results. The reason is that lenders’ signals concern the project’s cash flow given
distress.
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In t = 0, the borrower offers financing contracts to lenders. A financing contract is repre-
sented by (pg, rg), where pg is the probability that a lender from group g finances the project
and rg is the repayment to the lender.
Given its signal about θ, each lender i decides the amount of credit insurance si to buy
from CDS providers in t = 1. CDS providers act as price takers and decide whether to offer
a contract that pays 1 unit if there is a credit event in t = 2, in exchange for a fee of f (paid
up front). A credit event occurs if the borrower defaults on his debt — if the borrower fails
to repay his debt in full — and if out-of-court restructuring is unsuccessful. Default and
renegotiation are described next.
Similar to Bolton and Jeanne (2005, 2007), I assume that the borrower has incentives to
repay his debt only as a way of avoiding default costs. I assume that failure to repay the debt
in full when the realized cash flow is y results in a “reputational cost” given by γy, which I
assume equals y (i.e., γ = 1) to streamline the analysis. In other words, the borrower loses
all the output y if he is able to repay all his debt but chooses to default instead.
If the borrower is in distress, i.e., c = y (θ), then no reputational cost applies. However,
I assume that there is a cost ρy (θ) if the borrower cannot successfully renegotiate his debt
out-of-court. This assumption is supported by evidence that out-of-court restructurings are
considerably less costly than bankruptcies to debtor firms (e.g., Gilson et al (1990)). This
cost, which for simplicity I assume equals y (θ) (i.e., ρ = 1), can be interpreted as a sanction
imposed by the investors that financed the borrower. Renegotiation proceeds as follows.
In t = 2, each lender’s CDS position can be observed by the borrower and the other
lenders but cannot be verified by a court. Upon the realization of y (θ), the borrower offers
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qi to lender i. If qi < rgi , then lender i receives qi if he accepts and his outside option
oi ∈ {0, si} if he rejects. If a lender rejects the borrower’s offer, then renegotiation fails and
each lender receives his outside option.
[Figure 3.1 about here]
Lenders are heterogenous with respect to their payoffs. Let υi be lender i’s payoff if
renegotiation succeeds. Lender i’s incremental payoff of insuring over not insuring if he
finances the borrower is
pii (si, P, θ) =

−fsi + λ (si + Lgi (a)− Lgi (si + a− fsi)) if renegotiation fails
−fsi + λ (υi + Lgi (a)− Lgi (υi + a− fsi)) if renegotiation succeeds
.
(3.2)
The function Lgi (Ii) represents the additional loss suffered by lender i if the borrower
is in distress, where Ii is lender i’s the final income and LR (a) = LS (a) = L (a). This loss
captures lenders’ exposure to the borrower’s risk of distress and is assumed to decrease in
the final amount of funds, i.e., L′gi (Ii) < 0.
9
I assume lenders of group R, which I refer to as “risky” lenders, have a higher exposure to
the borrower’s risk of distress. Therefore, CDS insurance is more attractive to these lenders
than to those from group S, which I refer to as “safe” lenders. Formally, Lg (·) is assumed to
be such that L′R (I) < L
′
S (I) for all I. One can think of the portfolios of lenders of group R
as containing mostly loans with default risk similar to that of the borrower. Or it could be
that these lenders have higher absolute sensitivity to credit risk — which depends on factors
9This way of modelling lenders’ exposure to distress follows Duffee and Zhou (2001). It is a shortcut to
capture this dependence without having to model lenders’ capital structure and default conditions.
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such as size of portfolio and leverage. Therefore, if the borrower is in distress, these lenders
face a higher probability of being in distress as well — facing extra liquidity needs and
harder access to capital markets. Lenders of group S are safer in that they are less exposed
to the borrower’s risk of distress, which translates into a lower sensitivity to the amount of
available funds. These lenders can be seen as having more diversified loan portfolios such
that their soundness are less affected in the event the borrower is in distress.10
Finally, if V is the borrower’s proceeds if renegotiation succeeds, then his payoff is
ub (P, θ) =

(1− λ) (y − pRβrR − pS (1− β) rS) if renegotiation fails
(1− λ) (y − pRβrR − pS (1− β) rS) + λV if renegotiation succeeds
(3.3)
3.3 The CDS Coordination Game
I examine the coordination problem among lenders regarding their decisions to buy CDS
protection. I first argue that lenders’ decision to insure depends only on the percentage of
the total debt outstanding for which there is CDSs written on rather than on the aggregate
amount of CDS protection. As a consequence, the coordination game is simplified and lenders
need only worry about other lenders’ decision to insure. Then I show that the each group
equilibrium strategies are in the form of switching strategies around the group’s cutoff regard-
ing the borrower’s economic fundamental. Finally, since I want to focus more on strategic
uncertainty rather than fundamental uncertainty, I make lenders’ signals about the funda-
mental be nearly precise and derive the unique liquidation cutoff that lenders agree upon.
Assuming a lender accepts the offer if he is indifferent, the borrower offers qi = 0 to a
10For evidence of variation in lenders’ exposure to loans of differente risks see Knaup and Wagner (2009).
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lender with oi = 0. It is also clear that the borrower offers min {rgi , si} to a lender with
oi = si. Let r ≡ pRβrR + pS (1− β) rS. Renegotiation fails (a credit event occurs) if
y (θ)
r
< P ≡ 1
r
∫
{i: oi=si}
min {rgi , si} di, (3.4)
and succeeds (a credit event does not occur) otherwise.
Therefore, lender i’s incremental payoff of insuring over not insuring if he finances the
borrower is
pii (si, P, θ) =

−fsi + λ (si + Lgi (a)− Lgi (si + a− fsi)) if y(θ)r < P
−fsi + λ (min {rgi , si}+ Lgi (a)− Lgi (min {rgi , si}+ a− fsi)) ify(θ)r ≥ P
.
(3.5)
Since pii (si, P, θ, f) is strictly increasing in si for si < rgi , lender i insures only if he buys
CDS protection in an amount at least as great as his repayment, i.e., si ≥ rgi . Let lg be the
fraction of lenders of group g that buy CDS. The borrower defaults if
y (θ)
r
< P =
1
r
[lRβrR + lSpS (1− β) rS] , (3.6)
and does not default if otherwise. Condition 3.6 states that the borrower’s cash flow under
distress is smaller than the total amount of outstanding debt that is insured.
One can rewrite lender i’s incremental payoff of insuring over not insuring as:
pii (P, θ) =

−fsi + λ (si + L (a)− Lgi (si + a− fsi)) if P > θr
−fsi + λ (rgi + L (a)− Lgi (rgi + a− fsi)) if P ≤ θr
. (3.7)
Note that the payoff of lender i depends on his own amount of CDS insurance si, the
borrower’s fundamental θ, and the fraction of lenders that insure. Lender i’s payoff does
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not depend on the amount of CDS insurance chosen by the other lenders. This implies that
lenders of group g should choose the same amount of insurance sg in equilibrium. It also im-
plies that the coordination problem among lender is regarding their decisions to either insure
or not insure. Lenders’ equilibrium strategies is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The unique equilibrium among lenders after observing CDS fee f in t = 1
has each lender i following a threshold strategy: insuring if xi < x
∗
gi
and not insuring if
xi ≥ x∗gi.
Proposition 1 states that lenders of a particular group insure if their signal regarding the
borrower’s cash flow in distress is below the group’s threshold. It is important to note that
when the true value of the fundamental lies between xR and xS there is miscoordination
between riskier and safer lenders. This is mainly due to the fact that their signals are noisy.
Since my focus is on the strategic uncertainty among lenders rather than fundamental
uncertainty (uncertainty regarding θ), I derive the equilibrium when σ → 0, i.e., the uncer-
tainty regarding the fundamental θ becomes small.11 Proposition 2 states that, in this case,
lenders of each group agree upon a common liquidation cutoff.
Proposition 2 Let 1− φ ≡ θ
r
. As σ → 0, the thresholds x∗R and x∗S converge to a common
critical fundamental θ∗ and lenders coordinate on insuring whenever φ > φ∗ and not insuring
whenever φ < φ∗, where
φ∗ =
pRβ
α
fsR + λ [LR (rR + a− fsR)− L (a)− rR]
λ [sR + LR (rR + a− fsR)− LR (sR + a− fsR)− rR]+
pS (1− β)
α
fsS + λ [LS (rS + a− fsS)− L (a)− rS]
λ [sS + LS (rS + a− fsS)− LS (sS + a− fsS)− rS] .
11One could imagine a setup in which lenders receive signals about what they will learn at the interim
stage — and therefore lenders’ decision either to buy or not CDS protection. This setup will have similar
strategic effects since the important part is the feedback to the borrower’s initial problem. The assumption
that lenders’uncertainty vanish is a short cut for ease of analysis.
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The threshold of Proposition 2 is computed as follows. Although the threshold lenders of
each group have different beliefs regarding the probability that the fraction of insured debt
is less than a certain number, the average of this beliefs is the uniform belief on the unit
interval (see Steiner and Sakovics (2010)). Therefore, the average belief of a credit event is:
pRβ
α
(1− Pr (P ≤ 1− φ∗|R)) + pS (1− β)
α
(1− Pr (P ≤ 1− φ∗|S)) = 1− (1− φ∗) = φ∗
(3.8)
One can rewrite lenders’ incremental payoffs using
Bgi ≡ λ (si − rgi + Lgi (rgi + a− fsgi)− Lgi (sgi + a− fsgi))
Cgi ≡ fsgi − λ (rgi + L (a)− Lgi (rgi + a− fsgi))
such that
pii (si, P, θ, f) =

Bgi − Cgi if P > θr
−Cgi if P ≤ θr
. (3.9)
Since the threshold lender of each group must be indifferent between insuring and not insuring
then, it must be that:
(1− Pr (P ≤ 1− φ∗|g)) (Bg − Cg)− Pr (P ≤ 1− φ∗|g)Cg = 0
⇒ (1− Pr (P ≤ 1− φ∗|g)) = Cg
Bg
. (3.10)
Therefore, 3.8 and 3.10 yield the cutoff presented in Proposition 2.
It is now possible to calculate, given f , lender i’s incremental payoff of financing the
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borrower over non-financing:
Ugi (rgi , sgi) =
H (r (1− φ∗)) {(1− λ) (rgi + a− fsgi) + λ [sgi + a− fsgi − Lgi (sgi + a− fsgi)]}+
(1−H (r (1− φ∗))) {(1− λ) (rgi + a) + λ (a− L (a))} − (1 + a) .
Because the CDS market is competitive, it must be that f = λ. Since Ugi (rgi , sgi) is
strictly increasing in si, it is optimal for every lender i to choose si =
a
λ
. Therefore, lenders’
payoffs and the liquidation cutoff reduce to
(1− λ) rg − λ
[
H (r (1− φ∗))Lg
(a
λ
)
+ (1−H (r (1− φ∗))L (a))
]
− 1 (3.11)
and
φ∗ =
pRβ
α
a+ λ [LR (rR)− L (a)− rR]
a+ λ
[
LR (rR)− LR
(
a
λ
)− rR]+pS (1− β)α a+ λ [LS (rS)− L (a)− rS]a+ λ [LS (rS)− LS ( aλ)− rS] , (3.12)
respectively.
From 3.11 it is possible to see that CDSs work as insurance to both risky and safe lenders.
Without CDSs the probability that lenders buy CDS is zero, which results in a loss of L (a)
to both types of lenders if the borrower is in distress. With credit default swaps, lenders
receive CDS payments when coordination succeeds. This reduces their expected loss since
Lg
(
a
λ
)
< L (a). It is also clear that risky lenders benefit more from CDSs insurance since
LR
(
a
λ
)
< LS
(
a
λ
)
. Equation 3.11 also implies that the payoffs of both types of lenders are
increasing in the probability of a credit event, with that of risky lenders increasing faster.
Finally, it is also readily available from 3.12 that the liquidation cutoff is decreasing in the
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repayments of each group. The reason is that a higher repayment reduces the opportunity
cost of insuring, which facilitates coordination among lenders.
3.4 Optimal Financing Policy
In this section I examine the borrower’s optional financing policy. In the presence of CDSs,
the borrower needs to take into account that the probability of liquidation once in distress
depends on proportion of debt hold by each type of lender. The next subsection derives
the optimal financing policy in the absence of CDSs. This will serve as a benchmark once I
derive the results in an economy with CDS markets.
In what follows, I assume CR
BR
≤ CS
BS
for all combinations of rR, rS, a, and λ. From 3.12,
this implies that riskier lenders reduce the liquidation cutoff whereas safer lenders contribute
increase this threshold. It follows that the higher the proportion of riskier lenders holding
the borrower’s debt, the higher the probability of a credit event given distress.
3.4.1 Without CDSs
Without CDSs, the borrower need not worry about being liquidated if he is in distress. This
implies that his only goal is to finance his debt with the smallest face value. The borrower’s
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problem in t = 0 is the following:
max
rg ,pg∈[0,1] for g=R,S
(1− λ) (y − pRβrR − pS (1− β) rS) + λ
∫ ∞
0
θh (θ) dθ
s.t.
pRβ + pS (1− β) = α (3.13)
pgUg (rg) ≥ 0 for all g = R, S (3.14)
The first constraint means that the borrower needs to borrow enough to finance his debt.
The second constraints are lenders’ participation constraints. It insures that lenders receive
at least the same return they obtain if they choose not to finance the borrower and to store
the money at the market interest rate (which is normalized to zero).
Since there is no insurance, lenders receive no additional payments when the borrower is
in distress (except for the return on their illiquid assets a). Because the loss functions are
normalized such that both types of lenders lose the same amount L (a), the heterogeneity
among lenders is irrelevant. This intuition is formalized in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3 The optimal financing policy without CDSs has repayment r∗ = 1+λL(a)
1−λ and
probabilities of financing (p∗R, p
∗
S) =
(
pR,
α−βpR
1−β
)
for pR ∈
[
0, α
β
]
. This contract generates a
surplus to the borrower equal to
W ∗ (λ) = (1− λ)
(
y − α1 + λL (a)
1− λ
)
+ λ
∫ ∞
0
θh (θ) dθ (3.15)
Proposition 3 states that the borrower is indifferent between both types of lenders when
he seeks finance as both types of lenders yield the same repayment r∗ = 1+λL(a)
1−λ . This repay-
ment is increasing in λ for two reasons. The first is because lenders’ payoffs are decreasing
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in the probability of distress. The second is that lenders’ payoff are satisfied with equality
in equilibrium. Finally, it is worth noting that the borrower’s payoff is decreasing in λ as
one of the assumptions is that y is sufficiently large.
3.4.2 With CDSs
In the presence of CDS markets, financing terms and the proportion of each type of lender
that holds the borrower’s debt significantly impact the probability of distress given default.
The borrower’s problem in t = 0 is the following:
max
rg ,pg∈[0,1] for g=R,S
(1− λ) (y − pRβrR − pS (1− β) rS) + λ
∫ ∞
[pRβrR+pS(1−β)rS ](1−φ∗)
θh (θ) dθ
s.t.
pRβ + pS (1− β) = α (3.16)
pgUg (rg) ≥ 0 for all g = R, S (3.17)
The borrower’s payoff with CDSs is clearly smaller under distress. However, this nega-
tive impact can be compensated by better financing terms and higher payoffs in non-distress
times. Proposition 4 below shows that when the borrower’s probability of distress is suffi-
ciently small, the surplus brought about by CDSs is positive.
Proposition 4 Debt repayments with CDSs and known lenders are lower than those without
CDSs. Let W ∗∗ (λ) be the borrower’s surplus with CDSs and known lenders. There exists a
cutoff λ for the borrower’s probability of distress such that, if λ > λ, then W ∗∗ (λ) ≤ W ∗ (λ)
and if λ < λ, W ∗∗ (λ) ≥ W ∗ (λ). That is, the surplus brought about by CDSs is positive for
safer borrowers and negative for riskier ones.
The intuition behind this proposition is the following. On the one hand, CDSs work as
insurance to lenders in the event the borrower is in distress, increasing their payoffs. This
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allows the borrower to obtain finance with better terms, i.e., with lower repayments. On
the other hand, CDSs increase lenders’ outside options in distress times, causing the bor-
rower to be liquidated with positive probability. If the distress probability is sufficiently low,
the former effect dominates the latter. In this case, the surplus brought about by CDSs
is positive. However, as the probability of distress increases, the CDS fee also increases,
making insurance more costly. If the probability of distress is sufficiently high, the latter
effect dominates the former, implying the borrower’s surplus with CDSs is negative.
The next step is to understand how the borrower adjusts his financing policy according
to his probability of distress. Proposition 5 states that safer borrowers lean more heavily on
riskier lenders.
Proposition 5 The higher the borrower’s probability of distress λ, the higher the repayment
of lenders of group R, the lower the repayment of lenders of group S, and the lower the
probability that lenders of group R finance the borrower.
Proposition 5 states that the borrower weighs the benefits of reduced repayments in good
times against the costs of a higher probability of liquidation in distress times. Since risky
lenders benefit the most from CDS insurance, they allow for better financing terms com-
pared to safe lenders. Thus, the borrower can extract a higher surplus by obtaining a larger
fraction of finance from these lenders. The borrower can obtain even better financing terms
with risky lenders by increasing the repayment of safe lenders. This is possible because a
higher repayment for safe lenders increase these lenders’ benefit from insurance. As a result,
coordination among all lenders is facilitated, resulting in lenders buying CDS more often
and in a higher probability of liquidation. The benefit of risky lenders from CDS insurance
is further increased, lowering the borrower’s financing cost.
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The problem is that risky lenders contribute to a lower liquidation cutoff given distress.
The more the borrower obtains funding from these lenders, the higher the probability of
liquidation given distress. The benefits of lower repayments relative to increased distress
costs is higher for safer lenders. Therefore, safer borrowers obtain a large portion of funding
from risky lenders, face lower financing costs — although the spread between the highest
and lowest repayments is higher, and have CDSs written more often on their debt.
Note that Proposition 5 provides a simple rationale to recent evidence provided by the
empirical literature on CDSs. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Hirtle (2009) show that CDSs
are more liquid for safer, larger firms and that these firms have benefited the most in terms
of reduced interest on their bank loans. This result would seem puzzling at first glance since
one would expect risky firms to benefit the most from CDSs in terms of greater credit supply
and better financing terms. According to the model, however, safer firms benefit more from
CDSs and lean more heavily on lenders that profit the most from CDS insurance, obtaining
better financing terms. This results in lenders demanding protection more often, causing
CDSs associated with safer firms to be more liquid.
3.5 Extensions
In this section, I extend the model to examine the impact of fees on the equilibrium and the
implications of lenders’ types being unknown to the borrower. In the first case, I show that a
simple fee scheme in which lenders with higher distress exposure pay higher fixed fees to buy
CDS protection would make CDSs beneficial to riskier borrowers. I then compare this fee
scheme with the following commonly proposed interventions: limiting voting in restructuring
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decisions to lenders with positive net economic ownerships — CDS protection below the
amount of debt owed by the firm, making voluntary renegotiations trigger a credit event,
and capping the amount of protection to the amount of debt owed by the borrower. The
first two proposals are equivalent in terms of their impact according to the present model.
The first proposal has received wide attention in the press (see Mengle (2009)) and is
supported by the legal scholars Hu and Black (2008a,b), who have proposed the empty cred-
itor hypothesis. The second proposal has recently received some attention as CDS buyers
have expressed concerns over the ability that entities have to avoid credit events.12 The third
proposal is suggested by Spamann (2010) and Bolton and Oehmke (2011) in order to avoid
the empty voting and empty creditor problems, respectively.
I conclude that the fee system outperforms these proposals if the borrower’s probability
of distress is sufficiently high — exactly the region for which CDSs can be harmful. In the
second case I show that, if the borrower is unknown about lenders’ exposure to distress risk,
then the benefit of CDSs is reduced.
3.5.1 CDS fees
Much has been proposed in terms of improving the efficiency of CDS markets. In this section,
I show how a fixed fee scheme denoted by τg for g = R, S affects the liquidation threshold
given distress and find a fee incidence that improves the outcome for borrowers that are
harmed by CDSs. Proposition 6 below shows that a fixed fee incidence enters linearly in the
liquidation cutoff equation.
12See “Restructuring credit event may be reviewed - ISDA,” Reuters, August 3, 2011.
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Proposition 6 Suppose lenders of group R have to pay a fixed tax τR if they buy CDSs.
The equilibrium of the game that starts in t = 1 is characterized by the following liquidation
cutoff:
φ∗ (τR, τS) = pRβ
a+ λ [LR (rR)− L (a)− rR] + τR
a+ λ
[
LR (rR)− LR
(
a
λ
)− rR] +
pS (1− β) a+ λ [LS (rS)− L (a)− rS] + τS
a+ λ
[
LS (rS)− LS
(
a
λ
)− rS]
Proposition 6 states that applying a fixed fee on lenders that buy CDS reduce the incre-
mental benefit of insuring over not insuring, making coordination among lenders harder and
increasing the liquidation cutoff. Since the liquidation costs caused by the introduction of
CDSs are greater than its benefits for riskier borrowers, Proposition 6 suggests that imposing
fees on CDS trading could improve the welfare of these borrowers.
A desirable fee scheme would reduce inefficient liquidation without eliminating the in-
surance property of CDSs. One intuitive way of accomplishing that is to allow liquidations
only when the borrower’s realized cash flow under distress is 0, i.e., θ ≤ 0. In this way, the
borrower loses nothing in distress times and lenders still benefit from CDSs. The resulting
outcome is definitely higher then in the absence of CDS markets. It follows that impos-
ing trading fees makes CDS beneficial to riskier lenders that would be harmed otherwise.
Proposition 7 formalizes this idea.
Proposition 7 Suppose the borrower’s surplus with CDSs and known lenders is smaller
than that without CDSs. Suppose further that the planner imposes fees on CDSs such that
τg = λ
[
L (a)− Lg
(
a
λ
)]
and does not redistribute the fee revenue. Then the borrower’s surplus
with CDSs, known lenders, and fees is higher than that without CDSs.
By choosing a fee scheme as in Proposition 7, the planner can induce a liquidation cutoff
of φ∗ = 1. In other words, the borrower will be liquidated once in distress if and only if
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φ = 1− θ
r
> 1, which is true if and only if the fundamental θ is negative. A good property of
this fee system is that it does not require information regarding lenders’ private information
and their distributions or the proportion of each type of lender holding the borrower’s debt.
It only requires a measure of the exposure of each group of lenders to borrower’s distress
and the probability of distress, where the former can be obtained from balance sheet data
and the latter from CDS spreads. This fee scheme is also intuitive as the fee is higher if the
CDS is written on a risky borrower and if the protection buyer is a risky lender.
3.5.1.1 Restructuring as a credit event
Some of the applicable credit events are bankruptcy, obligation default, obligation accelera-
tion, failure to pay, and repudiation/moratorium. The standard CDS contract, as defined by
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), does not recognize out-of-court
restructuring as a credit event. Although it is possible to include restructuring as a credit
event in a CDS contract, CDS payment is triggered only if the restructuring binds all debt
holders. As a result, a private workout in the U.S. corporate segment has never triggered a
credit event. This has put pressure on the ISDA to broaden the restructuring definition such
that to allow private workouts to constitute credit events. I examine the consequences of
including voluntary renegotiations as a credit event and compare it to the fee scheme derived
in the former subsubsection.
If voluntary restructurings are considered credit events, then the borrower is not liqui-
dated under distress if and only if he is able to repay his debt in full, i.e., y (θ) < r. It follows
that each lender’s decision to buy CDS protection does not depend on the overall fraction
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of lenders that insure. Since lenders’ signals are nearly precise, they will buy CDS if θ < r
and will not buy if otherwise. Analogously, the borrower’s financing policy need only worry
about obtaining the best financing terms terms — as this also insures the lowest liquidation
threshold. To be more precise, the borrower’s payoff under restructuring as a credit event is
(1− λ) (y − pRβrR − pS (1− β) rS) + λ
∫ ∞
[pRβrR+pS(1−β)rS ]
θh (θ) dθ, (3.18)
while lenders’ payoff are given by:
(1− λ) rg − λ
[
H (r)Lg
(a
λ
)
+ (1−H (r))L (a)
]
− 1. (3.19)
Under the tax system proposed in the previous subsubsection, the liquidation cutoff is
φ∗ = 1. Therefore, the borrower’s payoff is
(1− λ) (y − pRβrR − pS (1− β) rS) + λ
∫ ∞
0
θh (θ) dθ, (3.20)
and the payoff of lenders of group g is
(1− λ) rg − λ
[
H (0)Lg
(
a− τg
λ
+ τg
)
+ (1−H (0))L (a)
]
− 1. (3.21)
From 3.19 and 3.21 it is possible to conclude that lenders’ payoff are higher under re-
structuring as a credit event. The reason is that this contract structure eliminates strategic
uncertainty and solves lenders’ coordination problem. Lenders become better protected in
distress times, allowing the borrower to obtain better financing terms. However, this comes
at a cost. The borrower will be liquidated more often compared to the fee scheme scenario.
It follows that if the probability of borrower’s distress is sufficiently small, restructuring as a
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credit event is preferred to the fee scheme. However, the likelihood of distress is high enough,
then the fee system is preferred. This is formalized in Proposition 8 below.
Proposition 8 Debt repayments are lower if the intervention takes the form of requiring
restructuring to be a credit event as opposed to implementing a fixed fee scheme. Let W r (λ)
be the borrower’s surplus in the former and W τ (λ) that in the latter. There exists a cutoff
λ for the borrower’s probability of distress such that, if λ > λ, then W r (λ) ≤ W τ (λ) and if
λ < λ, W r (λ) ≥ W τ (λ). That is, implementing the fee scheme is more (less) beneficial to
riskier (safer) borrowers compared requiring restructuring to be a credit event.
Proposition 8 states that, if the purpose of intervening in the CDS market is to make
CDSs beneficial so riskier borrowers, then the fixed fee scheme proposed is preferred. The
intuition is quite simple. The main problem faced by riskier borrowers with the existence of
CDSs is that of frequent liquidation. Therefore, in order to overcome this problem, it is nec-
essary to make it harder to lenders to coordinate when they buy CDS protection. Requiring
restructuring as a credit event does exactly the opposite.
3.5.1.2 Capping CDS insurance
Capping the amount of CDS insurance to the amount of debt hold by the lender has been
proposed on theoretical grounds by Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and Spamann (2010). Bolton
and Oehmke (2011) argue that the empty creditor problem is associated with negative eco-
nomic ownership — CDS protection greater than renegotiation proceeds consistent with no
liquidation. They suggest limiting the enforcement of excessively large default payments.
Spamann (2010) shows that and informed trader such as a hedge fund destroys social value
when he is overinsured — votes to minimize the security value (empty voting). It follows that
capping the amount of CDS protection is a natural way of reducing inefficiencies in his model.
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In the two papers mentioned in the last paragraph, the empty creditor and voting out-
comes result from the action of a player that is big relative to the market. In other words,
the inefficiency results from the following: (i) the player has negative economic ownership,
i.e., prefers the inefficient outcome and (ii) the player is big enough so as to influence the
outcome in his favor. Therefore, restricting the economic positions of these players to be
non-negative improves welfare.
In the present paper, lenders are small relative to the market and face a coordination
problem. Liquidation occurs only if the average belief about the total fraction of insured
lenders is sufficiently high. The effect of capping the amount of CDS insurance to the amount
of debt hold by the lender facilitates lenders’ coordination. The reason is that this interven-
tion equalizes lenders’ incremental payoff of insuring over not insuring regardless of whether
a credit event occurs. Since it is dominant for lenders of group g to buy an amount of
protection of at least rg, this constraint on the amount of CDS protection results in lenders
of group g buying exactly sg = rg. Lenders insure if θ < r and do not insure if otherwise,
which means a higher probability of default given distress compared to the baseline model.
In terms of liquidation outcomes given distress, this policy is similar to that of requir-
ing restructuring to constitute a credit event. As a result, the borrower’s payoff following
financing is exactly equal to that in 3.18. However, the surplus of lenders of group g is given
by:
(1− λ) rg − λ [H (r)Lg (rg + a− λrg) + (1−H (r))L (a)]− 1. (3.22)
If a is sufficiently high, these payoffs are smaller than the correspondent ones under the
requirement that restructuring be a credit event. As a result, since for riskier borrowers the
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fixed fee scheme is superior to the requirement that restructuring be a credit event, which
in turn is superior to capping CDS insurance, I conclude that the proposed fixed tax system
if the most appropriate if the goal is to make CDS beneficial to these borrowers.
3.5.2 Unknown lenders
So far I have assume that the borrower knows the group of each lender. As a consequence, the
borrower trades off increasing the proportion of risky lenders and obtaining better financing
terms against increasing the proportion of safe lenders and inducing a lower probability of
liquidation given distress. The safer the borrower, the more advantageous the former option.
In addition, according to Proposition 5, this involves reducing the repayment of risky lenders
and increasing the repayment of safe ones. In other words, the spread — the repayment of
safe lenders minus that of risky ones — is higher for safer borrowers.
However, the assumption that lenders’ exposures are known to be borrower might be
somewhat unrealistic. There is large evidence that banks manipulate reports on their loan
loss data (see Wall and Koch (2000) and Hasan and Wall (2004)). There is also evidence
that banks delay loan provisioning (Laeven and Majnoni (2003)) and overstate the value of
distressed assets (Huizinga and Laeven (2009)).
If lenders’ types are unknown to the borrower, then risky lenders would have incentives
to act strategically and conceal his type from the borrower. Therefore, the borrower just
offer contracts that satisfy the lenders’ incentive constraint, i.e., the borrower fancying policy
must be such that lenders of one type do not prefer to be treated as those of the other type.
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The new problem faced by the borrower in t = 0 is the following:
max
rg ,pg∈[0,1] for g=R,S
(1− λ) (y − pRβrR − pS (1− β) rS) + λ
∫ ∞
[pRβrR+pS(1−β)rS ](1−φ∗)
θh (θ) dθ
s.t.
pRβ + pS (1− β) = α (3.23)
pgUg (rg) ≥ 0 for all g = R, S (3.24)
pgUg (rg) ≥ p−gUg (r−g) for all g = R, S (3.25)
As it is usual in this kind of problems, one can show that the only participation constraint
that binds is that of the safe borrowers, while the only incentive constraint binding in the
optimum is that of risky lenders. As Proposition 9 below states, the presence of unknown
lenders makes the borrower increase the fraction of funds obtained from safe lenders, decrease
the repayment of safe lenders, and increase the repayment of risky lenders.
Proposition 9 With CDSs and unknown lenders, the repayment of lenders of group R is
higher, the repayment of lenders of group S is lower, and the probability that lenders of group
R finance the borrower is lower compared to the case with CDSs and known lenders.
Proposition 9 says that the existence of unknown lenders makes is less attractive to ob-
tain funding from risky lenders. When lenders’ types are known, the borrower obtains the
best lending terms from risky lenders. This benefit is weighed against the cost of facing a
higher probability of liquidation given distress. With unknown lenders, the borrower must
make financing terms more favorable to risky lenders since otherwise they prefer the con-
tracts offered to safe lenders. Therefore, it makes financing risky lenders relatively more
costly compared to safe lenders. This suggests that a good way to improve the market
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would be to obtain good measures of lenders exposure the borrowers’ distress and to make
this information accessible to potential borrowers.
3.6 Empirical Implications
I dedicate this section to the discussion of the model’s implications. I present a non-
exhaustive list of testable empirical predictions. I believe that examining these predictions
would deepen our understanding of the CDS markets and their impact on corporate financing
and economic efficiency.
Implication #1: Firms with a greater proportion of debt held by lenders that are more
exposed to distress should experience a higher probability of default given distress.
This result follows from Proposition 2. Riskier lenders reduce the liquidation cutoff
whereas safer lenders contribute increase this threshold. Therefore, the higher the proportion
of riskier lenders holding the firms’s debt, the higher the probability of default given distress.
Implication #2: Among firms with similar distress probability and debt composition, those
with higher debt repayments should experience a higher probability of default given distress.
This result also follows from Proposition 2. The lower the debt repayments, the higher the
opportunity of insuring. This makes coordination among lenders more difficult, increasing
the liquidation cutoff.
Implication #3: Firms should experience better financing terms after the emergence of
CDSs
This result follows from Proposition 4. CDSs work as insurance to lenders in the event
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the firm is in distress, increasing their payoffs. This allows firms to obtain finance with better
terms, i.e., with lower repayments.
Implication #4: The equity value of safer firms should increase after the emergence of
CDSs while that of riskier ones should decrease.
This implication also follows from Proposition 4. CDSs allows firms to obtain lower re-
payments at the cost of increasing the probability liquidation given distress. The former
effect dominates the latter for safer firms while the converse is true for riskier firms.
Implication #5: Safer firms should experience better financing terms and higher proba-
bility of default given distress after the emergence of CDSs.
This implication follows from Proposition 5. The benefits of lower repayments relative to
increased distress costs is higher for safer lenders. Therefore, safer firms face lower financ-
ing costs. This comes at the cost of having CDSs written more often on their debt, which
increases the probability of default given distress.
Implication #6: Safer firms should have a greater proportion of debt hold by lenders that
are more exposed to distress.
This result also follows from Proposition 5. Lenders that are highly exposed benefit the
most from CDS insurance, allowing the firm to finance his debt offering lower repayments. In-
creasing the proportion of these lenders reduce the overall face value of debt but decreases the
liquidation cutoff. Therefore, safer borrowers finance more heavily with more exposed lenders
While my model’s predictions are new and have not been directly taken to the data,
some reported empirical regularities are consistent with my theory. I argue, for example,
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that CDSs are more beneficial for firms that are safer. This result is interesting and stands
in contrast to common intuition that riskier firms would benefit the most from the existence
of CDS markets. Consistent with my theory, however, recent studies by Ashcraft and Santos
(2009) and Hirtle (2009) find that safer and larger firms have benefited the most from CDS
contracts (for example, by paying lower spreads on their bank loans). Song and Uzmanoglo
(2010) explore the financial crisis and find evidence that firms associated with safer banks
observed smaller CDS spreads in the 2008–9 period.
A number of other predictions listed above can be directly taken to the data. Empirical
research on CDS is still in its infancy and this strikes us as setting in which models describ-
ing rich sets of relations — some direct, others indirect — are particularly useful in guiding
empirical work.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
The emergence of CDSs could be considered an important source of improvements to capital
markets. As Alan Greenspan once noted, “The new instruments of risk dispersion have
enabled the largest and most sophisticated banks in their credit-granting role to divest
themselves of much credit risk by passing it to institutions with far less leverage.”13 By
promoting better risk sharing, CDSs could allow for greater credit supply and better terms
for firms. Theoretically, riskier firms would benefit the most from the existence of CDS
insurance. This is in contrast with recent evidence by Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Hirtle
(2009) that find that CDSs are more liquid for safer, larger firms and that these firms have
13From his speech “Economic Flexibility” before Her Majesty’s Treasury Enterprise Conference (London,
26 January, 2004).
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benefited the most from CDS markets. This puzzling result suggests that CDSs can be
beneficial to some firms and less so to others.
This paper provides a simple rationale to this apparent puzzle by developing a model
examining the optimal financing policy in the presence of CDSs when competitive lenders
have different exposures to borrowers’ distress risk and face coordination problems. The
model shows that the borrower weighs the benefits of reduced repayments in good times
against the costs of a higher probability of liquidation in distress times. Since risky lenders
benefit the most from CDS insurance, they allow for better financing terms compared to safe
lenders. Thus, the borrower can extract a higher surplus by obtaining a larger fraction of
finance from these lenders.
The problem is that risky lenders contribute to a lower liquidation cutoff given distress.
The more the borrower obtains funding from these lenders, the higher the probability of
liquidation given distress. The benefits of lower repayments relative to increased distress
costs is higher for safer lenders. Therefore, safer borrowers obtain a large portion of funding
from risky lenders, face lower financing costs — although the spread between the highest and
lowest repayments is higher, and have CDSs written more often on their debt. Overall, firms
that are sufficiently safe benefit from CDSs as the surplus brought about in terms of reduced
repayments in good times surpasses the extra distress costs. On the other end of the spec-
trum, firms for which distress probabilities are large enough have inefficiently low liquidation
cutoffs. These firms are frequently liquidated once in distress and CDSs are harmful to them.
I look for policy innovations that might improve efficiency. I show that a simple fee
scheme in which lenders pay a fixed fee in order to buy CDS protection can reduce inefficient
124
liquidation. The fees are proportional to lenders’ exposure, with the proportionality constant
given by the borrower’s probability of distress. In other words, fees are higher for CDSs writ-
ten on the debt of riskier borrowers and for lenders that are more exposed to the borrower’s
risk of distress. As a result, it becomes harder for lenders to coordinate, which raises the
liquidation cutoff. This fee system requires very little knowledge from the planner. It does
not require information regarding lenders’ private information and their distributions or the
proportion of each type of lender holding the borrower’s debt. It only requires a measure of
the exposure of each group of lenders to borrower’s distress and the probability of distress,
where the former can be obtained from balance sheet data and the latter from CDS spreads.
I compare this fee scheme with commonly proposed interventions such as limiting voting
in restructuring decisions to lenders with positive net economic ownerships and capping the
amount of protection to the amount of debt owed by the borrower. I show that the fee sys-
tem is superior to these proposals if the borrower’s probability of distress is sufficiently high,
which turns out the be the range for which CDSs can be harmful otherwise. The reason is
that these proposals work as a coordination tool to lenders, resulting in an excessively low
liquidation cutoff and a high distress cost.
If lenders’ exposures are unknown to the borrower at the time of financing (e.g., lenders’
distress risk is hard to measure precisely), more exposed lenders want to look like less ex-
posed ones in order to enjoy higher repayments. This harms specially safer borrowers since
they lean more heavily on more exposed lenders. As a result, these borrowers inefficiently
increase the proportion of less exposed lenders, reducing the surplus brought about by CDSs.
Proposals aimed at making information regarding lenders’ risk exposure more transparent,
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accessible, and accurate could greatly improve market efficiency.
126
3.8 Figures and Tables
Table 3.1: Timing
t = 0 (Investment Period) t = 1 (CDS Insurance) t = 2 (Renegotiation)
1. Borrower offers contracts 1. Lenders receive signals xi about 1. Cash flow c is realized. If
(pg, rg). the fundamental θ c = y no default.
2. Lenders buy CDS protection. 2. If c = y (θ), renegotiation.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1 The expected payoff of the VC under uninformed financing at the
time of refinancing is vUιV p
(
piH −RU1
)
+
(
1− vUιV
)
u. Therefore, vUιV = 1 if and only if
p
(
piH −RU1
) ≥ u ⇐⇒ piH − up ≥ RU1 . Analogously, the expected payoff of the VC at
the time of refinancing under informed financing is vIιV p
(
piH −RI1
)
+
(
1− eIιV
)
u. Therefore
eIιV = 1 if and only if piH − up ≥ RI1.
The payoff of the investor under uninformed financing is v2ιV
(
pRU1 − 1
)
, which is equal
to 0 if RU1 > piH − up and equal to pRU1 − 1 for RU1 ≤ piH − up . The optimal strategy is
RU1 = piH − up , which gives a payoff of ppiH −u− 1 > 0. The investor’s payoff under informed
financing is vIιV
(
pRI1 − 1
)
, which is equal to 0 if RI1 > piH − up and pRI1 − 1 if otherwise. It is
optimal for the investor to choose RI1 = piH − up , which gives him a payoff of ppiH −u−1 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose there is a VC-equilibrium each VC charges a different price
zιV . We will show that the best strategy for the investor is to choose k = 0, which leads to a
contradiction. Note that, by consistency of beliefs, we have µK (ιV |zιV ) = µK (ιV |zιV , τιV ) = 1
and µE (ιV |ιE, zιV ) = µE (ιV |ιE, zιV , τιV ) = 1. Using this along with the result of lemma 1
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will allow us to compare the investor’s payoff when k = 0 to that when k = 1. The en-
trepreneur’s belief that his project is of type G is µ (G|ιE, ιV ). Without loss of generality,
assume µ (G|ιE, ιV ) > 0.
Case 1 (k = 0): We can write the entrepreneur’s expected payoff by:
eUιEµ (G|ιE, ιV ) p
(
piH −RU0
)
+
(
1− eUιE
)
(mH + u) .
Therefore, she will choose eUιE = 1 if and only if:
µ (G|ιE, ιV ) p
(
piH −RU0
) ≥ mH + u
Since the investor knows that type of the VC, his belief that the project is good is µ (G|ιV ).
The expected payoff of the investor is:
eUιE
(
µ (G|ιV ) pRU0 − (1−mH)
)
+ eUιEpµ (G|ιV ) (ppiH − u− 1) .
Thus, if he sets RU0 ≤ piH − mH+uµ(G|ιE ,ιV )p his expected payoff is
µ (G|ιV ) pRU0 − (1−mH) + pµ (G|ιV ) (ppiH − u− 1) , (A.1)
and if he sets otherwise, 0. He will choose RU0 = piH − mH+uµ(G|ιE ,ιV )p if and only if:
µ (G|ιV ) ppiH − (mH + u) µ (G|ιV )
µ (G|ιE, ιV ) − (1−mH) + pµ (G|ιV ) (ppiH − u− 1) ≥ 0. (A.2)
Case 2 (k = 1): The entrepreneur’s expected payoff is:
eIιEµ (G|ιE, ιV ) p
(
piH −RI0
)
+
(
1− eIιE
)
(mH + u) .
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This implies that the entrepreneur will choose eIιE = 1 if and only if:
µ (G|ιE, ιV ) p
(
piH −RI0
) ≥ mH + u
The investor’s expected payoff is:
eIιE
(
µ (G|ιV ) pRI0 − (1−mH)− zιV
)− (1− eIιE) zιV + eIιEpµ (G|ιV ) (ppiH − u− 1) .
If he chooses RI0 ≤ piH − mH+uµ(G|ιE ,ιV )p his expected payoff is
µ (G|ιV ) pRI0 − (1−mH)− zιV + pµ (G|ιV ) (ppiH − u− 1) , (A.3)
and if he sets otherwise, −zιV . He will choose R1 = piH − mH+uµ(G|ιE ,ιV )p if and only if:
µ (G|ιV ) ppiH − (mH + u) µ (G|ιV )
µ (G|ιE, ιV ) − (1−mH) + pµ (G|ιV ) (ppiH − u− 1) ≥ 0. (A.4)
Note that (A.2) ⇐⇒ (A.4) and (A.1) > (A.3). Thus, if (A.4) holds, then the investor is
better off choosing k = 0. If (A.4) does not hold, then the investor’s payoff if k = 1 is −zιV ,
while his payoff if k = 0 is 0 > −zιV . Therefore, the investor chooses k = 0 and we have a
contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3 If k = 0, the entrepreneur of type ιE believes his project is of type
G with probability µιE (G|ιE, z) ≡
∑
ι′V ∈S(T )
µιE (ι
′
V |ιE, z)µ (G|ι′V , ιE). Therefore, his expected
payoff is:
eUιEµιE (G|ιE1 , z) p (piH −R0) +
(
1− eUιE
)
(mH + u) .
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He will choose eUιE = 1 if and only if:
µιE (G|ιE, z) p (piH −R0) ≥ mH + u.
If ιE = {B}, we have µιE (G|ιE, z) = 0 and eU{B} = 0 ∀RU0 ∈ R+. If ιE = {G}, then
µιE (G|ιE, z) = 1 and eU{G} = 1 if and only if RU0 ≤ piH − mH+up ≡ R0. If ιE = {U}, then
µιE (G|ιE, z) = λ and eU{U} = 1 if and only if RU0 ≤ piH − mH+uλp ≡ RU0 . The argument is the
same if k = 1, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4 One must note that, given the strategies chosen by the entrepreneurs,
the expected payoff of the investor is increasing in RU0 . If it is optimal for the investor to
choose RU0 ∈
[
0, RU0
]
, only the entrepreneurs of types {U} and {G} will accept the contract.
Hence, the investor chooses RU0 = R
U
0 . If it is optimal to choose R
U
0 ∈
(
RU0 , R
U
0
]
only
the entrepreneur of type {G} will accept the contract and the investor chooses RU0 = RU0 .
For RU0 > R
U
0 no entrepreneur will accept the contract and the investor’s expected re-
turn is d. In this case a contract with price RU0 = R
U
0 gives the investor a higher pay-
off. To see this, note that the investor’s belief that the entrepreneur is of type ιE is
µK (ιE|z) =
∑
ι′V ∈S(z)
µK (ι
′
V |z)µ (ιE|ι′V ) the expected payoff of the investor if he charges RU0 is
µK ({G} |z)
[
pRU0 − (1−mH)
]
+ µK ({G} |z) p (ppiH − u− 1) =
µK ({G} |z) [ppiH (1 + p)− (mH + u)− 1] > d,
which is positive since µK ({G} |z) = λq and we assume piH − mH+uλp > 1.
Proof of Lemma 5 Suppose in equilibrium k = 1. If all types of VC report the same infor-
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mation τ , then consistency implies that µK ({G} |z) = µK ({G} |z, τ) = λq, µK ({B} |z) =
µK ({B} |z, τ) = (1− λ) q, and µK ({U} |z) = µK ({U} |z, τ) = 1 − q. The implied be-
liefs for the entrepreneur are µE (G| {G} , z) = µE (G| {G} , z, τ) = 1, µE (G| {B} , z) =
µE (G| {B} , z, τ) = 0, and µE (G| {U} , z) = µE (G| {U} , z, τ) = λ. Therefore, the same
argument used in the proof of lemma 2 applies and the investor is better off choosing k = 0,
which leads to a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 6 Suppose it is not ; i.e., 1 > d− (1−mH) +Ri0. Since an optimal debt
contract has a price Ri0 ∈
{
Ri0, R
i
0
}
, the assumption piH − mH+uλp > 1 implies Ri0 > 1. There-
fore, d− (1−mH) + Ri0 > 1 + d− (1−mH) ≥ 1 > d− (1−mH) + Ri0 ⇒ 1 > Ri0, which is
a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1 By lemma 4, we need only consider four types of equilibria: τ{G} 6=
τ{U} 6= τ{B}; τ{U} = τ{B} = τ , τ{G} 6= τ ; τ{G} = τ{U} = τ , τ{B} 6= τ ; τ{G} = τ{B} = τ , τ{U} 6= τ .
In order to characterize VC-equilibria, we need to find the optimal strategy for the investor
given his beliefs, check if the reports given by VCs are optimal given the investor’s beliefs,
and see whether eK = 1 is optimal for the investor. The expected payoff of the VC of type
ιV is
∑
ιE∈T
eIιEµ (ιE|ιV )µ (G|ιE, ιV ) pu. The investor’s expected payoff is
∑
ιE∈T
µK (ιE|z, τ)
 eIιE (R1 (τιV )) (µ (G|ιE) pRI0 (τιV )− (1−mH)− z)−(
1− eIιE (R1 (τιV ))
)
z + eIιEµ (G|ιE) p (ppiH − u− 1)
 .
Case 1 (τ{G} 6= τ{U} 6= τ{B}): Suppose Π (q = 0) > 0. In these equilibria µK (ιV |z, τιV ) =
1, µK (ιE1|z, τιV ) = µ (ιE|ιV ). If ιE2 = {G}, then the investor clearly chooses RI0
(
τ{G}
)
= RI0
and receives a payoff of Π (λ = 1, q = 1) − z. If ιV = {U}, then µE (G|ιE, z, τ) = λ and
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RI0
(
τ{U}
)
= piH − mH+uλp . The investor receives a payoff of −z if RI0 > RI0
(
τ{U}
)
and a payoff
of Π (q = 0) − z if RI0 = RI0
(
τ{U}
)
. Since Π (q = 0) > 0, the investor chooses RI0
(
τ{U}
)
=
RI0
(
τ{U}
)
. If ιV = {B}, then the investor’s payoff is −z ∀RI0 ∈ R+. The expected payoff of
the VC of type ιV = {G} is pu independent of his report, so he has no incentive to deviate.
The expected payoff of the VC of type ιV = {U} is λpu if he reports τ{U} and at most λpu
if he reports either τ{G} or τ{B}. Therefore, he has no incentive to deviate. The expected
payoff of the VC of type ιV = {B} is 0 regardless of his report and he has no reason to
deviate. The ex ante expected payoff of the investor is
Π = Π + (1− q) Π (q = 0) = Π + q (1− λ) (mH + u) > max
{
Π,Π
}
,
and the investor chooses k = 1 if z ≤ min{d− (1−mH) ,Π−max{Π,Π}}, and k = 0
otherwise. Consequently, VCs will optimally set z = min
{
d− (1−mH) ,Π−max
{
Π,Π
}}
and we have a characterization of VC-equilibria when Π (q = 0) > 0.
Suppose now there is a VC equilibrium with Π (q = 0) ≤ 0. If Π (q = 0) = 0 and
R1
(
τ{U}
)
= R1
(
τ{U}
)
, then we know a VC-equilibrium cannot exist since z = 0 in this case,
which leads to a contradiction. If RI0
(
τ{U}
)
> RI0
(
τ{U}
)
, then the VC of type ιV = {U} has
an incentive to deviate and report τ{B} provided that RI0
(
τ{B}
) ≤ RI0 (τ{U}). Therefore, we
must have RI0
(
τ{B}
)
> RI0
(
τ{U}
)
in order to sustain such equilibria. However, the investor’s
ex ante payoff under informed financing is Π ≤ max{Π,Π}, which implies z = 0 and we
have a contradiction. If Π (q = 0) < 0 then it must be that RI0
(
τ{U}
)
> RI0
(
τ{U}
)
and we
already know that z = 0, leading to a contradiction. Hence, a VC-equilibrium exists if and
only if Π (q = 0) > 0.
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Case 2 (τ{U} = τ{B} = τ , τ{G} 6= τ): Suppose Π (q = 0) > 0. In these equilibria, we have
µK
({G} |z, τ{G}) = 1, µK ({U} |z, τ) = 1−q1−q+(1−λ)q , and µK ({B} |z, τ) = (1−λ)q1−q+(1−λ)q . If ιV =
{G}, then the investor chooses RI0
(
τ{IG}
)
= R1, receiving a payoff of Π (λ = 1, q = 1) − z.
Note that µE (G| {U} , z, τ) = λ, which implies RI0 (τ) = piH − mH+uλp . If the investor chooses
RI0 > R
I
0 (τ) upon receiving a report from either type {U} or type {B} , his payoff is −z. If
he chooses RI0 = R
I
0 (τ) instead:
1− q
1− q + (1− λ) q (Π (q = 0)− z)−
(1− λ) q
1− q + (1− λ) q z.
Therefore, the investor will choose RI0 (τ) = R
I
0 (τ). Clearly, no VC has an incentive to
deviate regardless of RI0 (τ
′) for τ ′ ∈ T\{τ, τ{G}}, which implies the investor can have
any belief upon receiving report τ ′. As a consequence, the investor’s ex ante payoff will
be Π + (1− q) Π (q = 0) and the investor chooses k = 1 if the management fee is such
that z ≤ min{d− (1−mH) ,Π−max{Π,Π}}, and k = 0 otherwise. VCs charge z =
min
{
d− (1−mH) ,Π−max
{
Π,Π
}}
. Thus, we characterized the VC-equilibria when it
holds that Π (q = 0) > 0. Suppose now there is a VC equilibrium with Π (q = 0) ≤ 0.
The argument that leads to a contradiction is that same as that in Case 1. Therefore, a
VC-equilibrium exists if and only if Π (q = 0) > 0.
Case 3 (τ{G} = τ{U} = τ , τ{B} 6= τ): Suppose Π (q = 0) > 0. In this equilibria, we
have µK
({B} |z, τ{B}) = 1, µK ({U} |z, τ) = 1−q1−q+λq , and µK ({G} |z, τ) = λq1−q+λq . Since the
uninformed entrepreneur has belief µE (G| {U} , z, τ) = λ that the holds a good project, if
the investor chooses RI0 (τ) = piH − mH+uλp upon receiving a report from either type {U} or
type {G} , his expected payoff will be Π
1−q+λq − z. If the investor chooses RI0 instead, his
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expected payoff will be Π
1−q+λq−z. Therefore, if Π > Π the investor chooses RI0 (τ) = RI0, and
if Π < Π the investor chooses RI0 (τ) = R
I
0 (τ). Regarding a report from the VC of type {B},
e1{B} = 0 and the investor’s expected payoff is −z ∀RI0 ∈ R+. The VC of type {G} has clearly
on incentive to deviate. If Π > Π the VC of type {U} has an incentive to deviate provided
that either RI0 (τ
′) or RI0
(
τ{B}
)
is less than or equal to RI0 (τ) for τ
′ ∈ T\{τ, τ{B}}. In this
case, has an expected payoff of 0 if he reports τ and λpu otherwise. Thus, we must have
RI0 (τ
′) , RI0
(
τ{B}
)
> RI0 (τ) to sustain such equilibria. However, the investor’s ex ante payoff
under informed financing is Π = Π ≤ max{Π,Π} and he is better off choosing k = 0. Hence,
no VC-equilibrium exists if Π > Π. If Π < Π then no VC has incentive to deviate regardless
of RI0 (τ
′) and RI0
(
τ{B}
)
, which implies the investor can have any belief upon receiving report
τ ′. However, the investor’s ex ante payoff will be Π = Π ≤ max{Π,Π} and he is better off
choosing k = 0. Therefore, there is no VC-equilibrium if Π < Π. Conversely, there is no
VC-equilibrium if Π (q = 0) ≤ 0 since in this case the investor must choose RI0 (τ) = RI0 and
we know the implied investor’s expected payoff is Π = Π ≤ max{Π,Π}.
Case 4 (τ{G} = τ{B} = τ , τ{U} 6= τ): Suppose Π (q = 0) > 0. In these equilibria, we
have µK
({U} |z, τ{U}) = 1, µK ({B} |z, τ) = (1−λ)q(1−λ)q+λq , and µK ({G} |z, τ) = λq(1−λ)q+λq . Since
the uninformed entrepreneur has belief µE
(
G| {U} , z, τ{U}
)
= λ that he has a good project,
RI0
(
τ{U}
)
= piH − mH+uλp . If the investor chooses RI0 > RI0
(
τ{U}
)
upon receiving a report
from the VC of type {U}, his expected payoff is −z. If he chooses RI0 = RI0
(
τ{U}
)
, his
expected payoff is Π (q = 0)− z. Therefore, the investor chooses RI0
(
τ{U}
)
= RI0
(
τ{U}
)
. The
investor will clearly choose RI0 upon receiving the report τ , which implies R
I
0 (τ) = R
I
0 and
an associated payoff of Π
1−q+λq −z. It is straightforward to check that no VC has an incentive
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to deviate regardless of regardless of RI0 (τ
′) for τ ′ ∈ T\{τ, τ{U}}. Therefore, there are no
restrictions on the investor’s belief upon receiving report τ ′. The investor’s ex ante payoff
under informed financing is Π = Π + (1− q) Π (q = 0) > max{Π,Π}. The investor chooses
k = 1 if z ≤ min{d− (1−mH) ,Π−max{Π,Π}} and k = 0 if otherwise, and the VCs
will optimally choose z = min
{
d− (1−mH) ,Π−max
{
Π,Π
}}
. We have characterized the
VC-equilibria when Π (q = 0) > 0. The argument to show that no VC-equilibrium exists if
Π (q = 0) ≤ 0 is the same as that in Case 1.
Therefore, we have shown that a VC-equilibrium exists if and only if Π (q = 0) > 0.
Moreover, we have characterized the VC-equilibria and they are all payoff-equivalent.
Proof of Proposition 2 We start by showing (i). The payoff of the VC of type ιV is∑
ιE∈T
e1ιEµ (ιE|ιV )µ (G|ιE, ιV ) pu, and the investor’s expected payoff upon receiving a report
from VCs is
∑
ιE∈T
µK (ιE|z, τ)
 eIιE (RI0 (τιV )) (µ (G|ιE) pRI0 (τιV )− (1−mH)− z)−(
1− eIιE
(
RI0 (τιV )
))
z + eIιEµ (G|ιE) p (ppiH − u− 1)
 .
To see a separating equilibrium exists, first note that µK (ιV |z, τιV ) = 1. If ιV = {G},
then µE
(
G| {U} , z, τ{G}
)
= 1, which implies RI0
(
τ{G}
)
= RI0. Thus, the investor optimally
chooses RI0
(
τ{G}
)
= RI0 and receives a payoff of Π (λ = 1, q = 1)− z. If ιV = {U}, then the
uninformed entrepreneur believes with probability µE
(
G| {U} , z, τ{G}
)
= λ that he holds
a good project and RI0
(
τ{U}
)
= piH − mH+uλp . The investor’s expected payoff if he chooses
RI0 is Π − z, whereas his payoff if he chooses RI0
(
τ{U}
)
is Π − z. This implies RI0
(
τ{U}
)
=
RI0 since Π > Π. If ιV = {B}, then the investor’s payoff is −z ∀RI0 ∈ R+. The VC of
type {G} has not incentive to deviate since he receives a payoff of pu if he conforms, and
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at most this amount if he deviates. If RI0
(
τ{B}
) ≤ RI0 (τ{U}), then the VC of type {U} has
an incentive to deviate and report τ{B}. To see this note that he gets a payoff of λpu if he
deviates compared to a payoff of λqpu if otherwise. Hence, to sustain such equilibria we
need RI0
(
τ{B}
)
> RI0
(
τ{U}
)
. The investor’s ex ante expected payoff is Π+(1− q) Π and VCs
optimally choose z = min
{
d− (1−mH) , (1− q) Π
}
.
For the semi-pooling equilibria in which S (τ) = {{U} , {B}}, we have µK
({G} |z, τ{G}) =
1, µK ({U} |z, τ) = 1−q1−q+q(1−λ) and µK ({B} |z, τ) = q(1−λ)1−q+q(1−λ) . If ιV = {G}, then the un-
informed entrepreneur has belief µE
(
G| {U} , z, τ{G}
)
= 1 that he holds a good project,
which implies RI0
(
τ{G}
)
= RI0. The investor chooses R
I
0
(
τ{G}
)
= RI0 and receives a pay-
off of Π (λ = 1, q = 1) − z. Following report τ , the uninformed entrepreneur has belief
µE (G| {U} , z, τ) = (1−q)λ(1−q)+q(1−λ) that his project is good, which implies RI0 (τ) = piH −(
1−λq
1−q
)
mH+u
λp
. Calculating expected payoffs, the investor receives a payoff of
1
1− q + q (1− λ)
[
(1− q)λqΠ (λ = 1, q = 1)]− z.
if he chooses RI0 and a payoff of
1
1− q + q (1− λ)
[
(1− q)λqΠ (λ = 1, q = 1)]+ Π− Π− q (1− λ)
1− q + q (1− λ) (mH + u)− z,
if he chooses RI0 (τ). Therefore, the investor chooses R
I
0 (τ) = R
I
0 since Π−Π < 0. We need
to check that no VC wants to deviate. The VC of type {G} receives a payoff the of pu if
he conforms with τ{G} and at most pu if he deviates. Thus, he has no incentive to deviate.
The VC of type {B} receives a payoff of 0 in any outcome and therefore has no incentive to
deviate either. The VC of type {U} receives a payoff of qλpu if he conforms and a payoff
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of λpu if he deviates to RI0 (τ
′), provided that RI0 (τ
′) ≤ RI0 (τ) for τ ′ ∈ T\
{
τ, τ{G}
}
. Hence,
RI0 (τ
′) > RI0 (τ) to sustain such equilibria. The investor ex ante payoff is Π + (1− q) Π, and
VCs optimally charge min
{
d− (1−mH) , (1− q) Π
}
.
For (ii), we have µK
({B} |z, τ{B}) = 1, µK ({U} |z, τ) = 1−q1−q+λq and µK ({G} |z, τ) =
λq
1−q+λq . If ιV = {B}, then µE
(
G| {U} , z, τ{B}
)
= 0 and the investor’s payoff is d− z for all
RI0 ∈ R+. The uninformed entrepreneur has belief µE (G| {U} , z, τ) = λ1−q+λq that his holds
a good project upon observing report τ , which implies RI0 (τ) = piH − (1− q + λq) mH+uλp . If
the investor chooses RI0 = R
I
0 his expected payoff is
1
1− q + λqλqΠ (λ = 1, q = 1)− z,
while if he chooses RI0 = R
I
0 (τ) his payoff is
1
1− q + λqλqΠ (λ = 1, q = 1) + (1− q) Π (q = 0)−
(1− q) [q (1− λ)]
2
1− q (1− λ) (mH + u)− z.
Without loss of generality, suppose Π (q = 0)− [q(1−λ)]2
1−q(1−λ) (mH + u) = 0. The investor is in-
different between choosing RI0 or R
I
0 (τ). Suppose he chooses the latter; i.e., R
I
0 (τ) = R
I
0 (τ).
The VC of type {G} receives pu and at most this amount if he deviates. Analogously, the VC
of type {U} receives a payoff of λpu if he conforms and at most this quantity if he deviates.
The VC of type {B} receives 0 in any outcome and has clearly no incentive to deviate. The
investor’s ex ante payoff in this type of equilibria is Π + (1− q) Π and VCs optimally choose
z = min {d− (1−mH) , (1− q) Π}. If the investor chooses the former, then the VCs of type
{G} and {U} want to deviate provided that either RI0
(
τ{B}
) ≤ RI0 (τ) or RI0 (τ ′) ≤ RI0 (τ)
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for τ ′ ∈ T\{τ, τ{B}}. To see this, note that the VC of type {G} receives a payoff of qpu
and the VC of type {U} receives a payoff of λqpu if they conform. If they deviate and
report either τ{B} or τ ′ they receive payoffs of pu and λpu respectively. Thus, we need both
RI0
(
τ{B}
)
> RI0 (τ) and R
I
0 (τ
′) > RI0 (τ) to sustain such equilibria. However, this type of
equilibria give the investor an ex ante expected payoff of Π, and no VC-equilibria exist. If
Π (q = 0)− [q(1−λ)]2
1−q(1−λ) (mH + u) < 0 then the investor must choose R
I
0 (τ) = R
I
0 and we already
know a VC-equilibrium does not exist in this situation. Therefore, VC-equilibria in which
S (τ) = {{G} , {U}} exist if and only if Π (q = 0)− [q(1−λ)]2
1−q(1−λ) (mH + u) ≥ 0.
To show (iii), note that µK
({U} |z, τ{B}) = 1, µK ({G} |z, τ) = λ and µK ({B} |z, τ) =
1− λ. If ιV = {U}, then µE
(
G| {U} , z, τ{U}
)
= λ, which implies RI0
(
τ{U}
)
= piH − mH+uλp . If
the investor chooses RI0 he receives a payoff of λqΠ (λ = 1, q = 1)−z. If he chooses RI0
(
τ{U}
)
his payoff is
λqΠ (λ = 1, q = 1) + (1− q) Π (q = 0)− q (1− λ) (mH + u)− z.
Therefore, he chooses RI0
(
τ{U}
)
only if (1− q) Π (q = 0) − q (1− λ) (mH + u) ≥ 0. After
observing τ the uninformed entrepreneur believes he holds a good project with probability
µE (G| {U} , z, τ) = λ, which implies RI0 (τ) = piH − mH+uλp . Therefore, the expected in-
vestor’s expected payoff is the same as that when he faces the VC of type {U}. This in
turn implies that he chooses RI0 (τ) only if (1− q) Π (q = 0) − q (1− λ) (mH + u) ≥ 0. If
(1− q) Π (q = 0) − q (1− λ) (mH + u) < 0, then the investor chooses RI0 (τU) = RI0 (τ) =
RI0 and a VC-equilibrium, if it exists, gives the investor an ex ante expected payoff of Π. But
then eK = 0 and we have a contradiction, which implies a VC-equilibrium does not exist.
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Suppose (1− q) Π (q = 0)− q (1− λ) (mH + u) ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, assume the
investor chooses RI0 (τU) = R
I
0 (τ) = R
I
0 (τ). Clearly no VC has an incentive to deviate and
then investor’s implied ex ante expected payoff is Π, which implies a VC-equilibrium does
not exist.
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose they are strong announcement-proof. We claim that the
announcement 〈D,N〉 with N = D = {{G} , {U}} is a credible announcement relative these
equilibria. If this announcement is believed, then the beliefs of investors and entrepreneurs
are updated according to (12). In particular, the beliefs of the investor and uninformed
entrepreneur are the same as in the proof of (ii) of Proposition 2: µ̂K ({U} |z,D) = 1−q1−q+λq ,
µ̂K ({G} |z,D) = 1−q1−q+λq , and µE1 (G| {U} , z,D) = λ1−q+λq . Therefore, the equilibria induced
by these beliefs are the same as those in (ii) of Proposition 2 and this announcement is
credible since: (1) the payoff of the VC of type {G} in (ii) is the same as his payoff in (i),
(2) the payoff of the VC of type {U} in (ii) is strictly preferred to his payoff in (i), (3) the
payoff of the VC of type {B} in (ii) is the same as his payoff in (i), and (4) there is clearly
no other announcement that, if believed, could increase the payoffs of the VCs of types
{G} and {U}. Hence, we have a contradiction. That the equilibria in (ii) of Proposition
2 are strongly announcement-proof follows from the observation that all VCs receive their
maximum expected payoff in those equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 4 We omit the proof of Proposition 4 since it is nearly identical to
that of Proposition 2.
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Appendix B
Refinement Criterion
We first state the payoffs of the VC and the investor of the cheap-talk game that starts when
k = 1. The investor’s expected payoff given his belief upon receiving report τ is:
uK
(
RI0, τ
) ≡∑
ιE∈T
µK (ιE|z, τ)
 eIιE (RI0 (τ)) (µ (G|ιE) pRI0 (τ)− (1−mH)− z)−(
1− eIιE (R1 (τ))
)
z + eIιEµ (G|ιE) p (ppiH − u− 1)
 .
(B.1)
The expected payoff of the VC of type ιE2 is:
uV
(
RI0, τιV , ιV
) ≡∑
ιE∈T
eIιE (R1 (τιV ))µ (ιE|ιV )µ (G|ιE, ιV ) pu. (B.2)
It is clear that the VC of type {U} prefers those equilibria in (ii) to those in (i). To
see this note that his payoff in (i) is uV
(
RI0, τ{U}, {U}
)
= λqpu, while his payoff in (ii) is
uV
(
RI0, τ{U}, {U}
)
= λpu. However, VCs of type {G} and {B} are indifferent between equi-
libria played in (i) and equilibria played in (ii) since in each of these equilibria they receive
uV
(
RI0, τ{G}, {G}
)
= pu and uV
(
RI0, τ{B}, {B}
)
= 0 respectively.
The idea behind the “strongly announcement-proof” criterion of Matthews et al. is sim-
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ple. Consider the equilibria in (i) and let N be a non-empty collection of non-empty and
disjoint subsets of T . Suppose D = {{G} , {U}} ∈ N and the VC of type {U} announces:
(1) his type is in D = {{G} , {U}}, (2) if his type was in another set in N he would have
announced it, and (3) if his type was not in N he would have played his equilibrium strat-
egy instead of making this announcement. If the investor and the entrepreneur believe this
announcement, they update their beliefs so that:
µ̂K (ιV |z,D) =

µK(ιV |z)∑
ι′
V
∈D
µ(ι′V |z)
if ιV ∈ D
0 if ιV /∈ D
, (B.3)
µ̂E (ιV |ιE,z,D) =

µ
E(ιV |ιE,z)∑
ι′
V
∈D
µ(ι′V |ιE,z)
if ιV ∈ D
0 if ιV /∈ D
. (B.4)
Formally, an announcement is a pair 〈D,N〉 where N is an announcement strategy
and D ∈ N . The set of deviant types is T (N) = {ιV ∈ T : ∃D ∈ N : ιV ∈ D }. Let
uV
(
RI0, τιV , ιV
)
be the payoff of the VC of type ιV in some equilibrium inA
(
Π
)
, uV
(
RI0, D, ιV
)
be the minimum payoff that VC of type ιV receives in an equilibrium if announcement 〈D,N〉
is believed, and let uV
(
RI0, D, ιV
)
be the maximum payoff the VC of type ιV receives if an-
nouncement 〈D,N〉 is believed.
Definition 1 An announcement strategy N and the corresponding announcements 〈D,N〉
are weakly credible relative to an equilibrium in A
(
Π
)
if:
(i) uV
(
RI0, D, ιV
) ≥ uV (RI0, τιV , ιV ) for all D ∈ N and ιV ∈ D with at least one strict
inequality;
(ii) uV
(
RI0, D, ιV
) ≤ uV (RI0, τιV , ιV ) for all ιV ∈ T/T (N)
(iii) uV
(
RI0, D, ιV
) ≥ uV (RI0, D, ιV ) for all D,D ∈ N and ιV ∈ D.
If no announcement is weakly credible, then this equilibrium and its outcome are strongly
announcement-proof.
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Appendix C
Proofs of Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose R1 > y2. In this case borrower always triggers renego-
tiation. The lender’s payoff is x (L (pi)) − f if he buys a CDS with pi ≤ pi∗ and L (pi) − f
if he buys a CDS with pi > pi∗. In the former case, since a credit event never occurs and
the CDS provider is competitive, f = 0. The lender’s payoff is maximized when he chooses
pi = pi∗, which yields him a payoff of δλy2. In the latter case, the competitive CDS provider
charges f = pi and the lender’s payoff is βI regardless of his CDS position. Therefore, since
δλy2 > βI, the lender buys a CDS with pi = pi
∗. Suppose R1 ∈ (δy2, y2]. If the lender buys
a CDS with pi ≤ pi∗, then
R1 > δy2 = δ (1− λ) y2 + δλy2 = δ (1− λ) y2 + x (L (pi∗)) ≥ δ (1− λ) y2 + x (L (pi)) .
Therefore, the borrower always triggers renegotiation. The lender’s payoff is δλy2 − f . Be-
cause a credit event never occurs, the competitive CDS provider charges f = 0. Therefore,
the lender’s payoff is δλy2. If the lender buys a CDS with pi > pi
∗, then since R1 ≤ y2, the
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borrower does not trigger strategic renegotiation. The lender’s payoff is
µ [pHR1 + (1− pH) (βI + pi)] + (1− µ) [pLR1 + (1− pL) (βI + pi)]− f.
Since the breakeven condition for the competitive CDS provider is
f = pi [µ (1− pH) + (1− µ) (1− pL)] ,
the lender’s payoff is µ [pHR1 + (1− pH) βI] + (1− µ) [pLR1 + (1− pL) βI]. Therefore, the
lender buys a CDS with pi > pi∗ if and only if
µ [pHR1 + (1− pH) βI] + (1− µ) [pLR1 + (1− pL) βI] > δλy2 ⇐⇒
R1 >
δλy2 − βI [µ (1− pH) + (1− µ) (1− pL)]
µpH + (1− µ) pL .
Suppose R1 ≤ δy2. In this case the borrower never calls for strategic renegotiation. In
the lender buys a CDS with pi ≤ pi∗, his payoff is
µ {pHR1 + (1− pH)x (L (pi))}+ (1− µ) {pLR1 + (1− pL)x (L (pi))} − f.
Since a credit event never occurs, the competitive CDS provider charges f = 0. Since the
lender’s payoff is increasing in pi, it is optimal to choose pi = pi∗. Therefore, the lender’s
payoff is
µ {pHR1 + (1− pH) δλy2}+ (1− µ) {pLR1 + (1− pL) δλy2} .
If the lender buys a CDS with pi > pi∗, then his payoff is
µ {pHR1 + (1− pH) (βI + pi)}+ (1− µ) {pLR1 + (1− pL) (βI + pi)} − f.
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Because the competitive CDS provider charges f = pi [µ (1− pH) + (1− µ) (1− pL)], the
lender’s payoff is µ {pHR1 + (1− pH) βI} + (1− µ) {pLR1 + (1− pL) βI}. Clearly, it is op-
timal for the lender to demand pi = pi∗.
Proof of Proposition 4 For R1 > y2, the borrower’s payoff if he chooses high effort is
pH (y1 + (1− δ) y2) + (1− pH) (1− δ) y2 and his payoff if he chooses low effort is given by
pL (y1 + (1− δ) y2) + (1− pL) (1− δ) y2 + B. Therefore, the borrower chooses high effort if
and only if y1 (pH − pL) ≥ B. Suppose R1 ∈ (δy2, y2]. If the lender has a CDS with pi > pi∗,
the borrower’s payoff if he chooses high effort is pH (y1 −R1 + y2) and if he chooses low
effort is pL (y1 −R1 + y2) + B. Therefore, the borrower chooses high effort if and only if
y1 + y2 − BpH−pL ≥ R1. If the lender has a CDS with pi ≤ pi∗, the borrower’s payoff if he
chooses high effort is
pH [y1 + (1− δ) y2] + (1− pH) (1− δ) y2.
The borrower’s payoff if he chooses low effort is
pL [y1 + (1− δ) y2] + (1− pL) (1− δ) y2 +B.
Therefore, the borrower chooses high effort if and only if y1 (pH − pL) ≥ B. Suppose
R1 ≤ δy2. The borrower’s payoff is he chooses high effort is
pH [y1 −R1 + y2] + (1− pH) (1− δ) y2.
The borrower’s payoff is he chooses low effort is
pL [y1 −R1 + y2] + (1− pL) (1− δ) y2 +B.
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Therefore, the borrower chooses high effort if and only if
y1 + δy2 − B
pH − pL ≥ R1.
Proof of Proposition 5 One must note that (1) and (3) follow directly from Propositions
4 and 5. For (2), let R1 ∈ (R (0) , y2]. One must note that R1 > R (0) ≥ R (µ), which
implies that the lender buys a CDS with pi > pi∗. If R1 > R1, then the borrower chooses
eL, which implies µ = 0. Therefore (pi > pi
∗, e = eL, µ = 0) is the unique equilibrium of the
CDS–Effort game, which establishes (a). If R1 ≤ R1, then the borrower chooses eH and
we have µ = 1. As a result, R1 > R (0) ≥ R (1) and (pi > pi∗, e = eH , µ = 1) is the unique
equilibrium of the CDS–Effort game, which establishes (b).
Let R1 ∈ (δy2, R (0)]. Suppose R1 > R1. If µ is such that R1 > R (µ), the lender chooses
pi > pi∗. The borrower chooses eL, which implies µ = 0. But then we have a contradiction
since R1 ≤ R (0) and choosing pi = pi∗ is optimal for the lender. If µ is such that R1 ≤ R (µ),
the lender chooses pi = pi∗. The borrower chooses eL, which implies µ = 0. Therefore, R1 ≤
R (µ) ≤ R (0) and (pi = pi∗, e = eL, µ = 0) is the unique equilibrium of the CDS–Effort game.
Suppose R1 ≤ R1. If µ is such that R1 > R (µ), the lender chooses pi > pi∗. The borrower
chooses eH , which implies µ = 1. Therefore, R1 > R (µ) ≥ R (1) and (pi > pi∗, e = eH , µ = 1)
is an equilibrium. If µ is such that R1 ≤ R (µ), the lender chooses pi = pi∗. As a conse-
quence, the borrower chooses eL, which implies µ = 0. Therefore, R1 ≤ R (µ) ≤ R (0) and
(pi = pi∗, e = eL, µ = 0) is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6 Suppose R1 is such that R1 ≤ δy2. Without loss of generality, let
R1 ∈ [0, δy2]. If the lender chooses R1 = R1, then the borrower chooses eH , the lender buys a
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CDS with pi = pi∗, and consistency of beliefs implies µ = 1. We know that the borrower does
not call for strategic renegotiation. The lender’s expected payoff is pHR1 + (1− pH) δλy2. If
the lender chooses δy2 = R1, the borrower chooses eL, the lender buys a CDS with pi = pi
∗,
and consistency of beliefs implies µ = 0. We know that the borrower does not call for strate-
gic renegotiation. The lender’s expected payoff is pLR1 + (1− pL) δλy2. The lender chooses
R1 = R1 if and only if y2 ≥ y2 ≡ − pHδ(pH−pL)(1−λ)∆.
Suppose he chooses R1 ∈ (δy2, y2]. If the lender chooses R1 = R1, then the borrower
chooses eH , the lender buys a CDS with pi > pi
∗, and consistency of beliefs implies µ = 1.
The borrower does not trigger strategic renegotiation. The lender’s expected payoff is
pHR1 + (1− pH) βI. If the lender chooses R1 = y2, then the borrower chooses eL, the
lender buys a CDS with pi > pi∗, and consistency of beliefs implies µ = 0. The borrower
does not call for strategic renegotiation. The lender expected payoff is pLy2 + (1− pL) βI.
The lender chooses R1 = R1 if and only if pHR1 + (1− pH) βI ≥ pLy2 + (1− pL) βI ⇐⇒
y2 ≥ y2 ≡ − pHpH−pL∆ + βI. If R1 > y2 then the borrower chooses eL, the lender buys a
CDS with pi = pi∗, and consistency of beliefs implies µ = 0. The borrower triggers strategic
renegotiation. The lender’s payoff is δλy2.
Proof of Proposition 7 max
{
Π (y2) ,Π
(
R1
)}
= Π (y2), max
{
Π (δy2) ,Π
(
R1
)}
= Π (δy2)
for y2 < y2. Since Π (y2) > Π (δy2) for y2 small, there exists y
∗
2 such that Π (y
∗
2) = Π (δy
∗
2) if
and only if the slope of Π (δy2) is higher than that of Π (y2). This is true if and only if c (pL) >
pL. In this case, direct calculations show that y
∗
2 < y2 if and only if the liquidation value is suf-
ficiently small, i.e., βI < −pH∆[c(pL)−pL]
(pH−pL)[1−c(pL)] . We also have that max
{
Π (y2) ,Π
(
R1
)}
= Π
(
R1
)
and max
{
Π (δy2) ,Π
(
R1
)}
= Π (δy2) for y2 ≤ y2 < y2. Since Π (δy2) > Π
(
R1
)
for y2
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small, there exists y∗∗2 such that Π (δy
∗∗
2 ) = Π
(
R1
)
if and only if the slope of Π
(
R1
)
is
higher than that of Π (δy2). This is true if and only if pH > c (pL). Finally, we have that
max
{
Π (y2) ,Π
(
R1
)}
= Π
(
R1
)
and max
{
Π (δy2) ,Π
(
R1
)}
= Π
(
R1
)
for y2 ≥ y2. Since
Π
(
R1
)
> Π
(
R1
)
for y2 small, there exists y
∗∗∗
2 such that Π
(
R1
)
= Π
(
R1
)
if and only if the
slope of Π
(
R1
)
is higher than that of Π
(
R1
)
. This is true if and only if c (pH) > pH .
Case 1 (pH > pL ≥ c (pH) > c (pL)): In this case, the lender chooses R1 = y2 for y2 < y2
and R1 = R1 for y2 ≥ y2. It must follow that R1 = R1 for y2 ≤ y2 < y2. To see this, suppose
otherwise, i.e., y∗∗2 is such that either y
∗∗
2 ≥ y2 or y2 < y∗∗2 < y2. If the latter holds then,
because Π (y2) > Π (δy2) for all y2, we have Π (y2) > Π (δy2) > Π
(
R1
)
for y2 < y2 < y
∗∗
2 . But
this contradicts the definition of y2. If the former holds then, because Π
(
R1
)
> Π
(
R1
)
for
all y2, we have Π (δy2) ≥ Π
(
R1
)
> Π
(
R1
)
for y2 ≤ y2 ≤ y∗∗2 . This contradicts the definition
of y2.
Case 2 (pH ≥ c (pH) > pL ≥ c (pL)): The analysis is the same as in case Case 1.
Case 3 (pH ≥ c (pH) > c (pL) > pL): In this case, the lender chooses R1 = R1 for y2 ≥ y2.
There are two cases to consider: (1) y∗2 ≥ y2 and (2) y∗2 < y2. If (1) holds, then we are back
to Cases 1 and 2 as R1 = y2 for y2 < y2 and R1 = R1 for y2 ≤ y2 < y2. The former follows by
assumption since Π (y2) > Π (δy2) for all y2 such that y2 < y2, which establishes. For the lat-
ter, suppose otherwise, i.e., y∗∗2 > y2. First, let y2 < y
∗∗
2 < y2. If y
∗
2 is such that y2 ≤ y∗2 < y∗∗2 ,
then we have Π (y2) ≥ Π (δy2) > Π
(
R1
)
for y2 ≤ y2 ≤ y∗2, which contradicts the definition of
y2. If y
∗
2 ≥ y∗∗2 , then we have Π (y2) > Π (δy2) > Π
(
R1
)
for y2 < y2 < y
∗∗
2 , which also contra-
dicts the definition of y2. Second, let y
∗∗
2 ≥ y2. In this case, because Π (y2) > Π (δy2) for all y2,
we have Π (δy2) ≥ Π
(
R1
)
> Π
(
R1
)
for y2 ≤ y2 ≤ y∗∗2 , which contradicts the definition of y2.
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If (2) holds, then R1 = y2 for y2 < y
∗
2 and R1 = δy2 for y
∗
2 ≤ y2 < y2. This implies
y2 < y
∗∗
2 < y2 such that R1 = δy2 for y2 ≤ y2 < y∗∗2 and R1 = R1 for y∗∗2 ≤ y2 < y2.
To see this, suppose otherwise. i.e., either y∗∗2 ≥ y2 or y∗∗2 < y2. If y∗∗2 ≥ y2 then, since
Π
(
R1
)
> Π
(
R1
)
for all y2, we have that Π (δy2) ≥ Π
(
R1
)
> Π
(
R1
)
for y2 ≤ y2 ≤ y∗∗2 , which
contradicts the definition of y2. If y
∗∗
2 < y2, then we have that Π
(
R1
)
> Π (δy2) > Π (y2) for
y∗∗2 < y2 < y2, which contradicts the definition of y2.
Case 4 (c (pH) > c (pL) ≥ pH > pL): In this case, the lender chooses R1 = δy2 for
y2 ≤ y2 < y2. This implies that y∗∗∗2 ≤ y2. To see this, suppose otherwise, i.e., y∗∗∗2 > y2.
Since Π (δy2) > Π
(
R1
)
for all y2, we have that Π (δy2) > Π
(
R1
)
> Π
(
R1
)
for y2 ≤ y2 < y∗∗∗2 .
But this contradicts the definition of y2. Therefore, it follows that y
∗∗∗
2 ≤ y2, which implies
that R1 = R1 for y2 ≥ y2. Finally, it must be that y∗2 < y2. To see this, suppose otherwise,
i.e., y∗2 ≥ y2. If y∗2 < y2, then we have that Π (y2) ≥ Π (δy2) > Π
(
R1
)
for y2 ≤ y2 ≤ y∗2, which
contradicts the definition of y2. If y
∗
2 ≥ y2, then Π (y2) ≥ Π (δy2) > Π
(
R1
)
for y2 ≤ y2 < y2,
which also contradicts the definition of y2.
Case 5 (c (pH) > pH > pL ≥ c (pL)): This case is impossible. To see this note that, by
the definition of c (p), p ≥ c (p) if and only if p ≥ δλ + δ (1− λ) p, which is true if and only
if p ≥ δλ
1−δ(1−λ) . But this implies that pL ≥ δλ1−δ(1−λ) > pH , which contradicts the assumption
that pH > pL.
Case 6 (c (pH) > pH > c (pL) > pL): There are two cases to consider: (1) y
∗
2 ≥ y2
and (2) y∗2 < y2. If (1) holds, then from Case 3 we know that R1 = y2 for y2 < y2 and
R1 = R1 for y2 ≤ y2 < y2. It also follows that y∗∗∗2 ≥ y2. To see this, suppose otherwise, i.e.,
y∗∗∗2 < y2. If y
∗∗∗
2 ≥ y2, then we have that Π
(
R1
) ≥ Π (R1) > Π (δy2) for y∗∗∗2 ≤ y2 < y2,
155
which contradicts the definition of y2. If y
∗∗∗
2 < y2, then Π
(
R1
) ≥ Π (R1) > Π (δy2) for
y2 ≤ y2 < y2, which also contradicts the definition of y2.
If Case 2 holds, then from Case 3 we know that R1 = y2 for y2 < y
∗
2 and R1 = δy2 for y
∗
2 ≤
y2 < y2. If y
∗∗
2 ≥ y2, then the lender chooses R1 = δy2 for y2 ≤ y2 < y2. This implies that we
are back to Case 4, from which it follows that y∗∗∗2 ≤ y2 and the lender chooses R1 = R1 for
y2 ≥ y2. If y∗∗2 < y2, then it must be that y2 < y∗∗2 < y2. To see this, suppose otherwise, i.e.,
y∗∗2 ≤ y2. For y∗∗2 > y∗2, it follows that Π
(
R1
) ≥ Π (δy2) > Π (y2) for y∗∗2 ≤ y2 ≤ y2, which
contradicts the definition of y2. For y
∗∗
2 ≤ y∗2, it follows that Π
(
R1
)
> Π (δy2) > Π (y2) for
y∗2 < y2 < y2, which also contradicts the definition of y2. Therefore, the lender chooses R1 =
δy2 for y2 ≤ y2 < y∗∗2 and R1 = R1 for y∗∗2 ≤ y2 < y2. Finally, it follows that y∗∗∗2 ≥ y2. To see
this suppose otherwise, i.e., y∗∗∗2 < y2. If y
∗∗∗
2 ≥ y∗∗2 , then we have that Π
(
R1
)
> Π
(
R1
)
>
Π (δy2) for y
∗∗∗
2 < y2 < y2, which contradicts the definition of y2. If y
∗∗∗
2 < y
∗∗
2 , then we have
that Π
(
R1
)
> Π
(
R1
) ≥ Π (δy2) for y∗∗2 ≤ y2 < y2, which also contradicts the definition of y2.
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Appendix D
Proofs of Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 1 The proof follows from Proposition 1 in Steiner and Sakovics
(2010), which characterizes the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a general class of
global games with heterogeneous agents, including mine.
Proof of Proposition 2 This result follows from Propositions 2 and 4 in Steiner and
Sakovics (2010). Their result relies on the same assumption used to prove the result in
Proposition 1 with the additional assumption that Bg and −Cg are Lipschitz continuous in
θ, which is clearly satisfied in my setup since Bg and −Cg do not depend on θ.
Proof of Proposition 3 Without CDSs, the incremental payoff of lenders of group g of
financing over not financing is Ug (rg) = (1− λ) rg − λL (a) − 1. The first order necessary
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conditions are
− (1− λ) βpR + µ1pR (1− λ) = 0, (D.1)
− (1− λ) (α− βpR) + µ2
(
α− βpR
1− β
)
(1− λ) = 0, (D.2)
− (1− λ) β (rR − rS) + µ1UR (rR)− µ2 β
1− βUS (rS) = 0, (D.3)
µ2
α− βpR
1− β US (rS) = 0, (D.4)
µ1pRUR (rR) = 0, (D.5)
µ1, µ2 ≥ 0. (D.6)
There are three cases to consider: pR = 0, pR =
α
β
, and 0 < pR <
pR
β
. If pR = 0, then D.2
implies µ2 > 0 and D.4 implies that US (rS) = 0⇒ rS = 1+λL(a)1−λ . If pR = αβ , then D.1 implies
UR (rR) = 0⇒ rR = 1+λL(a)1−λ . If 0 < pR < pRβ , then D.1 and D.2 imply µ1, µ2 > 0. Therefore,
D.4 and D.5 imply US (rS) = 0 ⇒ rS = 1+λL(a)1−λ and UR (rR) = 0 ⇒ rR = 1+λL(a)1−λ . All three
cases yield the same payoff to the borrower, which leads us to conclude that the optimal
repayment and financing probabilities are given by r∗ = 1+λL(a)
1−λ and (p
∗
R, p
∗
S) =
(
pR,
α−βpR
1−β
)
for pR ∈
[
0, α
β
]
.
Proof of Proposition 4 Let the function Q : {0, 1} × [0, 1] → R be such that Q (1, λ) =
W ∗∗ (λ) and Q (0, λ) = W ∗ (λ). This function has increasing differences in (γ, λ) if, for
λ′ > λ, it holds that
Q (1, λ′)−Q (0, λ′) ≥ Q (1, λ)−Q (0, λ) ,
which is equivalent to W ∗∗ (λ)−W ∗ (λ) being increasing in λ. From Milgron and Shannon
(1994) it is known that, if Q (γ, λ) has increasing differences in (γ, λ), then arg max
γ∈{0,1}
Q (γ, λ)
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is monotone non-decreasing in λ .
Let r∗∗ and r∗ be the average optimal repayment with and without CDSs, respectively.
Analogously, let µ∗∗R , µ
∗∗
S and µ
∗
R, µ
∗
S be the Lagrange multipliers with and without CDSs for
the constraints of risky and safe lenders. Let H ≡ H (r∗∗ (1− φ∗)) and h ≡ h (r∗∗ (1− φ∗)).
From the envelope theorem, at the optimum it holds that
∂W ∗∗ (λ)
∂λ
= − (y − r∗∗) +
∫ ∞
r∗∗(1−φ∗)
θh (θ) dθ − µ∗∗R pRA∗∗R (λ)− µ∗∗S
(
α− βpR
1− β
)
A∗∗S (λ) ,
∂W ∗ (λ)
∂λ
= − (y − r∗) +
∫ ∞
0
θh (θ) dθ − µ∗RpR [r∗R + L (a)]− µ∗S
(
α− βpR
1− β
)
[r∗S + L (a)] ,
where
A∗∗g (λ) = r
∗∗
g +
[
HLg
(a
λ
)
+ (1−H)L (a)
]
+λ
{
hr∗∗
∂φ∗
∂λ
[
L (a)− Lg
(a
λ
)]
−HL′g
(a
λ
) a
λ2
}
.
One can rewrite the first other conditions to show that µ∗∗g ≥ µ∗g. Since r∗∗ ≤ r∗ and
φ∗ = 1 if λ = 1, if follows that ∂W
∗∗(1)
∂λ
− ∂W ∗(1)
∂λ
≤ 0. Since φ∗ = 1 and r∗∗ = r∗ if λ = 0, it
follows that ∂W
∗∗(0)
∂λ
− ∂W ∗(0)
∂λ
≥ 0. Because ∂W ∗∗(λ)
∂λ
and ∂W
∗(λ)
∂λ
are continuous, there exists
λ ∈ [0, 1] such that ∂W ∗∗(λ)
∂λ
= ∂W
∗(λ)
∂λ
. In addition, because ∂W
∗∗(λ)
∂λ
is decreasing in λ, for
λ > λ, ∂W
∗∗(λ)
∂λ
< ∂W
∗(λ)
∂λ
and for λ < λ, ∂W
∗∗(λ)
∂λ
> ∂W
∗(λ)
∂λ
. Therefore, Q (γ, λ) has increasing
differences in (γ, λ) for λ < λ and decreasing if λ > λ, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5 The borrower’s problem is to maximize
Q (rR, rS, pR, λ) = (1− λ) (y − pRβrR − (α− βpR) rS) + λ
∫ ∞
[pRβrR+pS(1−β)rS ](1−φ∗)
θh (θ) dθ,
subject to a constraint set, which I call S. From Milgrom and Shannon (1994) we know that
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arg max
x∈X
f (x, t) is monotone non-decreasing in t if and only if f is quasisupermodular in x
and satisfies the single crossing property in (x; t). A sufficient condition for a function to be
quasisupermodular is for it to be supermodular. A twice continuously differentiable function
f is supermodular in x if and only if ∂
2f
xixj
for i 6= j.
It is easy to see that y−pRβrR− (α− βpR) rS is supermodular in (−rR, rS, pR). One can
also check that [pRβrR + pS (1− β) rS] (1− φ∗) is supermodular in (−rR, rS, pR). Since a
monotonic transformation of a quasisupermodular function is quasisupermodular, it follows
that ∫ ∞
[pRβrR+pS(1−β)rS ](1−φ∗)
θh (θ)
is quasisupermodular. For the same reason, because Q is the sum of two positive qua-
sisupermodular functions, it is also quasisupermodular. Finally, one can show that Q has
increasing differences in (−rR, rS, pR;−λ), which implies Q satisfies the single crossing prop-
erty in (−rR, rS, pR;−λ). Therefore, (−rR, rS, pR) is non-decreasing in −λ, which concludes
the proof.
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